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Addressing the Incoherency of
the Preemption
Provision of the Copyright Act of 1976
Joseph P. Bauer*
ABSTRACT
Section 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976 expressly preempts
state law actions that are within the "general scope of copyright" and
Ihat assert claims that are "equivalent to" the rights conferred by the
Act. The Act eliminated the previous system of common law copyright
for unpublished works, which had prevailed under the prior 1909
Copyright Act. By federalizing copyright law, the drafters of the
statute sought to achieve uniformity and to avoid the potential for state
protection of infinite duration.
The legislative history of § 301 stated that this preemption
provision was set forth "in the clearest and most unequivocal language
possible, so as to foreclose any conceivable misinterpretation... and to
avoid the development of any vague borderline between State and
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Federal protection." In fact, this goal has never been realized. Instead,
there are literally hundreds of federal and state decisions interpreting
this provision, which can charitably be described as inconsistent and
even incoherent. And, despite the plethora of court of appeals decisions
that have overruled district court decisions, and/or that have
contained strong dissenting opinions, the U.S. Supreme Court has
never decided a case under § 301. In short, it would not be an
overstatement to describe this important provision in the Copyright Act
as a "legislative failure."
This Article first reviews the background of the 1909 and 1976
Acts, including the rationales for copyright protection and the role
played by the preemption provision in advancing those goals. This
Article canvasses extensively the judicial treatment of § 301, including
detailed critiques of many of these decisions. This Article also
examines the constitutional aspects of preemption, including the role
played by the Supremacy Clause. Most importantly, this Article seeks
to provide ways to advance the original goal of the drafters of § 301, of
federalizing copyright law, and of affording consistent interpretation of
the preemption provisions. This Article continually returns to first
principles-the goals of the drafters-and uses them to argue for
expanded preemption of many state law claims.
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The legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 (the 1976
Act, the Copyright Act, or the Act) states that:
The intention of section 301 is to preempt and abolish any rights under the
common law or statutes of a State that are equivalent to copyright and that extend
to works coming within the scope of the Federal copyright law. The declaration of
this principle in section 301 is intended to be stated in the clearest and most
unequivocal language possible, so as to foreclose any conceivable misinterpretation
of its unqualified intention that Congress shall act preemptively, and to avoid the
development of any vague borderline areas between State and Federal protection. 
1
Boy, did they get it wrong! The authors of § 301 of the 1976 Act
2
asserted that they had drafted a provision, delineating the scope of the
displacement of state law by this new copyright statute, which would
afford predictability and certainty to the preemptive reach of the Act.
Instead, in the quarter-century-plus since the Act became effective in
1978,3 there have been literally hundreds of federal and state court
decisions in which courts have been required to apply and interpret
this statutory provision. The uncertainty about the scope of
preemption is highlighted not simply by these numbers, but by the
fact that, in particular, the appellate decisions have not infrequently
1. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 130 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5746 (emphasis added).
2. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2000)).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000) (specifying January 1, 1978, as the date on which the
statute's preemptive provisions begin to apply).
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overruled the trial court's conclusion on preemption, 4 and/or have
contained concurring and dissenting opinions on this supposedly
"clear" issue. 5
4. As examples of such decisions, see Toney v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905
(7th Cir. 2005); Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2004); Dunlap v.
G&L Holding Group, Inc., 381 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2004), amended by 400 F.3d 658 (9th
Cir. 2005); Carson v. Dynegy, Inc., 344 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 2003); Dun & Bradstreet
Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2002); Sturdza v.
United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch,
265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001); Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001);
Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 189 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc); Alcatel USA, Inc.
v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999); Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc.,
105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997); United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 104
F.3d 1453 (4th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Nat'l
Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993); G.S.
Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1992);
Valente-Kritzer Video v. Pinckney, 881 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1989); Acorn Structures, Inc. v.
Swantz, 846 F.2d 923 (4th Cir. 1988); Ehat v. Tanner, 780 F.2d 876 (10th Cir. 1985);
Kabehie v. Zoland, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (reversing as to certain
claims being preempted, affirming as to others); KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d
713 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Green v. Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 784 (Ind.
2002); Editorial Photocolor Archives, Inc. v. Granger Collection, 474 N.Y.S.2d 964 (N.Y.
1984).
There is not even any consistency to the direction of these reversals. In Toney, Dunlap,
Grosso, Carson, Dun & Bradstreet, Sturdza, Downing, Wrench, ProCD, National Car
Rental, G.S. Rasmussen, Valente-Kritzer, Acorn Structures, Kabehie, and KNB, the
appellate courts held that the lower courts had erred in concluding that the state law claim
was preempted; in the rest of the cases listed above, the appellate courts found error in not
applying preemption. Indeed, in Toney, the court of appeals had first affirmed the district
court's decision, 384 F.3d 486, 492 (7th Cir. 2004), and then, upon rehearing, the panel
vacated its original decision and reversed the district court, 406 F.3d at 907. See also
Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 301-07 (6th Cir. 2004) (concluding that
district court erred in finding that claim for misappropriation of trade secrets was
preempted, but affirming dismissal on other grounds); Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix
Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 309-10 (2d Cir. 2004) (affirming with respect to certain
preemption findings, and vacating and remanding other preemption findings); Rodrigue v.
Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 432, 442-43 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming district court's conclusion of no §
301 preemption, but reversing conclusion that federal law of ownership, under § 201,
overrides state law regarding community ownership of copyrights pursuant to "conflict
preemption" doctrine), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 905 (2001); Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., Inc.,
1 F.3d 225, 229 n.3 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming with respect to one preemption issue, but
stating that "the ruling of the district court that all of the state-law claims alleged by
[plaintiff] ... were preempted is obviously erroneous").
Perhaps most remarkably, in Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., the
district court first concluded that the plaintiffs state law claim was not preempted; after
the case was reassigned to another district court judge, that judge concluded that the claim
was preempted. 982 F.2d 693, 715-16 (2d Cir. 1992). On appeal, the Second Circuit initially
upheld the latter ruling, agreeing that the claim was preempted; however, upon rehearing,
that opinion was withdrawn and the court of appeals concluded that the claim was not
preempted. Id. at 716-17. So much for "foreclos[ing] any conceivable misinterpretation"!
5. See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1335-38 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (Dyk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the portion of the
majority opinion finding that the contract claim was not preempted); Foad Consulting
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Both the extent and the practical effect of the incoherency of
the preemption doctrine 6 are exacerbated by the fact that, while
federal courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over
copyright claims,7 it is the state courts that have primary jurisdiction
to hear state law claims. While these actions may often be brought in
federal court-either based on diversity of citizenship or as
supplemental to copyright claims also asserted by the plaintiff-a
large number of these potentially preempted claims are brought in the
state courts. Those courts have both less experience in applying a
federal statute like the Copyright Act and a diminished interest in
recognizing the primacy of a federal regime displacing state law.
These considerations, coupled with the significant divergence of
results that one would expect from courts in fifty different
jurisdictions and the lamentable fact that the Supreme Court has
never heard a case under § 301, either from a state or a federal court,
only contribute to the problem.
In Part I, this Article will review the situation under the prior
regime, established by the Copyright Act of 1909,8 which provided for
alternative state and then federal protection for copyrightable
materials, as well as the concerns that led Congress, in 1976, to opt for
virtually total displacement of state copyright protection. This Part
will then describe the justifications for affording copyright protection
for certain works of authorship, and the reasons for imposing limits on
that protection. This is followed by a discussion of the general
benefits from a single federal regime for determining copyright issues,
coupled with arguments for a robust preemption doctrine to foreclose
inconsistent state protection. In Part II, this Article will identify and
discuss the various elements found in § 301, as conditions for federal
preemption of state law. This Part will include a detailed analysis
and criticism of many of these cases applying and interpreting the
Group, Inc. v. Musil Govan Azzalino, 270 F.3d 821, 832, 834 (9th Cir. 2001) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring) (agreeing only with the result and characterizing the majority's preemption
analysis as incomplete); Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1285-88 (9th Cir. 1999)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with an order rejecting a suggestion for rehearing en
banc and sharply criticizing the panel's preemption analysis).
6. See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 917 (7th ed. 2006) ("One objective of
Congress in promulgating the new Copyright Act in 1976 was to clarify preemption
doctrine. Unfortunately . . . the 1976 Act has done little, if anything, to solve the
problem."); Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 199, 236 (2002) ("Overall, Section 301 is a legislative disaster. The current
interpretations of the section's language are both illogical and unsupportable.").
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
8. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, superseded by Copyright Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(2000)).
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statute. Part III of this Article will consider non-statutory, or conflict,
preemption, based on the inconsistency between state protection and
the goals of the federal copyright regime. Relying on the premise that
a more robust approach to preemption not only will fulfill the goals of
the drafters of the 1976 Act, 9 but indeed will advance the objectives for
a federal copyright regime contemplated by the Constitution, this
Article will conclude with some suggestions that, hopefully, will also
advance the other goal of the drafters of the 1976 Act-a statutory
provision which avoids, to the greatest extent possible, "vague
borderline areas."
I. INTRODUCTION
A. State and Federal Protection under the Copyright Act of 1909
Under the prior statute-the Copyright Act of 1909 (the 1909
Act)-copyright was characterized by a dual regime of alternative
state and then federal protection. The fundamental distinction was
between "unpublished" and "published" works. "Publication" was an
essential requirement for federal protection. 10 Before a work was
"published," it could be protected only by state law-usually referred
to as "common law copyright."" The term "publication" was not used
in the layman's sense, but rather was a term of art under copyright
law. It meant distribution of the work to the general public, although
the nature and extent of that dissemination was imprecise and
unpredictable. 12  As a practical matter, this meant that state
protection extended only to works that the author was not (yet)
exploiting commercially. No affirmative steps were needed to secure
common law copyright.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 23-27.
10. See Copyright Act of 1909 § 12.
11. See id. § 2 ("[Nlothing in this Act shall be construed to annul or limit the right
of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent
the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent, and to
obtain damages therefor." (emphasis added)).
12. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 130 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5746 ("With the development of the 20th-century communications revolution, the concept of
publication has become increasingly artificial and obscure. To cope with the legal
consequences of an established concept that has lost much of its meaning and justification,
the courts have given 'publication' a number of diverse interpretations, some of them
radically different. Not unexpectedly, the results in individual cases have become
unpredictable and often unfair.").
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After "publication," i.e., after the author undertook some form
of commercial distribution of his or her work, protection under state
law was no longer available. At that point, the copyright owner was
required to take several steps to obtain federal protection. These
steps-the principal ones of which were affixation of the specified
notice in a specified location on the work, 13 deposit of copies of the
work with the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress, 14 and
registration of the work' 5-were essential preconditions to obtaining
and retaining federal copyright protection. Failure to follow those
steps resulted in complete loss of any form of protection.
Under the 1909 Act, state and federal protection differed not
only in the nature of the works covered and the formalities required to
obtain protection, but also in the duration of protection. As long as
the work remained unpublished, and common law copyright,
therefore, still obtained, protection could be eternal. 16 On the other
hand, federal protection was afforded for an initial term of twenty-
eight years; 17 in the last year of that term, the copyright owner could
renew the copyright for another period of twenty-eight years.'8 Then,
after the expiration of federal copyright protection, anyone was free to
use the work without obtaining permission from, or paying royalties
to, the copyright owner.
B. Changes Effected by the Copyright Act of 1976
By contrast, § 301 of the present-day statute, the Copyright Act
of 1976,19 expressly preempts not only state (common law) copyright,
20
13. Id. § 9 (imposing a notice requirement); id. § 18 (specifying the content of
notice); id. § 19 (specifying the location of notice).
14. Id. §§ 12-13, 47.
15. Id. § 10 (permitting "registration of (a] claim to copyright by complying with the
provisions of this Act, including the deposit of copies" and the required notice).
16. Thus, for example, under the regime existing under the 1909 Act, if the diary of
a nineteenth century author, or that author's personal correspondence, had remained
private and "unpublished," it would continue to be entitled to common law copyright
protection even into the twenty-first century. See id. § 2. But see 17 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2000)
(providing that works created before January 1, 1978, but not in the public domain or
copyrighted on that date, have copyright protection of same duration as other works as
specified in § 302; term of copyright for works which were still unpublished on December
31, 2002 expired on that date; and previously unpublished works which were published by
December 31, 2002 have protection at least until 2047).
17. Copyright Act of 1909 § 23 ("[C]opyright... shall endure for twenty-eight years
from the date of first publication ... ").
18. See id. § 24 (permitting renewal of subsisting copyrights). If the copyright on
the work was not renewed in the last year of the first term, the work fell into the public
domain. Id.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 301.
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but also all other state law rights which are "equivalent to" the rights
afforded by the federal regime. 21 This preemption provision extends
even to state rights that conceptually are not usually intended to
protect traditional forms of "intellectual property," but rather arise
under tort, contract, or other bodies of law. Section 301(a) provides as
follows:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights [(1)] that are equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified in
section 106 [and (2)] in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of
expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections
102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or
unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is
entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common
law or statutes of any State.
22
The legislative history of § 301 sets forth a number of reasons
for the express preemption not only of common law copyright, but also
of other claims under state law that would be inconsistent with the
system created by the newly enacted (in 1976) federal law-a regime
that not only provides for the protection of certain copyrightable
materials, but that significantly also reflects a decision not to extend
or permit protection for certain other materials and activities. The
House Report on the bill that was eventually enacted offered four
"main arguments in favor of a single Federal system."23  It is
noteworthy that the first argument proffered, which referred to James
Madison's comments in the Federalist Papers, was the importance of
"promot[ing] national uniformity and . . . avoid[ing] the practical
difficulties of determining and enforcing an author's rights under the
differing laws and in the separate courts of the various States."24
The other three reasons given for displacement of state
protection were that (1) "[w]ith the development of the 20th-century
20. The chief exception to this assertion is that common law copyright continues to
survive for claims for infringement of a work which has not yet been "fixed in any tangible
medium of expression." See § 301(b)(1); infra Part II.B.2.
21. See infra Part II.A.2.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
23. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 129 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5745.
24. Id. (emphasis added). Congressional authority to preempt inconsistent state
protection was foreshadowed in a Supreme Court decision a few years prior to the passage
of the 1976 Act. In Goldstein v. California, the Court stated:
Where the need for free and unrestricted distribution of a writing is thought to
be required by the national interest, the Copyright Clause and the Commerce
Clause would allow Congress to eschew all protection. In such cases, a conflict
would develop if a State attempted to protect that which Congress intended to be
free from restraint or to free that which Congress had protected.
412 U.S. 546, 559 (1973).
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communications revolution, the concept of publication has become
increasingly artificial and obscure";25 (2) § 301 "would also implement
the 'limited times' provision of the Constitution, which has become
distorted under the traditional concept of 'publication,' [since]
[c]ommon law protection in 'unpublished' works is now perpetual";26
and (3) "[a]doption of a uniform national copyright system would
greatly improve international dealings in copyrighted material."27
Section 301 of the 1976 Act sets forth two conditions for
statutory preemption. To simplify this provision: The Act preempts
state law claims only if (1) the rights afforded under state law are
"equivalent to" the rights afforded to the owners of copyright under
the 1976 Act, and (2) the work of authorship is fixed in a tangible
medium of expression and the rights sought to be protected by state
law fall within the "subject matter" of copyright. 28 The first element
has been widely held, in turn, to require examination of whether the
state law claim requires proof of a qualitatively substantial "extra
element," beyond those required to establish a violation of copyright. 29
The largest number of cases considering the issue of statutory
preemption focus on the presence or absence of this "extra element."
C. Constitutional Preemption
Although § 301 is an explicit statutory source for preemption of
state law, it is certainly not the only such source. The federal
Constitution itself is obviously also an important basis for possible
preemption of a wide variety of forms of state protection, and was so
understood prior to the enactment of § 301.30 Therefore, quite apart
from the statutory command in § 301 of the 1976 Act, preemption may
also be mandated because state regulation is deemed inconsistent
with the goals, values, and policies reflected in the federal regime for
protecting (or not protecting) intellectual property.3
1
25. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 130, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5745.
26. Id., reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5746.
27. Id., reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5746.
28. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
29. For a discussion of this requirement, see infra Part II.A.2.
30. See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554-55 (1973) (recognizing
situations in which concurrent exercise of Federal and State copyright power presents not a
"mere possibility of inconvenience .... but an immediate constitutional repugnancy"); see
infra notes 71-72, 472 and accompanying text.
31. Preemption analysis involves a determination of the appropriate scope of
federal protection in the face of different or inconsistent state rights. By its terms, § 301
does not preempt the simultaneous or overlapping assertion of claims under the federal
trademark (or other) laws. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(d) ("Nothing in this title annuls or limits
20071
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Indeed, there are sound reasons for having a broader form of
constitutional preemption of state protection for copyright than in
other areas of the law. Unlike the bulk of federal legislation, which is
enacted pursuant to general constitutional authorization, such as the
Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause, there is
explicit constitutional authority for the enactment of the copyright
and patent laws. 32  This specific authority evidences not only a
recognition of the importance of promoting these forms of intellectual
property by affording them protection of limited duration, but also the
importance that the nature, scope, and duration of that protection be
controlled by federal law. Inconsistent or overlapping state law
protection for potentially patentable and copyrightable materials
would be particularly antithetical to these constitutionally-enunciated
goals, and thus, such attempted protection should be preempted even
in the absence of a specific statutory provision.
any rights or remedies under any other Federal statute."); see also CoStar Group Inc. v.
LoopNet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 712 (D. Md. 2001) ("[Tlhe Copyright Act, by its terms,
does not preempt plaintiffs Lanham Act claims."), aff'd, 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004);
Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, 124 F. Supp. 2d 836, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("In cases ... where
more than mere misappropriation is properly alleged, a Lanham Act claim is a viable
alternative to a copyright action."), aff'd sub nom. Stouffer v. ABC Corps., 93 F. App'x 332
(2d Cir. 2003); Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1056 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
("Plaintiffs complaint adequately alleges that defendants violated the Lanham Act by
bodily appropriating his [copyrighted] work."); Nash v. CBS, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 823, 831
(N.D. Ill. 1989) ("To the extent that [plaintiff] raises a Lanham Act claim ... we hold that it
is not preempted by § 301."), affd, 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir. 1990); Tracy v. Skate Key, Inc.,
697 F. Supp. 748, 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("Defendants' argument that the Lanham Act claim
is preempted is without merit."). In Salim v. Lee, the court rejected the argument that the
Lanham Act claims should be dismissed even though they were "identical to [the] copyright
claims." 202 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1128 (C.D. Cal. 2002). But see Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d
1353, 1364-65 (9th cir. 1990) ('We decline to expand the scope of the Lanham Act to cover
cases in which the Federal Copyright Act provides an adequate remedy.").
That understanding has at least been modestly undermined by the Supreme Court's
decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., which barred a Lanham Act
§ 43(a) reverse passing off claim, which asserted that the defendants had misrepresented
the "origin" of videotapes they offered for sale by failing to give credit to the plaintiffs as
the source of previously copyrighted audiovisual works that had fallen into the public
domain and that were subsequently included in those videotapes. 539 U.S. 23, 35-38
(2003); see also Mist-On Sys., Inc. v. Gilley's European Tan Spa, 303 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981
(W.D. Wis. 2002) ("Plaintiffs claim under the Lanham Act arises from the same conduct as
its copyright claim. In fact, it is a copyright infringement claim in disguise, and hence
preempted."). See generally Tom W. Bell, Misunderestimating Dastar: How the Supreme
Court Unwittingly Revolutionized Copyright Preemption, 65 MD. L. REV. 206 (2006)
(arguing that courts have misunderstood Dastar's holding and extended its intended
reach).
32. "The Congress shall have Power To ... promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
ADDRESSING THE INCOHERENCY
D. Rationales for Copyright Protection
Assessments about the proper scope of preemption of
inconsistent state protection for copyrightable materials are informed
by an understanding of the nature of the copyright regime. A
principal reason for affording copyright protection is to provide
incentives to engage in the creation of literary, musical, artistic,
audiovisual, and other kinds of works. L.
This objective is reflected in the preambular portion of the
Copyright Clause of the Constitution.33 It identifies the chief rationale
for affording copyright protection to authors: "To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts."34 This provision, which is the eighteenth-
century embodiment of classical economic principles, reflects the
assumption that according certain exclusive rights to authors-
although the exact scope of those rights is undefined in the
constitution and has varied (and been expanded over time) by
statute35-is a necessary and appropriate incentive to, and reward for,
the creation of literary and artistic works. However, it is important to
bear in mind that the real beneficiary of copyright protection is the
public, because the quality and quantity of society's cultural resources
are increased.36
Another rationale for affording copyright protection is based on
a combination of economic and artistic values, while also reflecting
certain natural law principles. To use the contemporary term, works
of authorship are identified as forms of "intellectual property."
Admittedly, both the means of creating copyrightable works and the
ways in which ownership of those works can be established differ
significantly from the creation and ownership of most other forms of
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8.
35. While finite, the duration of copyright has been frequently extended since the
first statute passed at the end of the eighteenth century-most recently by the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203, 301-304 (1998); see also Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199-205, 222 (2003) (rejecting challenge to constitutionality of
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, and reviewing history of extensions of
copyright duration).
36. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) ("The
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts."' (alteration in original)); Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The immediate effect of our copyright law is to
secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good."); see also Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 961 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("[C]opyright's basic objective is creation and its revenue objectives [are] but a
means to that end ....").
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property. However, the characterization of such works as "intellectual
property" has several implications.
First, the owner of any unit of property has the right, subject, of
course, to limitations based on supervening public and governmental
interests, to control its use; to exclude others from unauthorized use;
and to license, convey, or alienate it to others. Copyright law protects
those interests by setting forth minimal requirements for
establishment of copyright, 37 by identifying initial ownership of
works,38 by defining the exclusive rights of the copyright owner, 39 by
permitting transfer of those rights,40 and by affording remedies
against others who invade those rights.41 Second, the description of
these works as intellectual property not only recognizes that they
come into being as the result of human creativity, but also reflects the
recognition that the author has certain interests in the identity and
integrity of the work, and that these artistic interests may be
deserving of some protection, regardless of whether there are any
economic effects of the unauthorized use by others.
42
37. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2000) (defining the scope of subject matter for
original works, compilations, and derivative works).
38. See id. § 201(a) ("Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in
the author or authors of the work.").
39. See id. § 106 (defining copyright owner's "bundle of rights"); id. § 106A
(conferring certain rights of attribution and integrity).
40. See id. § 201(d) (permitting transfer "in whole or in part by any means of
conveyance or by operation of law").
41. See id. §§ 502-505 (providing remedies for infringement, including damages,
profits, injunctions, impoundment, costs, and attorney's fees).
42. These latter rights implicate both economic and non-economic interests. The
scope of protection afforded these interests by American law-which is less than that
afforded by many civil law systems-has been the subject of much controversy. See, e.g.,
Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A Comparative
Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (1997) (arguing for moral rights on the
ground that they are economically beneficial); Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral
Rights in Copyright, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795 (2001) (arguing for broader moral rights
for authors based on the value of the author's dignity); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use
Standard, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1105 (1990) (arguing against the judicial conversion of
American copyright law to create moral rights); Susan P. Liemer, Understanding Artists
Moral Rights: A Primer, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 41 (1998) (arguing for expanded moral
rights); Laura Nakashima, Comment, Visual Artists' Moral Rights in the United States: An
Analysis of the Overlooked Need for States to Take Action, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 203
(2000) (arguing for state action in favor of moral rights). While the 1976 Act, as enacted,
did not accord any "moral rights" to authors, some such limited rights have been extended
thereunder since 1990. See infra text accompanying notes 83-88.
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E. Preemption's Role in Advancing the Goals of the Copyright Regime
Because of these multiple underpinnings of the copyright
regime, a determination of the appropriate reach of the federal
copyright laws and of the counterpart displacement of state law
protection requires balancing a number of competing values and
interests. To be sure, both the author and society have interests in
the provision of some measure of copyright protection to works of
authorship. However, of course, the extent of those interests is
obviously not congruent. And, with respect to any work of authorship,
other (and perhaps overlapping) segments of society-those who want
to use copyrightable materials and those who would build upon them
to develop new works of authorship, and thus, who are also actual or
potential "authors"-have compelling reasons to want to limit the
scope of copyright protection.
These limitations are reflected in a number of ways. The
Copyright Clause extends exclusive rights only to "Authors," and
authorizes protection only "for limited Times."43 Various "creations"
-among the most prominent examples are ideas and facts gathered
through research-are beyond the scope of copyright protection.44
Section 107 of the Act codifies a long-understood common law
exception to the scope of copyright protection,45 by excluding from the
definition of infringement the "fair use" of a copyrighted work.46 The
1976 Act contains dozens of other express limitations on the rights of
the copyright owner. 47 The significance of these provisions is that, in
these and numerous other ways, first the drafters of the Copyright
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
44. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery ...."); see also Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 361-63 (1991) (denying copyright protection to names, addresses, and phone
numbers in telephone directory).
45. 17 U.S.C. § 107. The judicially created fair use doctrine has been recognized in
American law at least since Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No.
4901). As noted in the legislative history of the 1976 Act,
[t]he judicial doctrine of fair use, one of the most important and well established
limitations on the exclusive right of copyright owners, would be given express
statutory recognition for the first time .... [§] 107 is intended to restate the
present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any
way.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678-80.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 107 ("Notwithstanding the provisions of [§§] 106 and 106A, the fair
use of a copyrighted work ... is not an infringement of copyright." (emphasis added)).
Further discussion of the fair use doctrine is beyond the scope of this article.
47. See id. § 106 (making the grant of exclusive rights to copyright owners subject
to the limitations in §§ 107-122).
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Clause, and then the legislators who voted to pass the 1976 Copyright
Act, have made judgments about those works and the conduct of
others, for which protection should not be available. They did this
both by limiting the scope of potentially copyrightable works to which
protection should be extended and by narrowing the scope of
potentially exclusive rights which, in fact, have been given to the
owners of copyright
These constitutional and legislative judgments are reflective of
a balance. The- rights afforded recognize authors' interests in
protecting their works and in receiving rewards for their creations, as
well as society's interest in maximizing the creation of works. On the
other hand, the limitation on or exclusion of other rights not only
recognizes the public interest in permitting certain uses of works of
authorship even in the absence of authorization of or payment to the
copyright owner; they are also another means of promoting society's
parallel interest in expanding the creation of other, new works by
encouraging and protecting different authors. The extension of rights
under state law, beyond those provided for by the federal Copyright
Act, would distort that federally crafted balancing of interests.
48
F. Judicial Treatment of Preemption Issues
As noted above, § 301 of the 1976 Act sets forth two conditions
that must be satisfied before a state law claim is preempted.49
Although judicial application of this statutory test has yielded the
correct outcome in the majority of decisions, there have been a
significant number of occasions that have produced troublesome
results. While reported decisions have given far less attention to non-
statutory and constitutional preemption, some of the cases treating
this issue also have yielded problematic outcomes.
The imprecision in the scope of § 301 is undoubtedly the most
significant cause of this state of affairs. But these erroneous decisions
are also the product of two related occasional failures: a failure by the
courts to give full respect to Congress's stated purposes for the
48. An interesting question, but one that is beyond the scope of this Article, is
whether preemption is an affirmative defense which must be raised by the defendant, and
is waived if not asserted in a timely fashion, or whether a court must dismiss a particular
state claim as a matter of law because § 301 or the Constitution forecloses its assertion. I
would opt for the latter alternative; Congressional intent is flouted if such a state claim is
permitted, even if the defendant's failure to raise the question of preemption was the result
of carelessness or bad lawyering. But see DirectTV, Inc. v. Barrett, 311 F. Supp. 2d 1143,
1147 (D. Kan. 2004) (holding that preemption was waived by the untimely assertion of the
defense by a pro se defendant).
49. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a); see also supra text accompanying note 28.
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enactment of § 301 and their failure to consider fully the
incompatibility of these state law claims with the importance of
maintaining a consistent-and predominantly federal-system for
protecting (and, equally, for declining to protect) various forms of
intellectual property.
Proper attention to and correction of these failures will result
in greater preemption of state claims. It is the thesis of this Article
that this result will advance the goals both of the drafters of the 1976
Act and of the framers of the Constitution. In the next Part, this
Article will examine the various requirements for statutory
preemption. This will include consideration of case law, legislative
history, and other interpretative sources. Since subsequent
developments have revealed that the hopes of the drafters of the 1976
Act for clarity have not been realized, it would be the height of hubris
for me to suggest a "magic bullet" to achieve that hoped-for
consistency and predictability.
However, serious consideration of the goals that, in 1976,
animated the express displacement of state copyright protection and of
other related state law claims, by the insertion into the Act of an
explicit preemption provision, should prove helpful in guiding future
decision-makers as to the proper reach of state law. A better
appreciation of these goals, as well as of the policies that support,
alternatively, a greater or narrower scope of protection for
copyrightable or potentially copyrightable materials, will advance the
identification of some general principles for the determination of
whether a state law claim ought to be preempted by federal law.
As already noted, a major premise of this Article is that the
congressional determination, not only of the intellectual creations for
which copyright protection is available, but also those works for which
protection will not be available, and the legislative determination of
the scope of the rights available (and not available) to the copyright
owner, represent more than a judgment about the scope of federal
protection. Rather, the balances and compromises embodied in the
Act are a determination about the proper scope (and limits on that
scope) of copyright and quasi-copyright protection, which shall exist in
all courts in the United States, and under any legal theory, state as
well as federal. State law that purports to give different or greater
rights to creators and owners of this form of intellectual property is
inappropriate, and therefore, within the scope of the preemption
provision of the statute.
Finally, a determination of the appropriate scope of preemption
requires examination of sources in addition to § 301, particularly
Article I of the Constitution. Therefore, in Part III, this Article will
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also suggest that increased use of non-statutory preemption will
further advance the goal of achieving a uniform national system for
protecting the interests both of authors and of users of copyrighted
and copyrightable materials.
II. STATUTORY PREEMPTION
Section 301(a) of the 1976 Act contains two requirements for
statutory preemption of state law claims. 50 Breaking down these
requirements reveals that each, in turn, consists of two elements. The
first prong of the § 301(a) test is that the state right being displaced
must be (1) "equivalent to" any of the exclusive rights and (2) "within
the general scope of copyright," as provided in § 106 of the Act. The
second prong is that the work of authorship for which state protection
will be denied must be (1) "fixed in a tangible medium of expression,"
and (2) must "come within the subject matter of copyright as specified
in §§ 102 and 103."
Perhaps proceeding out of an excess of caution, the drafters of
the preemption provision also affirmatively indicated those types of
claims that would not be preempted.5 1  An examination of this
subsection reveals that several of those actions for which state
protection remains available are merely the mirror of the conditions
found in § 301(a). Section 301(b) provides:
Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common law
or statutes of any State with respect to -
(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of copyright as
specified by sections 102 and 103, including works of authorship not fixed in
any tangible medium of expression; or
50. The section states:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights [(1)] that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106 [and (2)] in works of authorship that are fixed in a
tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright
as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date
and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title.
Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such
work under the common law or statutes of any State.
17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
51. See id. § 301(b)(1)-(4). Canons of statutory construction normally adopt the
opposite presumption-that statutory provisions are not duplicative. See United States v.
Talebnejad, 460 F.3d 563, 568 (4th Cir. 2006), cert denied, Talebnejad v. United States, 127
S. Ct. 1313 (2007). However, this duplication is less problematic here, when the elements
in subsections 301(a) and (b) are complementary rather than inconsistent.
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(2) any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced before January 1,
1978;
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
section 106 .... 52
A. The First Prong of§ 301(a)
The first prong for statutory preemption, found in § 301(a),
consists of the "general scope of copyright" and "equivalence"
requirements. 53  As just noted, the reciprocal of this provision-
reiterating that a work not meeting these two requirements is not
preempted-is found in § 301(b)(3). I now turn to a detailed
examination of the inconsistent judicial treatment given to these
requirements.
Section 106 of the Copyright Act specifies the six exclusive
rights given to the owner of copyright 54-the so-called "bundle of
rights."55 These include (with respect to all kinds of works):56 the right
to reproduce (make copies of) the work;57 to prepare derivative works
based on the work;58 and to distribute copies of the work, by sale,
rental, lease, or lending.59 The Act also confers on the copyright owner
52. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1)-(3).
53. See id. § 301(a) (preempting "all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section
106").
54. As enacted in 1976, § 106 provided only for five such rights-the rights of
reproduction, adaptation, publication, performance, and display. Copyright Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 106, 90 Stat. 2541. The copyright owner's exclusive right to perform
copyrighted sound recordings by means of digital audio transmissions, found in 17 U.S.C. §
106(6), was added by the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub.
L. No. 104-39, § 2, 109 Stat. 336, 336.
55. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674.
These rights may be infinitely divided and owned, and may be transferred in whole or in
part. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d).
56. Section 102 now provides that "[w]orks of authorship include the following
[eight] categories." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). As enacted in 1976, there were seven such
categories. See Copyright Act of 1976 § 102. Protection for "architectural works" was added
by the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 703, 104 Stat.
5089, 5133 (1990) (codified in 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8)).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
58. Id. § 106(2). A "derivative work" is defined as a "work based upon one or more
preexisting works." Id. § 101.
59. Id. § 106(3). This right is conditioned by the "first sale" doctrine. See id. §
109(a). A person who acquires a lawfully made copy of a work is entitled to dispose of that
copy of the work without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner. Id.
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of certain forms of copyrightable works the exclusive right to perform
publicly and to display publicly those works.
60
There are numerous other rights that potentially might have
been conferred on a copyright owner, but which do not fall within
these specified, statutorily granted exclusive rights. One kind of
potential, but "non-conferred," right is a performance right for sound
recordings. 61 Additional "non-conferred" rights, and perhaps the most
important, are the full range of droits moral (moral rights).62 Yet
another "non-conferred" right would be one by the creator of an
artistic work to collect a portion of the increase in the value of the
work upon its resale-droit de suite (resale royalty right). Although
the case law has resulted in somewhat inconsistent treatment
regarding the preemption of those rights, state claims for these kinds
of rights are unavailable in most situations. This is because § 301
preempts not only those rights that are conferred by § 106, but also
those other rights that fall within the "general scope" of those rights.
This phrase also has been interpreted to include those rights that are
analogous to the § 106 rights, and protection for which could have
been, but was not, afforded by the copyright statutes.63
Preemption also extends only to those legal or equitable rights
that are "equivalent to" these § 106 rights. The facts supporting the
state right, and whether those facts would also give rise to an action
under federal law, are not determinative of "equivalence." Instead,
the vast majority of cases have, in turn, inquired into the legal
60. Id. § 106(4)-(5). The right to perform the work publicly extends only to "literary,
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other
audiovisual works." Id. § 106(4). In particular, there are no public performance rights with
respect to sound recordings, see id. § 114(a), with the exception of the recently created right
in § 106(6) with respect to performances by means of a digital audio transmission. See
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, § 2, 109
Stat. 336, 336 (codified in 17 U.S.C. § 106(6)). The right to display the work publicly
extends only to "literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
pictorial, graphic or sculptural works." 17 U.S.C. § 106(5). Even with respect to covered
works, the public display right is limited by § 109(c), which allows the owner of a lawfully
made copy "to display that copy publicly ... to viewers present at the place where the copy
is located." Id. § 109(c).
61. See infra Part II.A.l.a.
62. Among the "moral rights" recognized under many civil law regimes are the
right of attribution and the right to prevent the alteration, mutilation, or destruction of the
work. See Lee, supra note 42, at 802. Since the passage of the Visual Artists Rights Act of
1990, American law has afforded limited rights of attribution, and certain rights to prevent
such change or destruction of the work, to certain authors of certain specified works. See
Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 603, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128-29 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000)).
63. See, e.g., Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 659 (4th Cir.
1993) (noting that, if the rights plaintiff "seeks to protect are 'equivalent' to the exclusive
rights reserved to the owner of a copyright," the "cause of action.., is preempted.")
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elements necessary to make out the state claim,64 and have found an
absence of "equivalence" if (and only if) the state law requires an
additional or "extra" element.
65
1. Claims within the "General Scope of Copyright"
The first prong of § 301 preempts only those state claims that
are within the "general scope of copyright as specified in section 106."
This includes not only those rights specifically provided for in that
latter section, but also some rights which might have been, but that
were not, in fact, granted by the Copyright Act.
a. Sound Recordings
Sound recordings are the "works that result from the fixation of
a series of musical, spoken or other sounds,"66 as opposed to the music
or words themselves. 67 They are typically reproduced in such formats
as vinyl records, cassettes, CDs, or DVDs, which are "copies" of the
underlying sound recordings. Copyright protection for sound
recordings has had a special history. Until it was amended in 1971,68
the 1909 Act omitted protection for unauthorized reproduction of
sound recordings. Although the underlying musical or literary works
contained in those recordings may well have been subject to copyright
protection,69 so-called "record piracy" was rampant. In response, a
number of states passed legislation either permitting civil actions
64. See id. ('To determine whether a particular cause of action involves rights
equivalent to those set forth in § 106, the elements of the causes of action should be
compared, not the facts pled to prove them.").
65. This requirement is discussed in detail below. See infra Part II.A.2. An example
of such an additional element would be the requirement(s) in an action for improper use of
trade secrets that the plaintiff prove the extension of information in confidence and/or the
defendant's breach of an obligation of trust.
66. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
67. These are respectively musical works or literary works. See id. § 102(a)(1)-(2).
68. See Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (effective Feb. 15,
1972).
69. Older music-particularly classical music-was more likely to be in the public
domain, so that the unauthorized copying of a sound recording of a symphony written by
Beethoven, and performed and recorded by the New York Philharmonic Orchestra, would
have been unactionable by anyone under the copyright laws. See e.g., Metro. Opera Ass'n
v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950) (enjoining
defendant from making and selling phonographic records, based on its unauthorized
copying of plaintiffs live broadcasts of operas), affld, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (N.Y. App. Div.
1951).
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against or even criminalizing that conduct; 70 yet, other states allowed
claims against copying under the judicially-created misappropriation
theory.71 The vitality of these actions under state law was recognized
in a 1973 decision, Goldstein v. California, in which the Supreme
Court rejected the defendant's argument that such state protection
was preempted either expressly by the U.S. Constitution or impliedly
by principles of federalism.
72
Federal protection against unauthorized reproduction of sound
recordings is expressly provided for in the 1976 Act. 73 The Act also
gives the owner of copyright in a musical or literary work the
exclusive right to control the public performance of that work.
74
Copyright theory provides no a priori reason to deny the owner of
copyright in a sound recording the right to control the public
performance of that work; indeed, the decision whether to grant that
right was extensively debated in Congress. At the end of the day,
however, the 1976 Act withholds that right. 75 In fact, not only is this
performance right not listed in the grant of exclusive rights found in §
106,76 the Act expressly states that no such right shall exist.77 While a
70. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h (West 1999) (originally enacted Act of July
16, 1968, ch. 585, § 1, 1968 Cal. Stat. 1256); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 5670-5671 (McKinney
1968). See generally Ira M. Pesserilo, State Anti-sound Piracy Laws and a Proposed Model
Statute: A Time to Consolidate the Victories against Sound Piracy, 8 PERF. ARTS REV. 1
(1978) (arguing for a uniform law consistent with the 1976 Act that would protect pre-1972
sound recordings against piracy).
71. See, e.g., Mercury Record Prods., Inc. v. Econ. Consultants, Inc., 218 N.W.2d
705, 712 (Wis. 1974) (upholding claim for record and tape piracy).
72. 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973). Obviously, because the 1909 Act had no express
preemption as is found in § 301 of the 1976 Act, Goldstein did not present issues of
statutory preemption.
73. "Sound recordings" are included in the listing of "works of authorship" in 17
U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (2000). Section 106(1) gives to the owner of copyright the exclusive right
to "reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords." Id. § 106(1).
74. "IT]he owner of copyright.., has the exclusive right[] ... in the case of literary,
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other
audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly .... Id. § 106(4).
75. The controversial nature of this decision is emphasized by the fact that the Act
required the Register of Copyrights first to consult with industry members and public
representatives on this issue and then, on January 3, 1978, to submit to Congress "a report
setting forth recommendations as to whether this section should be amended to provide for
performers and copyright owners ... any performance rights"' in such material. H.R. REP.
NO. 94-1476, at 106 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5721 (alteration in
original); see 17 U.S.C. § 114(a).
76. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
77. "The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording are limited
to the rights specified by clauses (1), (2), (3) and (6) of section 106, and do not include any
right of performance under section 106(4)." Id. § 114(a).
The cumulative significance of these provisions is as follows: the composer of a song (a
"musical work") has the exclusive right to make copies of that song, to perform the work
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limited form of performance right in sound recordings was
subsequently granted in 1995 for performances by means of digital
audio transmission, 78 the broader denial of such a right under the
Copyright Act for the performance of sound recordings remains the
rule today.
The one exception found in § 301, which reserves state
protection for certain sound recordings-presumably including the
right of performance-is for sound recordings fixed before the 1972
effective date of the 1972 amendments to the 1909 Act,7 9 which had
expanded the right of reproduction to include those works. As to those
earlier works, state law protection will be available until 2067.80
However, state protection for public performance of any post-1972
sound recording, which falls within the protection of the 1976 Act,
must be preempted.81  The contrary result-permitting the states to
publicly, and to license others to make sound recordings of that work. That sound recording
will typically consist of the musical work, as performed by a vocalist and/or a band.
Although the owner of the copyright in the sound recording, in turn, has the exclusive right
to reproduce and distribute that work, the reproduction and distribution of the sound
recording is also a reproduction and distribution of the underlying musical work. Thus,
that copyright owner, in obtaining a license from the composer (or his/her assignee) to fix
the work in a sound recording, will also have to obtain permission to engage in
reproduction and distribution of the underlying musical work.
The performance of a sound recording-for example, by playing it in a restaurant or
nightclub or by transmitting it over the radio-is also the performance of the underlying
musical work embodied in the sound recording. The present-day significance of the
statutory withholding of a public performance right in the sound recording is that while a
radio station must obtain permission from the composer (or hisher assignee) to play the
song (and will pay royalties, typically through a performing society to which the composer
belongs), the radio station needs no permission from (and pays no royalties to) the
recording artist or the owner of copyright in the sound recording.
78. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39,
§ 2, 109 Stat. 336, 336 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106(6)).
79. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c).
80. Id. The choice of 2067 as the date for the termination of possible rights under
state law was to give a maximum duration for protection of those works of ninety-five
years-the present term for copyright of "works made for hire." Id. § 302(c); see Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 372 F.3d 471, 477-79 (2d Cir. 2004) (recognizing that
common law copyright claims are not preempted with respect to sound recordings fixed
prior to Feb. 15, 1972, and that the availability and scope of the remedy depend solely on
applicable state law).
81. As early as 1965, the Register of Copyrights asserted that such preemption
would be the result of the proposed legislation which eventually became the Copyright Act
of 1976. "The pre-emption is intended to be complete with respect to any work coming
within the scope of the bill, even though it would not be given as broad protection as might
otherwise be available to it under the common law. For example, since sound recordings
are now to be made copyrightable works, it would not be possible to afford them any rights
of public performance under State law even though they are denied these rights under
section 112 [(eventually § 114(a))] of the statute." H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH
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afford a right that has been expressly withheld by federal law-would
interfere with the balance of interests between creators of these works
and users thereof that was struck by Congress in 1976.82
b. Moral Rights
Although some European systems afford relatively broad rights
of attribution and integrity-so-called "moral rights"-to the authors
of certain literary and artistic works, historically, the American legal
system has declined to extend similar rights.83  For purposes of
CONG., SUPPLEMENTARY REGISTER'S REPORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW 84 (Comm. Print 1965).
A related issue-whether state protection is available under a right of publicity theory
against "sound-alike" versions of the performances of famous actors or vocal artists-is
discussed infra at notes 332-337 and the accompanying text.
82. Professor Goldstein asserts that it is not clear whether § 301 "would treat a
state law as coming within the general scope of copyright if instead of filling a gap in the
scope of a statutory right ... it grants a right that section 106 entirely withholds." PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, 3 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 17.2.1.1, at 17:10 (3d ed. 2005). He uses the
denial of performance rights to sound recordings as an example of such withholding, and
sets forth the plausible opposing conclusions one might draw from the statutory language.
Id. The argument offered for non-preemption is "the fact that the Act omits a right against
non-digital performance of sound recordings may mean that state laws against such
performances are immune from preemption since a right that does not exist-a non-digital
performance right in sound recordings-cannot be said to have a 'general scope."' Id.
As discussed below, courts have taken an expansive approach both to the "subject
matter of copyright" prong in § 301 and to the "scope" prong at issue here. See infra notes
196, 404, 416-420, 425-428 and accompanying text. Thus, for example, although ideas are
not protected, or protectable, under the Copyright Act, they are nonetheless within the
"subject matter" of copyright for purposes of § 301. It is fully consistent with that approach
to statutory construction to bring performance rights to sound recordings within the
general "scope" of copyright protection. And that interpretation is also fully consistent with
the policies of § 301, paramount of which is the development of a single and uniform
approach to the nature and extent of "copyright" protection.
Indeed, Professor Goldstein acknowledges:
The "general scope of copyright" means the full scope that Congress could have
described for any particular right .... While the [hypothetical] state law right
[affording a performance right in sound recordings] would be broader than the
statutory right [in § 106(4)], it would fall within the general ambit of the
performance right and thus be subject to preemption.
GOLDSTEIN, supra § 17:2.1.1, at 17:9-10 (emphasis added).
83. The range of moral rights may include (1) a right of "integrity," i.e., a right to
prevent alteration, distortion or destruction of the work; (2) a right of "paternity," i.e., a
right to be identified as the author of the work; (3) a right of "disclosure," i.e., a right to
control the timing and nature of the work's initial publication; and (4) a right of
"withdrawal," i.e., a right to withdraw, modify or disavow the work after its publication.
See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 82, § 17.23, at 17:200. See generally Thomas F. Cotter,
Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1997); Edward J. Damich,
State "Moral Rights" Statutes: An Analysis and Critique, 13 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 291
(1989); Jane C. Ginsburg, Have Moral Rights Come of (Digital) Age in the United States?,
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determining the proper scope of preemption, it is important to stress
that this more limited conferral of rights is not simply the product of
inaction, inertia, or indifference. Rather, the congressional failure to
accord that same broader range of moral rights represents affirmative
legislative and societal judgments about the nature of music,
literature, and the arts; about the relationship of the author to his or
her work; and, indeed, about the nature and purpose of copyright.
The 1976 Act made, at best, only limited provisions for the
federal protection of moral rights.8 4 In 1990, the Act was amended by
the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA)8 5 to afford certain limited rights
of attribution and integrity under federal law for certain works
8 6
19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 9 (2001); Robert A. Gorman, Federal Moral Rights
Legislation: The Need for Caution, 14 NOVA L. REV. 421 (1990); Liemer, supra note 42.
84. There are a handful of rights under § 106 which are analogous to some of these
moral rights. The closest is the copyright owner's exclusive rights of publication and
distribution, including when and where those occur, which are analogous to the exclusive
right of "disclosure." See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 552 (1985) (noting that 1976 Act "recognized for the first time a distinct statutory
right of first publication"). The copyright owner's exclusive right under § 106(2) to prepare
derivative works is analogous in some aspects to the right of integrity. There are fewer
analogies under the Copyright Act to the other two moral rights. And, it is noteworthy that
all of the exclusive rights under § 106 belong to the copyright owner-who is not
necessarily the author. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act has also been used to afford federal protection-under
a trademark theory-which is similar to some elements of moral rights. 17 U.S.C. §
1115(a); see, e.g., Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (recognizing
that a claim for deformation or mutilation of a work was akin to "the continental concept of
droit moral, or moral right").
85. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 603, 104 Stat. 5089,
5128-30 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A).
86. VARA extends protection only to a "work of visual art," which is defined, with
various additional exceptions, to include only paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, or
photographs produced in limited editions. See 17 U.S.C. § 101; see infra note 95 and
accompanying text (identifying the more prominent examples of the non-covered works).
Perhaps the most important transformation that is outside the protection of VARA (and
of existing state law) is the colorization of black and white motion picture films. Since the
copyright in a film is typically not owned by the director or actors, they typically will be
unable to rely on traditional copyright theories to challenge those alterations. See generally
Lawrence Adam Beyer, Intentionalism, Art, and the Suppression of Innovation: Film
Colorization and the Philosophy of Moral Rights, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 1011 (1988) (discussing
the right of integrity's possible impact on culture and innovation); David A. Honicky, Film
Labelling As a Cure for Colorization [and Other Alterations]: A Band-Aid for a Hatchet Job,
12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 409 (1994) (discussing film alteration techniques and their
relationship to copyright law); Anne Marie Cook, Note, The Colorization of Black and White
Films: An Example of the Lack of Substantive Protection for Art in the United States, 63
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 309 (1988) (recommending additional legislative protection for black
and white films); Craig A. Wagner, Note, Motion Picture Colorization, Authenticity, and the
Elusive Moral Right, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 628 (1989) (arguing that cinematic works and
authors do not receive adequate protection under the current laws).
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created by certain authors.8 7  Although VARA, or subsequent
legislation, obviously could have been more generous in extending
moral rights, the present-day state of the law is that American moral
rights doctrine remains considerably more limited than its European
counterpart.
88
As discussed below, § 301 not only preempts state claims for
those rights that have, in fact, been recognized by federal law, but also
preempts alternate claims for any of the rights that fall "within the
general scope of copyright."8 9 Because of the broad reading given to
that language, the first part of the initial prong of the statutory
provision is satisfied with respect to moral rights. It normally would
follow that the congressional decision-identifying and balancing
available moral rights, as well as the circumstances under which they
are not available-would preclude states from recognizing moral
rights extending beyond the range both of these federally granted and
withheld rights.
Although this Article generally calls for a presumption in favor
of an expansive approach to preemption, a number of considerations-
both statutory and policy-based-dictate that not all state causes of
action, either recognizing moral rights or rights which are analogous
to moral rights, ought to be preempted. First, as required by the
second half of the first statutory prong of § 301(a), preemption will
occur only with respect to claims that are "equivalent to" any of the
87. For example, VARA does not extend protection to "works made for hire." 17
U.S.C. § 101 (excluding such works from definition of "work of visual art").
88. The rights under § 106A are more limited than those afforded to artists under
certain European regimes in a number of other ways. For example, the American rights
belong only to the author, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (providing that rights may not be
transferred), and it endures only for his or her life, id. § 106A(d)(1). Some European
systems, including those of France and Germany, allow that right to be exercised by the
author's heirs and make it perpetual. The French Moral Rights Law, Law No. 92-597 of
July, 1992, art. 121, Journal Officiel de la R6publique Frangaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of
France], July 3, 1992, p. 8801, which addresses moral rights, is discussed and analyzed in
Andr6 Lucas & Pascal Kamina, France, in PAUL E. GELLER & MELVILLE NIMMER, 2
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE §7[4] (2006). The German Moral Rights
Law, Gesetz iber Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [UrhG] [Copyright Law of
Sept. 9, 1965], Sept. 9, 1965, BGB1. I at 2098, § 4 (F.R.G.), is discussed and analyzed in
Adolf Dietz, Germany, in id. § 7[4]. Again, in contrast to the French and German approach,
which makes the right non-waivable, the right conferred by VARA may be waived by the
author by an instrument in writing. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1). And, while some European
systems protect works even if created by persons in an employee status, VARA excludes
"works made for hire" from the scope of its protection. Id. § 101. See generally Gerald
Dworkin, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Common Law Countries, 19
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 229 (1995); Vera Zlatarski, "Moral" Rights and Other Moral Interests:
Public Art Law in France, Russia, and the United States, 23 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 201
(1999).
89. See infra Part II.A.2.
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exclusive rights conferred by the Act. Many moral rights differ
meaningfully from copyright claims, and therefore, fall short of that
"equivalence." Second, VARA contains its own preemption provision,
specifically exempting certain claims by creators of works of visual art
from federal preemption. 90  This would suggest a congressional
decision to permit a broader range of state claims in this area. Third,
the United States may well be dependent on state law to fulfill its
obligations under the Berne Convention to afford some measure of
protection to certain moral rights.91
The significance of the "equivalent rights" requirement for
statutory preemption of any state law claim, including one for alleged
violation of moral rights, is discussed in more detail below. 92 As will
be seen, most courts have employed an "extra element" test to
determine equivalence. Since many state claims akin to moral rights
genuinely require proof of an extra element not needed to make out a
claim for copyright infringement, it is appropriate that those claims
should fall outside the preemptive provisions of the Act.
The other two considerations also dictate caution in finding too
expansive a preemption of state-based moral rights claims. As just
noted, VARA has its own preemption provision, § 301(f), which has
similarities to the general copyright preemption provision in § 301(a),
but which, in a few respects, goes beyond that general provision.
Section 301(f) provides that all rights that are "equivalent to any of
the rights" granted by VARA, with respect to those "works of visual
art" for which VARA confers rights, are to be governed exclusively by
VARA, and protection under state law for those claims is foreclosed. 93
However, this provision not only keeps state-based causes of action
that violate rights that are "not equivalent" to rights conferred by
VARA outside its preemptive scope. In addition, claims that arose
90. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(2)(A)-(C). See generally Joseph Zuber, The Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990-What It Does, and What it Preempts, 23 PAC. L. J. 445 (1992).
91. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris
Act of July 24, 1971, as amended on Sept. 28, 1979, 25 U.S.T. 1341 [hereinafter Berne
Convention], is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101 as "the Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, signed at Berne, Switzerland, on September 9, 1886, and all acts,
protocols, and revisions thereto."
92. See infra Part II.B.2.
93. Section 301(f)(1) states in full:
[AIll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the rights conferred by
section 106A with respect to works of visual art to which the rights conferred by
section 106A apply are governed exclusively by section 106A and section 113(d)
and the provisions of this title relating to such sections. Thereafter, no person is
entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any work of visual art under the
common law or statutes of any State.
17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(1).
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from conduct before the statute's effective date and causes of action
that extend protection beyond the life of the author are also expressly
not preempted.94 And, of course, § 301(f) is inapplicable to the larger
body of "works" not falling within one of the categories of a "work of
visual art."
95
In fact, prior to the passage of VARA, a number of states had
enacted statutes that provided various kinds of moral rights to
creators of works of fine arts.96 The two most important of these are
the California Art Preservation Act 97 and the New York Artists'
Authorship Rights Act; 98 the statutes of nine other states follow one or
the other of these models.99 These statutes vary in a number of
details, 100 with California's Act giving a somewhat broader range of
rights to those artists than New York's. Specifically, the California
Act makes it unlawful to deface, mutilate, alter, or destroy a work of
94. See id. § 301(f)(2)(A),(C). Federal protection under VARA terminates with the
author's death. Id. § 106A(d)(1). State law may extend its protection for an indefinite
period beyond the end of the author's life-in theory, even beyond the life plus seventy
years period provided for in § 302(a) for the bundle of rights recognized by § 106. At least to
this extent, the uniformity goal of the basic preemption provision is compromised.
95. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 21 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915,
6931 ("[T]he new Federal law will not preempt State causes of action relating to works that
are not covered by the law, such as audiovisual works, photographs produced for non-
exhibition purposes, and works in which the copyright has been transferred before the
effective date.").
96. Although the works protected by these statutes varies, they generally apply to
the same kinds of "works of visual arts" as those covered by VARA. See supra text
accompanying notes 84, 93.
97. CAL. CIV. CODE. § 987 (West 2007) (effective Jan. 1, 1980).
98. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 11.01, 14.01-.03 (McKinney Supp. 2007)
(effective Dec. 31, 1984). See generally Edward J. Damich, The New York Artists'
Authorship Rights Act: A Comparative Critique, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1733 (1984) (comparing
New York's statute with similar legislation in California and France).
99. Statutes which follow the California model include CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§
42-116s to t (West 2000); MASS. GEN. ANN. LAWS, ch. 231, § 85S (West 2000); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-4B-1 to -3 (LexisNexis 2004); and 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2101-2110 (West
1993). Statutes which follow the New York model include LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2151
to :2156 (West 2003); 27 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
597.720-.760 (LexisNexis 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24A-1 to -8 (West 2000); and R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 5-62-2 to -6 (2004). Another group of states have enacted legislation,
conferring a variety of an even more limited range of rights on creators of works of visual
arts. See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 320/0.01-8 (West 1999) (granting artists rights in
context of consignment to art dealers); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 1-22-9 to -17 (2005 & Supp.
2007) (preserving certain rights for artists whose works are purchased with state money
and displayed in public buildings); UTAH CODE ANN. § 9-6-409 (2003) (granting rights with
respect to commissioned works of art).
100. For example, while some of the statutes, such as California's, require that the
work be one of "recognized quality," that requirement is absent in other statutes. CAL. CIV.
CODE. § 987(b)(2).
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fine art, either intentionally or, in certain cases, by gross
negligence.101
By contrast, the New York Act only makes it unlawful to
knowingly display publicly, publish, or reproduce a work of fine art "in
an altered, defaced, mutilated or modified form,"10 2 and then only "if
the work is displayed, published or reproduced as being the work of
the artist, or under circumstances under which it would reasonably be
regarded as being the work of the artist, and damage to the artist's
reputation is reasonably likely to result therefrom."10 3 Therefore, the
New York Act would not prohibit the complete destruction and the
subsequent removal of such works; nor would it reach the mutilation
or alteration of a work if done with appropriate notice and disclaimer.
In addition, both statutes also contain provisions dealing with the
artist's right of attribution: both the right to claim authorship and the
right, "for just and valid reason," to disclaim authorship of the work. 104
In sum, although there is some variation between these statutory
approaches to protecting artists' moral rights, it is clear that there is
significant overlap between the protection given to works of fine art by
these two types of state statutes and by the federal VARA.
As noted, § 301(f) has a similar preemptive reach as the basic
preemption provision in § 301(a). 105 The goal of both provisions is to
achieve uniformity between state and federal law. Therefore, to the
extent that VARA occupies the area by affording certain moral rights
for specified works of the visual arts, the differing, additional measure
of protection that these state laws purport to extend must be
foreclosed. As with the preemption of other state legislative or
common law causes of action, these state laws are no longer permitted
to grant "equivalent rights"'106 to those conferred by VARA. 10 7
101. Id. § 987(c). Like VARA, the Act does not apply to works made for hire, see id. §
987(a), (b)(1), (b)(7), and it also has special provisions for works of art which cannot be
removed from a building without substantial physical defacement or alteration. See id. §
987(h).
102. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(1).
103. Id.
104. CAL. CIV. CODE. § 987(d); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(2)(a).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 90, 93-95.
106. The meaning of "equivalent rights" under 17 U.S.C. § 301(f) raises the same
kinds of problems in this context as are discussed more generally in this Article. See infra
Part II.A.2.
107. For example, VARA gives to the author of a work of visual art the right to
"prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which
would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation." 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2000).
Therefore, although that conduct is also proscribed by the California statute (and under
certain circumstances also by the New York statute), see supra notes 101-103, because of §
301(f), any cause of action by a living author, challenging such distortion or mutilation of a
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A handful of cases, applying pre-VARA law, incorrectly held
that claims under the New York statute were not preempted.108 More
work of visual art created after 1990, would have to be asserted only under the federal
statute. However, because the rights created by VARA endure only for the life of the
author, id. § 106A(d)(1), claims for such distortion or mutilation occurring after his or her
death could be asserted under state law. See id. § 301(f)(2)(C); see also Robert A. Gorman,
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 38 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 233, 240 (1991) (noting
that VARA "is not an unmixed blessing for artists," since it will preempt some broader
rights previously extant under state laws).
108. In Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, a professional artist complained that
the defendant had, without his authorization, copied and distributed fragments of his
works. 745 F. Supp. 130, 132-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). He brought an action under the 1976 Act
and under the New York statute (his state law theory was that the alteration and
distribution of his work injured his reputation). See id. at 139. The court recognized that
the copyright claim was shielded by the fair use doctrine. Id. at 142-43. However, the court
nonetheless allowed his action under New York law to proceed, rejecting the defendant's
preemption argument because the aim of the New York statute-the protection of the
artist's reputation-and its elements were different. Id. at 135. As to the latter, the court
pointed to the statutory requirement that the work must be altered or modified, that this
modification must be attributed to the artist, and that this conduct must damage his
reputation. Id. at 135-36.
There is little authority for looking to the "aim" of the drafters of a state statute for
evaluating the scope of preemption. And, as discussed below, it is not enough, to avoid
preemption, merely to point to one or more additional, but perhaps trivial, elements. See
infra Part II.A.2.a. Those elements must change the nature of the action, so that it is
qualitatively different from a copyright infringement action. See supra text accompanying
note 148. Here, the gravamen of the plaintiffs complaint, plain and simple, was the
violation of the copyright owner's exclusive rights of reproduction, transformation, and
distribution, which are at the heart of a copyright infringement claim. The court erred in
concluding that the state claim was not preempted, since the congressional determination
that federal law should not afford the copyright owner a claim with respect to this alleged
infringement was frustrated by allowing a cause of action under state law for the self-same
conduct.
The court further erred by relying on the preemption provision (§ 301(f)) in VARA,
which at that point had been passed by the House but had not yet been acted upon by the
Senate, as "demonstrating that Congress does not currently view the various state 'moral
rights' laws, including New York's, as preempted by the Copyright Act." Id. at 136 n.2.
Indeed, regardless of VARA, those state laws, or at least portions thereof, must be
preempted if they fall within the conditions specified in § 301(a).
In Pavia v. 1120 Avenue of the Americas Associates, a well-known sculptor brought an
action, under the New York statute, for the unauthorized modification and display of his
multi-part sculpture, growing out of the defendant's disassembly and then re-installation of
a part of the sculpture in a different location. 901 F. Supp. 620, 623-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
Because the challenged conduct occurred before the effective date of VARA, the court,
relying on § 301(f)(2)(A), correctly rejected the defendant's preemption argument under
VARA. Id. at 626-27. Relying on Wojnarowicz, the court reached a more questionable
conclusion that the New York statute, § 14.03, was not preempted by § 301(a), adding that
"the fact that VARA was eventually added to the Copyright Code, granting authors rights
similar to those provided in § 14.03, indicates that the rights granted by § 14.03 are not
equivalent to those in the pre-VARA Code." Id. at 627. Once again, the court reached the
wrong conclusion on § 301(a) preemption because it failed to discuss, much less properly to
weigh, the factors set forth in that provision. See also Schatt v. Curtis Mgmt. Group, Inc.,
764 F. Supp. 902, 911 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (following Wojnarowicz); Roberta Rosenthal
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recent cases have recognized that VARA probably has resulted in the
preemption of these state laws.1 09 However, in any event, even if it
were decided that a state cause of action for infringement of a visual
artist's moral rights did not fall within § 301(f), that conclusion ought
not to preclude preemption under the general provision of § 301(a). 110
Kwall, How Fine Arts Fares Post VARA, 1 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (1997)
("[Tihose state provisions that provide more comprehensive protection to works covered by
VARA probably would be deemed preempted by VARA, although the possibility exists that
courts would sever the preempted provisions and uphold the remainder of the state
statutes.").
109. See, e.g., Cort v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Cos., 311 F.3d 979, 984 n.1 (9th
Cir. 2002) ("It appears that [the California Art Preservation Act] may have been
preempted by VARA."); Bd. of Managers of Soho Int'l Arts Condo. v. City of New York, No.
01 CV 1226 DAB, 2003 WL 21403333, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2003) ("VARA pre-empts
the [New York] state statute."); Lubner v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24, 28 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1996) (asserting, as one ground for dismissing action for accidental destruction of
works of art, that "it appears that [§] 987 [of the California Civil Code] has been preempted
by the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990"); see also Pavia, 901 F. Supp. at 627 (recognizing
possibility that "VARA has preempted [N.Y. Act] § 14.03 since the effective date of the
federal legislation"); Wojnarowicz, 745 F. Supp. at 135 n.2 (noting that the then-pending
VARA bill "would arguably preempt state laws such as the New York Artists' Authorship
Rights Act which currently provide similar rights"). But see 136 CONG. REC. H13,314 (daily
ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) ("This . . . amendment narrows the
scope of the general preemption language. It clarifies that Congress does not intend to
preempt section 989 of the California Civil Code, the 'cultural heritage protection,' or any
other similar State code.").
In Gegenhuber v. Hystopolis Productions, Inc., the plaintiffs brought an action in state
court, premised, inter alia, on a state-based right of attribution for their role in creating,
designing, and directing a puppet show for adults. No. 92 C 1055, 1992 WL 168836, at *1-2
(N.D. Ill. July 13, 1992). The defendant removed to district court on the ground that their
claim was based on federal copyright law, and thus, the state claim was preempted. Id. at
*2. The court initially concluded that puppets and costumes were not "works of visual art"
under VARA, and that "if a type of work is not included in the definition of 'visual art,' the
copyright laws afford an author no entitlement to attribution, even where the author's
work may otherwise be copyrightable." Id. at *3. The court then held that the claim was
not preempted by § 301, because the "[p]laintiffs' claimed right of attribution ... [did] not
fall under VARA and thus not within the subject matter of copyright." Id. at *4.
110. See Kwall, supra note 108, at 44 ("[Sjtate created moral rights statutes covering
non-VARA copyrightable works face a strong possibility of preemption by virtue of [§ 301(a)
of] the 1976 Act."). In Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., for example, the district court
held-without ever mentioning the possibility of preemption-that, although the plaintiff
had no claim under VARA for the removal by the defendant of some of his sculptures from
its park, the plaintiff nonetheless could assert a claim for that same alleged injury under
the Massachusetts Art Preservation Act ("MAPA"). 288 F. Supp. 2d 89, 92-93 (D. Mass.
2003), certifying questions to 819 N.E.2d 579 (Mass. 2004), affld, 459 F.3d 128 (1st Cir.
2006). The court acknowledged that the intended removal of those sculptures fell within
VARA's "public presentation" exclusion in § 106A(c)(2)-a provision that the court noted
was the product of a widely publicized dispute. Id. at 99-100. But, after reciting that MAPA
"provides broader protection to artists than the federal statute," id. at 100, the court
granted preliminary injunctive relief to the plaintiff under state law, apparently oblivious
to the fact that § 301 might pose an obstacle.
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Nonetheless, I believe that the preemption of state moral rights
claims ought not to be as broad as for causes of action seeking relief
for injuries of a more traditional copyright nature. Under the regime
that prevailed under the 1909 Act, common law copyright was, for the
most part, parallel to federal protection-it was principally available
for works only prior to their "publication." '111 By contrast, some forms
of state protection for moral rights were and are supplemental to
federal protection-they afford rights that are simply not available
under present-day federal law.
112
Moral rights obviously might be claimed for a variety of
works-both for "works of the visual arts" under VARA and for other
works. But, the fact that VARA expressly declined to preempt certain
moral rights not extended by that statute for works of the visual
arts,11 3 with the knowledge of existing state law protection for certain
moral rights, indicates a congressional decision to permit continued
state protection of those rights. In addition, because of the similarity
of the language in subsections 301(a) and (f), it is certainly arguable
that the inclusion of this limited preemption provision in VARA
represents a larger congressional recognition of the continued
desirability and importance of some state protection for moral rights
for all types of "works."
As a third consideration, a preference for a more limited
preemption of state-based moral rights claims is also counseled by
American obligations under the Berne Convention.11 4  This
multilateral convention adopts a "national treatment" approach,
imposing a duty on the United States, as a signatory state, to accord
the same rights to nationals of other member states as are given to its
own nationals.11 5 The Convention also imposes certain minimum
obligations with respect to the copyright rights that must be afforded
by the United States to nationals of all signatory states. Among these
After both parties filed interlocutory appeals, the district court certified the scope of
protection afforded to the plaintiffs work by MAPA to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court. See Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 132 (1st Cir. 2006). After
the Massachusetts court concluded that MAPA did not extend to site-specific works such as
the plaintiff's, the district court vacated its preliminary injunction. Id.(citing Phillips v.
Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 819 N.E.2d 579, 585-86 (Mass. 2004)).
111. See supra Part I.A.
112. Cf. Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal
System of Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945, 972 (1990)
(arguing for narrower scope of preemption so as to permit continued reliance on the
broader state moral rights statutes); Nakashima, supra note 42, at 215-16.
113. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(2)(B) (2000); supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
114. Berne Convention, supra note 91.
115. Id. at art. 5.
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provisions, Article 6bis of the Convention specifically requires the
recognition of certain moral rights. 116
In the late 1980s, when Congress was considering whether to
ratify the Berne Convention, the nature and extent of American
compliance with this obligation was one of the key subjects of
discussion and debate. 117 Although it is questionable whether the
then-existing combination of federal and state moral rights laws was
indeed sufficient to satisfy this responsibility, both the text of the
Berne Implementation Amendments and the legislative history
recognized the need to satisfy it, and clearly indicate a reliance on this
combination to support the conclusion that the United States had, in
fact, met its treaty obligations. 118 A more expansive approach to the
116. Article 6bis(1) of the Berne Convention provides:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and
to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his
honor or reputation.
Id. at art. 6bis.
117. "Article 6bis of Berne has generated one of the biggest controversies
surrounding United States adherence to Berne." H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 32 (1988).
118. The recognition of this obligation, and the affirmation of the belief that the
existing combined body of state and federal laws was sufficient to meet it, were made
explicit in several provisions of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853. Section 2(3) of that Act provides that "[tihe amendments made
by this Act, together with the law as it exists on the date of the enactment of this Act
[October 31, 1988], satisfy the obligations of the United States in adhering to the Berne
Convention and no further rights or interests shall be recognized or created for that
purpose." Id. § 2(3), 102 Stat. at 2853. Section 3(a) of the Act provides that "[tihe provisions
of the Berne Convention-(1) shall be given effect under title 17, as amended by this Act,
and any other relevant provision of Federal or State law, including the common law." Id. §
3(a), 102 Stat. at 2853 (emphasis added). Section 3(b) of the Act reads:
(b) The provisions of the Berne Convention, the adherence of the United States
thereto, and satisfaction of United States obligations thereunder, do not expand
or reduce any right of an author of a work, whether claimed under Federal, State,
or the common law-
(1) to claim authorship of the work; or
(2) to object to distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other
derogatory action in relation to the work, that would prejudice the author's
honor or reputation.
Id. § 3(b), 102 Stat. at 2953-54 (emphasis added).
Recognition of the importance of state law in fulfilling this obligation is elaborated in
the legislative history. For example, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Report states:
"[P]rotection is provided under existing U.S. law for the rights of authors listed in Article
6bis . . . .This existing U.S. law includes . ..various state statutes, and common law
principles such as libel, defamation, misrepresentation, and unfair competition ...." S.
REP. No. 100-352, at 9 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706, 3714. Similarly, the
House Committee on the Judiciary Report pointed to a variety of state laws which afforded
some measure of protection for moral rights: "[s]tate and local laws include those relating
to publicity, contractual violations, fraud and misrepresentation, unfair competition,
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preemption of those state-based causes of action for moral rights
would be directly inconsistent with this recognition of the importance
of state law in fulfilling our international obligations. Indeed, any
significant post-accession restriction on state protection for moral
rights would make it even more doubtful that the United States is in
full compliance with its obligations under the Berne Convention.
The Berne Amendments also added a subsection to § 301 of the
Copyright Act, indicating that American adherence to the Convention
would not affect the basic scope of preemption of state law. 119
Although Congress concluded that the Berne Convention's inclusion of
moral rights among those rights which must be afforded by member
states did not require any expansion of those rights beyond existing
federal or state law, 120 § 301 also furnishes no basis for either
contracting those rights previously available under state law or for
restricting a natural expansion of state-based rights that are
consistent with those pre-1988 norms. 121  This combination of
historical coexistence and international comity point to a broader
allowance of state-based moral rights claims, and thus, a narrower
range of preemption, than for state claims that abut the economically-
grounded interests traditionally protected by copyright.
c. Resale Royalty Rights
Another right recognized under certain European systems is
the so-called droit de suite, or resale royalty right.1 22 This "right"
defamation, and invasion of privacy. In addition, eight states have recently enacted specific
statutes protecting the rights of integrity and paternity in certain works of art." H.R. REP.
No. 100-609, at 34.
119. "The scope of Federal preemption under this section is not affected by the
adherence of the United States to the Berne Convention or the satisfaction of obligations of
the United States thereunder." 17 U.S.C. § 301(e) (2000); see H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 39
("[T]his amendment [adding § 301(e)] once again reinforces the neutrality of the
implementing legislation: adherence to Berne, and the satisfaction of our obligations under
the Convention, will have no effect on the law of preemption under section 301."); accord S.
REP. NO. 100-352, at 11, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3716.
120. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
121. Indeed, Congress apparently intended that this development of state law would
continue unaffected by the Berne Convention. For example, the Senate Judiciary
Committee Report states: "Courts should be as free to apply common law principles and to
interpret statutory provisions, with respect to claims of the right of paternity and the right
of integrity as they would be in the absence of U.S. adherence to Berne." S. REP. NO. 100-
352, at 10, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3715; accord H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 40.
122. Although the droit de suite is sometimes described as a "moral right," it is in
fact at best only "quasi-moral." While moral rights recognize artistic and reputational,
rather than economic, interests, resale royalty rights are designed solely to increase the
economic rewards to the creators of certain artistic works. The Berne Convention provides
for the droit de suite. See Berne Convention, supra note 91, at art. 14ter(1). However, in
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affords to the artist, sculptor, or creator of other works of fine art a
portion of the appreciation in the value of the work of art, from the
time of its original sale to its subsequent resale.1 23 The right is
predicated in part on the principle that this appreciation is usually, at
least to some degree, attributable to the artist's subsequent efforts
and growing fame. 124 The 1976 Act, however, does not provide such a
right. Although the bills that eventually led to the enactment of
VARA in 1990 originally contained provisions providing for the
creation of a federal droit de suite,1 25 Congress eventually opted
against the addition of a resale royalty right, and, instead, settled for
the inclusion in VARA of a provision calling for a study, by the
Copyright Office, of the feasibility of implementing such a right.
126
contrast to Article 6bis, which makes it mandatory for all signatory states to afford
protection to moral rights, see supra note 116 and accompanying text, the Convention
provides that "protection [for the droit de suite] ... may be claimed in a country of the
Union only if legislation in the country to which the author belongs so permits, and to the
extent permitted by the country where this protection is claimed." Berne, supra note 91, at
art. 14ter(2). Notwithstanding the apparently permissive nature of this obligation,
Professor Nimmer asserts that "[t]he question remains whether a country may permit no
recognition of the droit de suite and still comply with Berne." 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8C.04[A] [2] (2007).
123. See John Henry Merryman, The Wrath of Robert Rauschenberg, 40 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 241 (1992). For a further discussion of whether droit de suite is
compatible with American copyright law, see generally Eliott C. Alderman, Resale
Royalties in the United States for Fine Visual Artists: An Alien Concept, 40 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC y U.S.A. 265, 268-72 (1992); Monroe E. Price, Government Policy and Economic
Security for Artists: The Case of the Droit de Suite, 77 YALE L.J. 1333 (1968); Neil F. Siegel,
The Resale Royalty Provisions of the Visual Artists Rights Act: Their History and Theory, 93
DICK. L. REV. 1 (1988); Michael B: Reddy, The Droit de Suite: Why American Fine Artists
Should Have the Right to a Resale Royalty, 15 LOy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 509 (1995).
124. See Alderman, supra note 123, at 271. Other possible reasons for the
appreciation in value are that the artist may originally have undervalued the work or may
have lacked the financial wherewithal to bargain for its full value. Different treatment is
arguably justified for works of fine art for another reason-they are created singly or in
limited numbers, and there may be little value in the subsequent right of reproduction,
performance, or creation of a derivative work of such works. One characteristic giving value
to a painting or sculpture is its uniqueness, and this value may be realized only from
ownership or sale of the original copy. By comparison, the author of a literary work or the
composer of a musical work may reap benefits from the reproduction and distribution of his
or her work even years after its creation, and perhaps in different media, and he or she
may also gain economic benefits from its performance or reworking.
125. See H.R. 3221, 100th Cong. § 3(2)(d)(1) (1990); S. 1619, 100th Cong. § 3(2)(d)(1)
(1990); see also Shira Perlmutter, Resale Royalties for Artists: An Analysis of the Register of
Copyrights' Report, 40 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 284, 285, 285 n.ll (1992) (noting that
legislative proposals to afford a federal droit de suite date to the 1960s, and that the first
bill to attempt to create such a right was introduced in Congress in 1978).
126. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 608(b), 104 Stat.
5089, 5132; see also H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 23 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6933 (describing resale royalty as "a controversial provision, which was not included
in [the enacted bill]. Instead, the Committee [on the Judiciary] believes that the Congress
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Furthermore, this right appears to fly in the face of the "first sale"
doctrine found in the 1976 Act, which gives to the owner of a lawfully
made copy of a work the apparently unconditional right, "without the
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the
possession of that copy or phonorecord.
127
In fact, protection of such a right at the state level has been
afforded only by a single state.1 28 In 1976, California enacted the
Resale Royalties Act, 129 which confers such rights on creators of works
of fine arts. 130 In the only decision to consider the validity of the
California statute, Morseburg v. Balyon, the Ninth Circuit rejected a
challenge to the California Act. 131 However, that case only analyzed
possible preemption under the 1909 Act and the U.S. Constitution. 13 2
should await the results of the Copyright Office study before deciding whether any such
provision is appropriate.").
The Report required by the statute was issued in 1992. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DROIT DE SUITE: THE ARTIST'S RESALE ROYALTY (1992) [hereinafter
REPORT]. Its conclusion stated that "the Copyright Office is not persuaded that sufficient
economic and copyright policy justification exists to establish droit de suite in the United
States." Id. at 149. See generally Perlmutter, supra note 125, at 313 (canvassing arguments
for and against enactment of the federal statute and concluding that Report was "unduly
negative").
127. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000). While admittedly the obligation of the reseller to pay
a resale royalty does not prevent a sale which the "first sale" permits, the requirement
created by state law, to share a portion of the resale price with the creator of the work,
diminishes the value of the unrestricted resale right conferred by federal law.
128. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West 2007). The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico also
provides for resale royalties under the Intellectual Property Act of July 15, 1988, P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 31, § 1401h (1993). Droit de suite legislation has been unsuccessfully introduced in
at least eleven other state legislatures. See REPORT, supra note 126, at 75.
129. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986.
130. The California Act applies only to sales of works of fine arts, where the gross
sales price is in excess of $1000. See id. § 986(b)(2). It also applies only where either "the
seller resides in California or where the sale takes place in California," id. § 986(a); and
where the artist is either an American citizen or has resided in California for at least two
years. Id. § 986(c)(1). For these covered transactions, the seller must pay five percent of the
sales price to the buyer (and not just the appreciation in value of the work), id. § 986(a),
except where the sales price is less than the purchase price paid by the seller. Id. §
986(b)(4). Although as originally enacted the resale right terminated on the artist's death,
id. § 986(b)(3), the Act was subsequently amended to extend these rights for twenty years
beyond the life of an artist who died after January 1, 1983, id. § 986(a)(7).
The Puerto Rico statute, which is far less detailed than California's, provides that the
creator of "a work of art is entitled to receive five (5) percent of the increase in the value of
said work at the moment it is resold." P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31, § 1401h.
131. 621 F.2d 972, 974-75 (9th Cir. 1980).
132. See id. at 976-78 (rejecting the arguments that the California statute was
inconsistent with the balance of interests, and federal v. state protection thereof, reflected
in the Copyright Clause, and was also preempted by the Contracts Clause and the Due
Process provisions of the U.S. Constitution). Because the California Act became effective on
January 1, 1977, and the sale in question occurred in March, 1977, the Copyright Act of
2007] ADDRESSING THE INCOHERENCY
Regardless of whether Morseburg correctly decided the challenges to
the California Act on those two bases, 133 the inclusion of a specific
preemption provision and of the first sale doctrine in the 1976 Act134-
and Congress's subsequent "affirmative inaction" in failing to create a
federal resale royalty right135-show that the California statute
certainly ought to be preempted by § 301.
As with moral rights,1 36 a resale royalty right is "within the
general scope of copyright" and is a right that could be conferred on
the owner of a copyright under the copyright statutes. And, because it
reallocates the balance between the author and subsequent
purchasers of the distribution right established by the Copyright
Act,137 it involves rights that are "equivalent to," albeit not identical
to, the rights conferred by § 106 of the Act. 138 Thus, while there may
be sound policy arguments for affording such a right to creators of
works of the fine arts, this is a decision that should be made by
Congress, to achieve uniformity throughout the United States.1 39
1976 was not implicated, since the effective date of that statute was January 1, 1978. Id. at
974 n.1, 975, 975 n.2.
133. Two cases that cited Morseburg v. Baylon have hinted that subsequent events
may have undermined the court's analysis of the validity of the California Resale Royalties
Act. See Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971, 992 n.36
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (noting that the Supreme Court had recently held that "even in the area of
domestic relations, which 'belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the
United States .... [sic],' a state's community property laws must give way to federal law"
(alteration in original) (citing McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), quoting In re
Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890)), rev'd on other grounds, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982);
Robert H. Jacobs, Inc. v. Westoaks Realtors, Inc., 205 Cal. Rptr. 620, 625 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) (noting Professor Nimmer's argument "that the Resale Royalties Act is also
preempted by the 1976 Copyright Act").
134. The Morseburg court explicitly noted that "[w]e do not consider the extent to
which the 1976 Act . . . may have preempted the California Act .... [O]ur holding, as well
as our reasons, . . . are addressed to the 1909 Act only." 621 F.2d at 975.
135. The House Report on VARA indicated that the new preemption provision
therein, § 301(f), would not foreclose a claim for resale royalties. "[T]he law will not
preempt a cause of action ... for a violation of a right to a resale royalty." H.R. REP. No.
101-514, at 21 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6931. However, since this
statement was made without providing any analysis or citing any authority, it should at
most apply only to preemption under § 301(f), and it should not foreclose a court from
finding such a claim preempted by the general provision in § 301(a).
136. See supra Part II.A.1.b.
137. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2000).
138. Section 109(a) explicitly recites that the "first sale" limitation is an exception to
the exclusive rights conferred by § 106(3). Id. § 109(a).
139. At present, California is the only state affording such a right. See supra notes
128-134 and accompanying text. The lack of national uniformity would be accentuated by
multiple state laws, varying in the percentage amount of the royalty, the duration of the
right, the works to which it applied, and so forth. The fact that, at present, only one state
has such a statute heightens the incentives for Californians to engage in behavior to avoid
this obligation.
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Until the 1976 Act is amended to create a droit de suite, the absence of
such a federal right should foreclose the recognition of a similar right
under state law.
140
2. State Claims Must be "Equivalent To" Federal Rights
Section 301 preempts state claims that are "equivalent to" the
rights within the general scope of copyright. This requirement has
proven to be the most frequent source of difficulty for the courts in
interpreting and applying § 301. The variety of state law theories
asserted to prosecute claims for infringement of various forms of
intellectual property is in part a testimony to the versatility and
creativity of the legal profession.141 These claims have varied sources,
drawing on the full range of contract, tort, and property law.
1 42
140. A number of commentators have concluded that state resale royalty protection
is preempted by the 1976 Act. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 122, § 8C.04[C][1];
Gordon P. Katz, Copyright Preemption Under the Copyright Act of 1976: The Case of Droit
de Suite, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 200, 219-22 (1978); Lynn K. Warren, Comment, Droit de
Suite: Only Congress Can Grant Royalty Protection for Artists, 9 PEPP. L. REV. 111, 127-29
(1981); see also Lewis D. Solomon & Linda V. Gill, Commentary, Federal and State Resale
Royalty Legislation: 'What Hath Art Wrought?," 26 UCLA L. REV. 322, 340 (1978) ("While
the Morseburg court chose to ignore the preemption implications of the new Act, the
argument for a future contrary holding is appealing."). Indeed, the Register's Study
reached a similar conclusion: "[t]he Thornburg court's analysis together with the view of
copyright experts firmly suggest that any state droit de suite provision would be preempted
under the current Copyright Law." REPORT, supra note 126, at 86 (citing Associated Film
Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa. 1981)).
141. See, e.g., Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest River Housing, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 865,
871-75 (N.D. Ind. 2007) (holding that certain aspects of claims for conversion, theft of trade
secrets, tortious interference with contractual relations and with prospective business
advantage, and unfair competition were preempted, while other aspects of those claims
were not preempted); Price v. Fox Entm't Group, Inc. 473 F. Supp. 2d 446, 453, 460-61
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (concluding, in an action complaining of failure to treat a plaintiff as a co-
author and to account to him for profits, that claims for breach of contract, conversion,
conspiracy to commit conversion, and misappropriation were preempted, but that a claim
for quantum meruit was not preempted); Blue Nile, Inc. v. Ice.com, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d
1240, 1246-52 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (holding, in an action alleging infringement of the 'look
and feel" of a website, that claims for unfair competition, unjust enrichment, restitution,
and violation of state consumer protection act were preempted); McArdle v. Mattel Inc., 456
F. Supp. 2d 769, 776-79 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (holding, in an action by the author of a book
complaining that a toy manufacturer used his ideas, materials, and creative expressions to
create a line of toys, that claims for unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and
misappropriation were preempted, while claims for breach of contract, fraud, and negligent
misrepresentation were not); Chalfant v. Tubb, 453 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1318-21 (N.D. Okla.
2006) (finding, in an action by authors of a screenplay against a film maker, no preemption
of claims for unfair competition, unfair trade practices, fraud, constructive fraud, deceit,
breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, but preempting a claim for tortious interference
with prospective economic advantage); A Slice of Pie Prods., LLC v. Wayans Bros. Entm't,
392 F. Supp. 2d 297, 314-17 (D. Conn. 2005) (finding, in an action by the owner of a
copyright in a screenplay alleging that a motion picture producer incorporated elements of
ADDRESSING THE INCOHERENCY
The House Committee version of the bill that finally became
the 1976 Act actually had a listing of various state law theories that
would not be preempted. These included "rights against
misappropriation not equivalent to any of such exclusive rights,
breaches of contract, breaches of trust, trespass, conversion, invasion
of privacy, defamation, and deceptive trade practices such as passing
off and false representation."' 143  However, these examples were
removed from the version of the preemption provision that ultimately
became law. 144  One conclusion that may be drawn from this
legislative history is that these listed examples were deemed
superfluous, and their deletion did not change the congressional
objective that they not be preempted. An alternative interpretation is
that Congress did not want to resolve these questions conclusively,
perhaps because the content of these claims might vary from state to
state, and perhaps because the elements of at least some of these
the screenplay into a film, that claims for unfair competition, passing off, idea
misappropriation, and conversion were preempted); Hustlers, Inc. v. Thomasson, 253 F.
Supp. 2d 1285, 1292-94 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (concluding that claims for breach of contract,
unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and promissory estoppel were not
preempted); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't., Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 552,
555, 563-70 (D. N.J. 2002) (holding, in a dispute over motion picture advertising trailers
asserting claims for unfair competition, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion,
and replevin, that only the unjust enrichment claim was preempted), aff'd, 342 F.3d 191
(3d Cir. 2003); CoStar Group Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 692, 712-15 (D. Md.
2001) (holding, in an action asserting copyright infringement for unauthorized use of
plaintiffs photographs and claims for unfair competition, unjust enrichment, reverse
passing off, and intentional interference with existing and prospective business
relationships, that all of these claims were preempted, but that claims for Lanham Act
violations and trade secret misappropriation were not preempted), aff'd, 373 F.3d 544 (4th
Cir. 2004); Archie Comic Publ'ns, Inc. v. DeCarlo, 141 F. Supp. 2d 428, 429, 431-32
(S.D.N.Y.) (dismissing counterclaims for unfair competition, misappropriation, conversion,
and unjust enrichment, growing out of alleged interests in copyrighted cartoon figures),
aff'd, 11 F. App'x 26 (2d Cir. 2001); Am. Movie Classics Co. v. Turner Entm't Co., 922 F.
Supp. 926, 929, 931-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (concluding, in an action asserting two counts of
copyright infringement based on a defendant's unauthorized broadcasting of motion
pictures during the time period when a plaintiff had exclusive exhibition rights, that the
state claims for breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, unfair competition
through misappropriation of plaintiffs property interests, and unjust enrichment were
preempted).
142. Cf. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 2d
1291, 1295-96, 1303-04 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (holding that state regulation of wagering on horse
races that were simulcast from an out-of-state racetrack was not preempted, since controls
on wagering did not regulate "rights equivalent to a copyright"), aff'd, 479 F.3d 1310 (11th
Cir. 2007).
143. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 24 (1976).
144. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 301(b)(3), 90 Stat. 2541, 2572
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) (2000)); see also 122 CONG. REC. 32,015 (1976)
(reporting on the vote to remove specific state law examples from § 301(b) and related
discussions).
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claims were thought to be still in a state of evolution. Under either of
these alternatives, this listing is at least helpful in delineating the
types of claims which are unaffected by § 301.145 Another, although
considerably less likely, possibility is that, by omitting these
examples, Congress intended that all of the previously listed examples
would be preempted.14
6
a. "Extra Element" Test
In determining whether various state law claims are
''equivalent" to any of the rights within the general scope of copyright,
courts have usually resorted to the "extra element" test: Does
successful invocation of the asserted claim require proof of an
additional legal element? 147 Or, on the other hand, does the state
claim merely restate the elements of a copyright claim in a different
guise?
The Sixth Circuit has provided a useful formulation of this
frequently invoked test:
Equivalency exists if the right defined by state law may be abridged by an act
which in and of itself would infringe one of the exclusive rights. Conversely, if an
extra element is required instead of or in addition to the acts of reproduction,
performance, distribution or display in order to constitute a state-created cause of
action, there is no preemption, provided that the extra element changes the nature
of the action so that it is qualitatively different from a copyright infringement
claim.
1 4 8
In short, the plaintiffs claim must contain a meaningful additional
element, rather than merely an allegation such as the defendant's
awareness of the plaintiffs rights or claims or intent by the defendant
145. In the legislative history to the Visual Artists Rights Act, passed fourteen years
after the Copyright Act of 1976, the House Report stated that "[sitate law causes of action
such as those for misappropriation, unfair competition, breach of contract, and deceptive
trade practices, are not currently preempted under section 301, and they will not be
preempted under the proposed law." H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 21 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6931.
146. But see National Car Rental System v. Computer Associations International,
Inc., where the court asserted:
Although the deletion of a provision from a final bill generally means that
Congress intends to disavow what was formerly expressed, we believe in this
case the facts surrounding the deletion of § 301(b)(3) suggest Congress did not
intend to reverse the presumption of non-preemption for the examples initially
included in § 301(b)(3).
991 F.2d 426, 433 (8th Cir. 1993).
147. See Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 287 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that most
circuits have adopted this test, but also noting that the test "has received much criticism").
148. Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 456 (6th Cir. 2001) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
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to deprive the plaintiff of some allegedly protected right. 149 The "extra
element" is also not supplied by the fact that state law affords
different relief for the unlawful conduct.
50
In invoking the extra element test to determine "equivalence,"
courts are faithful to the congressional understanding of the statutory
language.151 Moreover, as a matter of policy, this test makes sense, for
it reflects the understanding that "equivalent to" is not synonymous
with "identical to." Congress's enactment of § 301 evidenced its desire
to make the federal laws the exclusive basis for determining rights,
defenses, and remedies between copyright claimants and others.
Therefore, under this approach, courts are required to determine
whether there truly are meaningful differences between the state
claim and rights created by the federal copyright laws. However, as
discussed in the balance of this portion of this Article, judicial
application of the test to the large number and variety of claims has
given rise to a host of interesting, controversial, oftentimes troubling,
and, not surprisingly, inconsistent decisions.
b. Claims Typically Not Preempted
Actions for breach of an express contract (other than one
merely promising not to engage in behavior constituting copyright
infringement), conversion of a copy of a work, breach of fiduciary duty,
fraud, breach of a confidential relationship (including misuse of
information which may constitute a trade secret), defamation, and
theft of trade secrets are some examples of situations in which the
state claim most likely would not be preempted. Each of these actions
usually requires proof of one or more important elements that are
qualitatively different than those needed to prove an infringement of
the rights conferred by the Copyright Act. For example, an action for
breach of contract requires proof of some agreement between the
parties and consideration for the reciprocal promises; 152 an action for
149. See Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 306 (2d Cir. 2004)
(noting that the proper approach was "a restrictive view of what extra elements transform
an otherwise equivalent claim into one that is qualitatively different from a copyright
infringement claim").
150. See Henry v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 147 F. Supp. 2d 16, 23 (D. Mass. 2001)
(preemption was not avoided by the availability of treble damages and attorneys' fees for a
violation of an unfair competition statute).
151. "[C]ommon law rights . . . would remain unaffected as long as the causes of
action contain elements . . . that are different in kind from copyright infringement." H.R.
REP. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748.
152. The scope of the preemption of breach of contract actions is discussed infra Part
II.A.2.e.
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conversion of tangible property requires proof that the defendant
unlawfully obtained (or retains) possession of an object;153 an action
for breach of fiduciary duty requires proof of the nature of the
relationship between the parties which gives rise to expectations of
trust and a duty of fair dealing;154 an action for fraud requires proof of
153. The 1976 Act distinguishes between a "work" and a "copy." See 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2000) ('Copies' are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is f5xed...
."); id. § 102(a) ("Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of authorship .. "); id.
§ 202 ("Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is
distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied."). A novel or
play is a 'literary work," and it is the subject of copyright protection; the book or computer
disk, which is a tangible medium in which the literary work is embodied, is not entitled to
copyright protection. Thus, an action for theft or conversion of a limited, first edition of a
"book" would not give rise to a claim under the Copyright Act. See, e.g., Carson v. Dynegy,
Inc., 344 F.3d 446, 456 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that an action for refusal to return tangible
copies of a worksheet created by the plaintiff was not preempted since "elements of
conversion of physical property are . . . qualitatively different than those of copyright
infringement"); Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 635 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that an action for
conversion of papers comprising plaintiffs manuscript was not preempted); U.S. Trotting
Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781, 785 n.6 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that a claim
for misappropriation of property, based on the allegedly tortious taking of copyrighted
certificates and forms, was not preempted); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home
Entm't, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 552, 568-69 (D. N.J. 2002) (holding that claims for conversion
and replevin, based on the failure to return tangible property, were not preempted), aff'd
342 F.3d 191 (3rd Cir. 2003); see also Integrative Nutrition, Inc. v. Acad. of Healing
Nutrition, 476 F. Supp. 2d 291, 298-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that a claim for common
law trespass, which asserted that the defendant obtained plaintiffs' intellectual property by
unauthorized entry onto the plaintiffs premises, was not preempted); SecureInfo Corp. v.
Telos Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 593, 619-21 (E.D. Va. 2005) (finding that a claim for detinue,
based on the defendant's alleged unauthorized possession and use of a copy of plaintiffs
copyrighted software, was not preempted, and analogizing the situation to actions for
conversion or trespass, both of which also assert claims to tangible rather than intangible
property); cf. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200-01 (2d
Cir. 1983) (rejecting, on the merits, a claim for conversion based on a magazine publisher's
creation of an unauthorized excerpt of plaintiffs book after obtaining a purloined copy of
the original, temporarily removing the copy, copying parts thereof, and returning it
undamaged, as "far too insubstantial an interference with property rights to demonstrate
conversion"), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
154. See Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 307-09 (holding that an action for breach of a
fiduciary relationship was not preempted); accord Aagard v. Palomar Builders, Inc., 344 F.
Supp. 2d 1211, 1219-21 (E.D. Cal. 2004); Dorsey v. Money Mack Music, Inc., 304 F. Supp.
2d 858, 864-65 (E.D. La. 2003). Co-owners of a copyrighted work, including co-authors and
partners, have the right to undertake (or authorize others to undertake) any of the acts
specified in § 106 with respect to that work without securing permission from another co-
owner, and thus, that kind of conduct cannot form the basis of a copyright infringement
action. However, such a use of the work by one co-owner may make him or her liable to
share any financial benefits received from that use with other co-owners, under a variety of
legal theories, including breach of fiduciary duty. Because the co-owner's claim would not
be "equivalent to" an action to secure any of the rights protected by the Act, they would not
be preempted. See Oddo, 743 F.2d at 635 (refusing to preempt a claim that one partner
breached his fiduciary duty to his co-partner, since the claim "is quite different from the
interests protected by copyright"); cf. U. S. Naval Inst. v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 936 F.2d
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deceptive representations, confusion, reliance, or specified inequitable
conduct; 155 an action for breach of a confidential relationship requires
proof of a promise from the defendant that it would maintain that
confidence; 15 6 an action for defamation requires proof of injury to the
plaintiffs reputation and publication of the assertion to a third party,
and it is subject to such defenses as truth or privilege; 157 and an action
for theft of trade secrets requires proof that the plaintiff expected that
the information would remain secret, and that the plaintiff took steps
to preserve its secrecy. 158 Because of the requirement for evidence of
692, 695 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[A]n exclusive licensee of any of the rights comprised in the
copyright, though it is capable of breaching the contractual obligations imposed on it by the
license, cannot be liable for infringing the copyright rights conveyed to it."). But see
Cambridge Literary Props., Ltd. v. W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik G.M.B.H., 448 F. Supp. 2d
244, 254-56 (D. Mass. 2006) (finding that an action for accounting or imposition of a
constructive trust, for compensation due to plaintiff in his alleged status as co-owner of the
copyright, was preempted); Diamond v. Gillis, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1008-09 (E.D. Mich.
2005) (preempting a state law claim denominated "action against co-tenants" by a co-
author of copyrighted material and co-owner of a copyright against other co-authors and co-
owners, where the claim sought "precisely the remedy to which [plaintiff] would be entitled
under the Copyright Act" of 1976).
155. See, e.g., Valente-Kritzer Video v. Pinckney, 881 F.2d 772, 776 (9th Cir. 1989)
(concluding that an action for common law fraud was not preempted, since it required the
additional element of misrepresentation); Kabehie v. Zoland, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 735
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that an action for fraud, which alleged that the defendant
misrepresented its ownership of rights to musical compositions and falsely promised to
transfer rights including master recordings, was not preempted); see also Integrative
Nutrition, 476 F. Supp. 2d at 298 (holding that the claim that defendant obtained access to
plaintiffs' intellectual property through fraud and misrepresentation was not preempted,
since the claim required proof of numerous additional elements); Firoozye v. Earthlink
Network, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1127-28 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that an action for
misrepresentation was not preempted because it required proof that the defendant made a
false statement to the plaintiff with the intent of inducing reliance, and that the plaintiff
justifiably relied thereon).
156. See, e.g., Tingley Sys., Inc. v. CSC Consulting, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 95, 104-08
(D. Mass. 2001) (finding that an action for misappropriation of trade secrets was not
preempted, since it involved additional element of breach of duty of confidentiality); see
infra Part II.A.2.f.
157. See, e.g., Laws v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1145 (9th Cir. 2006)
("Our holding does not extinguish ... the general law of defamation and fraud ... so long
as those causes of action do not concern the subject matter of copyright and contain
qualitatively different elements than those contained in a copyright infringement suit."),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007); cf Kindergartners Count, Inc. v. DeMoulin, 249 F.
Supp. 2d 1233, 1251-52 (D. Kan. 2003) (holding that a defamation claim, growing out of
defendant's statement to plaintiffs boss that the plaintiff was a plagiarist, was not
preempted because a "finding of plagiarism is not contingent upon a finding of copyright
infringement"). But see Daboub v. Gibbons, 42 F.3d 285, 289-90 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding
that claims for defamation and plagiarism, which required proof of wrongful copying,
distribution, and performance of the lyrics of plaintiffs musical work, were preempted).
158. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Consuling, Inc., 307
F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that the misappropriation of trade secrets claims based on a
breach of the duty of trust can survive preemption). An action for improper taking of a
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these meaningful additional elements (or defenses), the policies
underlying a single, uniform federal regime for copyright would not be
impinged upon by parallel state adjudication of these claims.
c. Unfair Competition
Actions based on an unfair competition theory can arise from a
wide variety of allegedly deceptive, abusive, or "unfair" business
practices. 159 Since many of these claims do not arise in the context of
the alleged misuse of copyrighted or copyrightable materials, they
typically would not raise issues of possible preemption under § 301.
However, in the majority of the reported cases in which clashes
between unfair competition claims and the copyright regime were
presented, the courts properly found that the state claims were
preempted.160
The clearest instance of a properly preempted unfair
competition claim is one predicated on the unauthorized copying,
alteration, or distribution of a copyrighted work.1 61 Preemption is also
trade secret may also involve the defense of "reverse engineering," which would be
unavailable in a copyright infringement action. Preemption of trade secret claims is
discussed in more detail infra Part II.A.2.f.
159. "Unfair competition is a general term that includes deceptive trade practices,
acts such as trademark infringement, and appropriation of trade values or rights in
publicity." 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 457 (2001). See generally 1 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1:1-11 (4th ed. 2006)
(outlining the basic principles of unfair competition).
160. See, e.g., ATC Distrib. Group, Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmission and
Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 700, 713 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that an unfair competition claim
based on misappropriation of catalog numbers was completely preempted by the Copyright
Act); Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 785-90 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding
that the Copyright Act preempted an unfair competition claim that lacked any
qualitatively different elements).
161. See, e.g., Kodadek v. MTV Networks, Inc., 152 F.3d 1209, 1212-13 (9th Cir.
1998) (finding that an unfair competition claim, premised on the unauthorized copying or
the making of derivative versions of plaintiffs drawings, was preempted); Walker v. Time
Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 53 (2d Cir. 1986) (reiterating the state court's conclusion that
the "cause of action for unfair competition is preempted ... to the extent it seeks protection
against [the] copying of [plaintiffs] book"); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d
905, 919 (2d Cir. 1980) (preempting a claim for unfair competition, based on the copying of
Disney characters, since the relief sought was "equivalent to" that available under
Copyright Act); Auscape Int'l v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 461 F. Supp. 2d 174, 191 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (holding that an unfair trade practices claim, based on "wanton and repeated acts of
copyright infringement," was preempted); Decker, Inc. v. G & N Equip. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d
734, 7445 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (holding that an unfair competition claim, based on the
unauthorized copying of copyrighted illustrations, text, and photographs, was preempted);
Irwin v. ZDF Enters. GMBH, No. 04 CIV. 8027(RWS), 2006 WL 374960, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 16, 2006) (holding that an unfair competition claim, which only differed from
copyright infringement in the locus of alleged misconduct, was preempted); Curcio Webb
LLC v. Nat'l Benefit Programs Agency, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1211-13 (S.D. Ohio
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required for state claims that essentially allege the defendant's
unauthorized use of either copyrighted materials or of ideas or
methods falling within the realm of copyright. 162 Allegations that the
2005) (preempting a common law unfair competition claim premised on the unauthorized
copying of plaintiffs copyrighted document); Smith & Hawken, Ltd. v. Gardendance, Inc.,
No. C04-1664 SBA, 2004 WL 2496163, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2004) (holding that a
claim for unfair competition based on the unauthorized duplication of a garden torch, a
copyrighted "sculptural work," was preempted); MasterCard Int'l Inc. v. Nader 2000
Primary Comm. Inc., No. 00 Civ. 6068 (GDB), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *15-17
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 08, 2004) (holding that unfair competition and misappropriation claims,
grounded solely on the unauthorized copying of protected expression, were preempted);
Reinke & Assocs. Architects Inc. v. Cluxton, No. 02 C 0725, 2003 WL 1338485 at *2-3 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 18, 2003) (dismissing a state unfair competition claim based on the unauthorized
copying of architectural plans when allegations of "reverse passing off," consumer
confusion, and intention to deceive the public were insufficient to avoid preemption); Mist-
On Sys., Inc. v. Gilley's European Tan Spa, 303 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (W.D. Wis. 2002)
(holding that an unfair competition claim, predicated solely on the unauthorized copying of
materials from plaintiffs website, was preempted); Bell v. E. Davis Int'l, Inc., 197 F. Supp.
2d 449, 463 (W.D.N.C.) (holding that a claim for unfair competition, based on the
unauthorized copying of plaintiffs Indian headdress and the subsequent sale of copies of
the headdress, was preempted), affld, 45 F. App'x 253 (4th Cir. 2002); Meyer v. Giles, No.
4:92-CV-115, 1992 WL 489770, at *34 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 30, 1992) (holding that an unfair
competition claim, based on the unauthorized copying of plaintiffs books, was preempted
because the allegation of "confusion" was not a meaningful "extra element").
162. See, e.g., Lipscher v. LRP Publ'ns., Inc. 266 F.3d 1305, 1310-12 (11th Cir. 2001)
(preempting claim for unfair competition, which asserted that defendant's act of obtaining
subscription to plaintiffs newsletter by making false representations and then
disseminating information therein constituted "acquisition misconduct," because the claim
did not contain a meaningful extra element); Kregos v. Associated Press, 3 F.3d 656, 665-66
(2d Cir. 1993) (preempting a claim for unfair competition based merely on the defendant's
production and distribution of form reporting baseball statistics while noting, "[i]n
contrast, unfair-competition claims based upon breaches of confidential relationships,
breaches of fiduciary duties and trade secrets have been held to satisfy the extra-element
test and avoid § 301 preclusion"); Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d
973, 976-77 (9th Cir. 1987) (preempting an unfair competition claim seeking compensation
for "effort expended to create tangible works of authorship" based on the defendants'
alleged profiting from the use of documents created by the plaintiff at considerable expense
and effort); Ehat v. Tanner, 780 F.2d 876, 877-78 (10th Cir. 1985) (preempting unfair
competition and unjust enrichment claims, based on defendants' unauthorized copying of
quotations from journals of third-party, that were found by plaintiff during the course of
his research); A Slice of Pie Prods., LLC v. Wayans Bros. Entm't, 392 F. Supp. 2d 297, 315-
16 (D. Conn. 2005) (holding that an unfair competition claim, based on the allegation that
defendant used content and ideas from plaintiffs screenplay to create a motion picture,
was preempted); RDF Media Ltd. v. Fox Broad. Co., 372 F. Supp. 2d 556, 565-66 (C.D. Cal.
2005) (preempting an unfair competition claim based on the copying of the format of a
copyrighted television show); Faulkner v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 211 F. Supp. 2d 450, 477-
78 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (rejecting plaintiffs attempt to avoid preemption of an unfair
competition claim by characterizing its claim as one for "palming off," based on defendant's
placement of a copyright notice on materials that allegedly originated with plaintiff), aff'd,
409 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2005); see also DirecTV, Inc. v. Cashe, No. 1:03-CV-0310, 2004 WL
1622229, at *4 (S.D. Ind. June 7, 2004) (preempting an action for fraud and deception,
based on the purchase and use of devices to intercept encrypted satellite television signals,
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defendant's "unfair" conduct was also "immoral" or "unethical" do not
add meaningful additional elements, and thus, do not change the
underlying nature of the state claim.
163
The contrary conclusion in some decisions, in which courts held
that the particular claims for unfair competition or unfair trade
practices were not preempted, are quite problematic. For example, in
Computer Management Assistance Co. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., the
plaintiff, the owner of a copyrighted computer program, asserted
claims of both copyright infringement and violation of a state unfair
trade practices statute based on the defendant's unauthorized copying
of that program. 16 4 Although the Fifth Circuit ultimately affirmed the
dismissal of the state law claim on the merits, its intermediate
conclusion was that the claim was not preempted. The court
mistakenly asserted that, because the state statute "requires proof of
fraud, misrepresentation or other unethical conduct . .. the relief it
provides is not 'equivalent' to that provided in the Copyright Act."
165
However, a determination of what behavior rises to the level of
"unethical conduct" is inherently subjective. Therefore, the court's
approach apparently would permit relief under state law, either in
lieu of or in addition to federal relief, for any instances of copyright
infringement a court found particularly egregious. This result would
inappropriately narrow the reach of § 301. In fact, neither the
defendant's state of mind nor the supposedly outrageous nature of its
behavior, even if done willfully, are meaningful "extra elements,"
going beyond the elements necessary to prove copyright infringement,
so as to remove such state claims from the scope of federal
preemption. 166
where the claim presented no extra element beyond that needed to prove copyright
infringement).
163. See, e.g., Collezione Europa U.S.A., Inc. v. Hillsdale House, Ltd., 243 F. Supp.
2d 444, 449-50 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (preempting a state law claim for unfair and deceptive
trade practices based on the copying of copyrighted sculptural works because the
allegations of "deceptiveness" and of immoral, unethical, and unscrupulous behavior did
not supply a "qualitatively additional element which [was] separate and distinct from the
alleged copying," and, at best, "would only change the scope, not the nature of the action");
Old S. Home Co. v. Keystone Realty Group, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 2d 734, 736-39 (M.D.N.C.
2002) (holding that a state law claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices, based on the
construction of homes which replicated plaintiff's copyrighted home designs, was
preempted because the allegations that defendant's conduct was unethical and immoral,
and that it gave rise to consumer confusion, did not constitute qualitatively different
additional elements).
164. 220 F.3d 396, 399 (5th Cir. 2000).
165. Id. at 404-05.
166. See Chalfant v. Tubb, 453 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1319-20 (N.D. Okla. 2006) (finding
that an unfair competition claim was not preempted in an action by the authors of a
screenplay against a film maker, based on the failure to list the authors appropriately in
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In a recent district court decision in California, 167 the plaintiffs,
who had written and then recorded a musical work, alleged that the
defendant-store had altered some of the lyrics in their own song and
then had used them, without authorization, in advertisements and in-
store signage. The court erroneously held that the plaintiffs' unfair
competition claim was not preempted because the plaintiffs allegation
that the distorted lyrics confused fans constituted the requisite "extra
element."168  In fact, the defendant's conduct would have stated a
claim for unauthorized adaptation and distribution of a copyrighted
work; any alleged consumer confusion was not meaningfully different
from the effect on the copyright owner and on the public of garden
variety copyright infringement.
169
On the other hand, there will be a variety of situations in
which preemption of an unfair competition action would be
inappropriate. In particular, preemption is not called for where,
under state law, the particular state law claim requires proof of
deceptive or fraudulent conduct by the defendant, coupled with
reliance and confusion by consumers, in settings when those
requirements actually do constitute meaningful additional elements,
going beyond those needed to set forth a copyright claim.
170
the credits to the film, because plaintiffs' allegations "went beyond mere appropriation of
copyrighted material and included elements of deceptive behavior"); cf. Iconbazaar, L.L.C.
v. Am. Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 636-37 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (preempting an unfair
trade practices claim and noting that, even though fraud or deceit may be part of action,
proof thereof was not required to state claim).
167. Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
168. See id. at 1057-58.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., Donald Frederick Evans & Assocs. v. Cont'l Homes, Inc., 785 F.2d 897,
913-14 (11th Cir. 1986) (concluding that an unfair competition claim, based on alleged
misrepresentation by a homebuilder that its homes were identical to plaintiffs homes, was
not preempted because the state law required proof of extra elements-that defendant
engaged in deceptive or fraudulent conduct, and that customers were likely to be confused);
Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 247 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[T]o the extent that
plaintiffs are relying on state unfair competition law to allege a tort of 'passing off,' they
are not asserting rights equivalent to those protected by copyright and therefore do not
encounter preemption."); Silverstein v. Penguin Putnam, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 309 (JFK), 2003
WL 1797848, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2003) (holding that an unfair competition claim, for
the reverse passing-off of plaintiffs copyrighted compilation of poems, was not preempted,
since the state law required proof of misrepresentation or deception, giving rise to actual
consumer confusion), rev'd and vacated in part on other grounds, 368 F.3d 77 (2d Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1039 (2004); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't,
Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 552, 564-66 (D.N.J. 2002) (finding that a claim for unfair competition
based on "passing-off'-the false assertion by defendant that product actually created by
plaintiff was produced by defendant-was not preempted, since it required proof of
additional element of deception or misrepresentation); Salim v. Lee, 202 F. Supp. 2d 1122,
1125-27 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (concluding that an unfair competition claim asserting "reverse
passing-off," based on "bodily appropriation" of plaintiffs animation project, was not
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d. Unjust Enrichment
As is true for unfair competition actions, 171 because there is a
broad range of grounds for asserting unjust enrichment claims, 172 and
since the majority of them do not arise in the context of copyrightable
materials, questions of preemption are usually not present. And, once
again, most courts have properly preempted unjust enrichment claims
that do arise in these contexts. 173 Two cases are noteworthy, however,
to illustrate the sometimes difficult issues presented by these claims.
preempted); Kindergartners Count, Inc. v. DeMoulin, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1190-92 (D.
Kan. 2001) (concluding that an unfair competition claim, based on defendants' use of
plaintiffs copyrighted book and computer program to create and then distribute
substantially similar works, was not preempted, because "[p]roof of customer confusion or
deception and/or proof of a confidential relationship and the breach thereof are extra
elements"); Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, 124 F. Supp. 2d 836, 845-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(concluding that unfair competition and false designation of origin claims, based on
"reverse passing off' of trademarks, character likenesses, and character names from
plaintiffs copyrighted works presented at least one extra element, thus avoiding
preemption); Kisch v. Ammirati & Puris Inc., 657 F. Supp. 380, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(refusing to dismiss an unfair competition claim, based on alleged similarity between
plaintiffs copyrighted photograph and defendant's photograph, because plaintiff alleged
"passing off'); see also Moser Pilon Nelson Architects, LLC v. HNTB Corp., No. 05 CV 422
(MRK), 2006 WL 2331013, at *12-13 (D. Conn. Aug. 8, 2006) (holding that an unfair trade
practices action, which required proof that defendants "undermined the public bidding
process for the contract by agreeing to copy Plaintiffs' design in return for being awarded
contract," was not preempted, and further noting that the 1976 Act "offers no redress for
the alleged subversion of the important state interest in adherence to the mandated
procedures for awarding state contracts"). But see Integrative Nutrition, Inc. v. Acad. of
Healing Nutrition, 476 F. Supp. 2d 291, 296-98 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that an unfair
competition claim based on copying of elements of plaintiffs website was preempted as a
type of "reverse passing off claim [that] is equivalent to a claim for copyright
infringement"). See generally Bell, supra note 31, at 233-43 (asserting that unfair
competition reverse passing off claims are not preempted by § 301(a), but that Dastar Corp.
v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), has "opened the way to direct
Supremacy Clause preemption of reverse passing off claims that conflict with the ends and
means of copyright law").
171. See supra Part II.A.2.c.
172. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 565 (3d ed. 2002) ("A
claim for unjust enrichment is often available in cases of intentional tort or breach of
fiduciary duty, in cases of statutory torts such as infringement of intellectual property, and
sometimes in suits for breach of contract."). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Tentative Draft No. 3, West 2004).
173. See, e.g., Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 306-07 (2d Cir.
2004) (finding that an unjust enrichment claim, for the alleged breach of a contract to pay
royalties for a derivative work, was preempted, since it merely sought enforcement of the
right of adaptation); Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d 973, 976-77
(9th Cir. 1987) (preempting an unjust enrichment claim, based on defendants' alleged
profiting from use of documents created by plaintiff at considerable expense and effort);
Microstrategy, Inc. v. Netsolve, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 2d 533, 537-38 (E.D. Va. 2005) (finding
that an unjust enrichment claim was preempted, since the complaint contained no
additional element beyond the defendant-licensee's unauthorized reproduction and use of
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The Ninth Circuit undertook a difficult, but ultimately correct,
application of the equivalency test to complicated facts in G.S.
Rasmussen & Associates v. Kalitta Flying Service, Inc.174 The Federal
Aeronautics Administration (FAA) had promulgated regulations
regarding the certification of alterations to commercial aircraft.' 75
The owner of an airplane was permitted to make changes to its plane
if it obtained, and presented to the FAA, a Supplemental Type
Certificate (STC). 176  Obtaining an STC, in turn, required the
assembly and presentation of extensive engineering and test data to
the FAA. 177 After expending considerable time and expense, the
plaintiff had obtained an STC, which could be used to convert cargo
DC-8's; it had offered to license its STC to the defendant for the
conversion of one of its planes. 178  Eschewing that license, the
defendant made a photocopy of another of plaintiffs STCs and
presented that copy to the FAA for certification of its DC-8.179 The
defendant also made a photocopy of the plaintiffs flight manual
supplement, which FAA regulations required must be carried on a
plaintiffs software); Diamond v. Gillis, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1009-10 (E.D. Mich. 2005)
(finding that an unjust enrichment claim, brought by the alleged co-producer of a sound
recording, was preempted, as plaintiff did not allege meaningful "extra element," such as
breach of promise to pay); Sharp v. Patterson, No. 03 Civ. 8772 (GEL), 2004 WL 2480426,
at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2004) (finding that an unjust enrichment claim, based on
defendant's use of plaintiffs story and ideas to create defendant's literary work, was
preempted); Zito v. Steeplechase Films, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1023, 1027 (N.D. Cal.
2003) (finding that an unjust enrichment claim, based on the unauthorized distribution of a
photograph, was preempted, even though the state claim required proof of a benefit
conferred on the defendant); Faulkner v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 211 F. Supp. 2d 450, 476-
77 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that an unjust enrichment claim was not qualitatively different
from a copyright infringement claim), affl'd, 409 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2005); Video Pipeline, Inc.,
210 F. Supp. 2d at 567-68 (finding preemption of a counterclaim premised on the assertion
that the "plaintiff had exploited [defendant's] intellectual property without compensating
[defendant] for the benefits derived from such use"); Netzer v. Continuity Graphic Assocs.,
963 F. Supp. 1308, 1312-13, 1321-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (claim for unjust enrichment-or, in
the alternative, for quasi-contract-seeking accounting based on plaintiffs claim as the co-
author of a comic book, was preempted, since plaintiffs "gravamen [was] unauthorized
publication"); P.I.T.S. Films v. Laconis, 588 F. Supp. 1383, 1384, 1386 (E.D. Mich. 1984)
(concluding that claims for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, based on the
unauthorized use of slogans and characters from plaintiffs copyrighted television series,
were preempted).
174. 958 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1992).
175. See id. at 899.
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 899-900.
179. Id. at 900.
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modified plane.180 The plaintiff brought an action for conversion of its
STC and for unjust enrichment. 181
After first determining that state law recognized a property
right in the STC, the court of appeals concluded that the plaintiffs
state law claims were not preempted by § 301.182 The court correctly
recognized that an action based solely on unauthorized copying of the
plaintiffs works-the drawings and plans and the flight manual-
would surely have been preempted, and the STC certificate itself was
actually a government document, outside the scope of copyright
protection.183 However, the plaintiffs claim was for the "right to use
the STC as a basis for obtaining an airworthiness certificate,"184 which
then conferred "a valuable government privilege-the right to modify
an airplane in a particular way without going to the trouble and
expense of proving that the modification meets FAA standards."'18 5
This use by the defendant of the plaintiffs property, and the benefit it
received therefrom, are indeed qualitatively different elements from
an action predicated merely on unauthorized copying, which would not
have been actionable under state law. Permitting the claim for unjust
enrichment for that unauthorized use did not interfere with federal
interests in having a uniform set of standards to regulate permissible
copying.
A far more questionable result was reached in Ulloa v.
Universal Music and Video Distribution Corp.18 6 The plaintiff, a
recording artist, asserted a copyright interest in a sound recording of
her voice; she alleged that the defendants had used that recording,
without her permission, in creating another sound recording.18 7 The
plaintiff brought claims for copyright infringement and unjust
enrichment; the court noted that she potentially had a cause of action
for breach of contract.188 The court held that the two state law claims,
which the court interpreted as having been pleaded in the alternative,
were not preempted, since the copyright infringement claim might
have been subject to the defenses that the plaintiffs recording was a
"work made for hire," or that the plaintiff may have impliedly licensed
180. See id. at 899-900.
181. Id. at 900.
182. Id. at 908.
183. See id. at 904.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. No. 01 Civ. 9583 (BSJ), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6755 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2004).
187. See id. at *2.
188. Id. at *1 n.7.
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it to the defendant.18 9 The court's explanation for allowing the unjust
enrichment claim to proceed was that the plaintiff was entitled "to
persuade the jury that [the d]efendants have failed to compensate her
for her time and labor."1 90 However, if the defendants prevailed under
either of these defenses, they would have been entitled, under the
copyright laws, to use the plaintiffs sound recording. It would upset
the defendants' federally-defined panoply of rights to allow, for
example, a state claim for unjust enrichment for a portion of the value
of the defendants' copyrighted work based only on the "extra element"
that the plaintiff was allegedly inadequately compensated as an
employee under the "work made for hire" rubric.
e. Breach of Contract Actions
One of the clearest situations in which preemption is not called
for is a breach of contract action, where copyrighted works are the
subject of the dispute, but where the asserted breach does not involve
conduct by the defendant akin to the type of behavior giving rise to a
claim of copyright infringement. Examples of such disputes would be
a suit to collect royalties for the licensing of a copyrighted work,191 a
dispute about the transfer of ownership of a copyright,1 92 or a contract
189. See id. at *7.
190. Id.
191. For example, in Madison River Management Co. v. Business Management
Software Corp., the copyright owner sued its licensee on a breach of contract theory,
asserting a violation of an express promise in the parties' agreement to pay specified
amounts for "excess use" of the copyrighted software. 387 F. Supp. 2d 521, 533-34
(M.D.N.C. 2005). Relying on Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, the court denied a motion to
dismiss this state court claim, holding that "this express promise to pay creates an extra
element which prevents preemption." Id. at 541 (citing 846 F.2d 923 (4th Cir. 1988)); see
also Hustlers, Inc. v. Thomasson, 253 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1288, 1293 (N.D. Ga. 2002)
(holding that a breach of contract action by the assignee of a co-author of a musical work,
asserting that the licensee -distributor of that work failed to continue to make royalty
payments to plaintiff, was not preempted); infra text accompanying notes 212-219
(discussing Acorn Structures' analysis of preemption and contract claims). By contrast, at
an earlier stage of the Madison River case, the district court had held that other breach of
contract claims were not saved from preemption by the allegation of implied promises to
pay for use. Madison River, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 443-44.
192. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Money Mack Music, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 858, 861, 864-65
(E.D. La. 2003) (rejecting a preemption defense in an action by a songwriter/performer
against his agents and managers, asserting breach of contractual and fiduciary duties and
seeking accounting for royalties and a declaratory judgment to establish ownership rights
in copyrights); Asunto v. Shoup, 132 F. Supp. 2d 445, 449-53 (E.D. La. 2000) (rejecting
preemption argument in action by musician's estate against music recording and
distribution companies); Brown v. Mono Records, No. CV-00-286-ST, 2000 WL 33244473, at
*1, *4-*9 (D. Or. June 6, 2000) (rejecting a preemption defense in an action by band
members against other band members and a recording company, asserting claims for
conversion, breach of contract, and accounting, and involving disputed claims to royalties
2007]
50 VANDERBILTJ. OF ENTERTAINMENTAND TECH. LAW [Vol. 10:1:1
involving transfer of the physical object in which copyright is
embodied. 193 Resolution of all of these disputes would require proof of
elements qualitatively different from those at issue in a copyright
infringement action, including evidence regarding the giving of
consideration and the existence and nature of promises to pay
royalties or to convey ownership interests. As a policy matter, it is
appropriate to permit such state causes of action to proceed, since
resolution of these kinds of claims would not require the
interpretation or application of the copyright laws. Furthermore, the
adjudication of the parties' competing claims and defenses does not
implicate the federal interests underlying those laws.
Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp.194 provides a good example of a
different kind of action based on breach of contract. The plaintiffs
asserted claims that resembled copyright infringement, but the court
nonetheless properly rejected the proffered preemption defense.
195
The plaintiffs alleged that they had shared ideas for a promotional
campaign for Taco Bell (that featured a talking chihuahua), pursuant
to a promise that they would be compensated if the restaurant chain
used their ideas. 196 The Sixth Circuit found that the plaintiff had
raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant
breached an implied-in-fact contract providing for such payment and
that this action was not preempted by § 301.197 Applying the "extra
element" test, the court correctly concluded that there were several
legal elements necessary to prove breach of contract that would not be
part of a copyright infringement action. 198 In contrast to an action for
quasi-contract or implied-in-law contract, 199 the plaintiffs' claim
and ownership in the copyrighted works); accord Dead Kennedys v. Biafra, 37 F. Supp. 2d
1151, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 1999); see also Tewarson v. Simon, 750 N.E.2d 176, 184 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2001) (holding that § 301 did not preclude a state court's adjudication of a dispute
over the terms of a contract allegedly providing for a transfer of ownership of copyright).
193. See Kabehie v. Zoland, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 734-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that claims regarding failure to deliver master recordings or musical compositions,
as provided in the parties' agreement, was not preempted).
194. 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001).
195. See id. at 453-57.
196. Id. at 450. In theory, an alternative basis for finding that the contract claim
was not preempted would have been that ideas-as opposed to expressions of those ideas-
are unprotectable by the copyright laws. However, the court of appeals initially (and
properly) held-as have most other courts, see infra text accompanying notes 414-420---
that ideas nonetheless fell within the "subject matter of copyright." See id. at 454-55.
197. Id. at 453, 459.
198. See id. at 456-57.
199. The court suggested in dicta that a claim for a quasi-contract, i.e., a contract
implied-in-law, was far more likely to be subject to preemption, since such an "action
depends on nothing more than the unauthorized use of the work." Id. at 459; see Endemol
Entm't B.V. v. Twentieth Television Inc., No. CV 98-0608 ABC (BQRx), 1998 U.S. Dist.
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required proof, inter alia, of a promise by the defendant that it would
pay for the use of these ideas, 200 the defendant's failure to pay, and an
expectation by the plaintiffs that they would be paid, as well as
evidence of the value of the work and the defendant's use thereof.
20'
These meaningful extra elements made the plaintiffs' action
"qualitatively different" from a copyright infringement claim.20 2
LEXIS 19049, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 29, 1998) (preempting an action for breach of implied-
in-fact contract based on defendant's failure to pay for ideas for a television show, and
stating that the allegation of "promise not to accept the benefit of a copyright [sic] work"
without making payment was not the necessary "extra element"); see also Recursion
Software, Inc. v. Interactive Intelligence, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 756, 768-69 (N.D. Tex. 2006)
(finding that unjust enrichment and quantum meruit claims were preempted, since "[iun
the absence of a contract between the parties, the only possible source entitling [plaintiff]
to enforce its quasi-contractual claims is the Copyright Act"); Keane v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 921, 924-25, 945 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (holding that claims for
unfair competition, misappropriation, breach of implied contract, and quantum meruit,
based on defendant's failure to pay for ideas for a television show, were preempted, as
plaintiff failed to allege facts corresponding to an extra element such as the existence of a
confidential relationship or a fiduciary duty) (alternative holding), aff'd, 129 F. App'x 874
(5th Cir. 2005); Panizza v. Mattel, Inc., No. 02 CV 7722 (GBD), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17228, at *2, *10-*11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003) (preempting a claim for breach of quasi-
contract, based upon an unjust enrichment theory, for the use of ideas to create a television
show); Fischer v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 535, 541 (D. Md. 2000) ("[T]he majority
of courts addressing the issue have found that the Act preempts implied-in-fact contracts."
(emphasis added)); cf. Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 559 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding
that plaintiff had given defendant implied, non-exclusive license to incorporate its film
footage into defendant's motion picture and thus gave up its right to sue for copyright
infringement, but "retain[ed] the right to sue [defendant] in state court on a variety of
other grounds, including breach of contract"). But see Price v. Fox Entm't Group, Inc. 473 F.
Supp. 2d 446, 460-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (concluding, in an action complaining of failure to
treat plaintiff as co-author and to account to him for profits, that a claim for quantum
meruit was not preempted, because plaintiff was "seeking compensation for work he
contributed to the screenplay that could, in theory, be considered separate and apart from
ownership"); Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 945, 948 (W.D.
Tex. 1982) (concluding that an action for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, growing
out of the unauthorized copying and distribution of copyrighted architectural drawings,
was not preempted, since "Plaintiffs seek to recover under quantum meruit theory the
value of the services rendered by Defendants' use of the plans and specifications prepared
by Plaintiffs").
200. Wrench LLC, 256 F.3d at 457. The court was careful to note that the mere
presence of a promise was not always the necessary "extra element." It properly contrasted
this case with a situation where the defendant merely promises not to infringe one of the
rights protected under § 106 (e.g., a promise not to copy without permission) or merely
promises to pay royalties for use of those rights. See id. at 457-58.
201. Id. at 456. The court also looked to the remedies available to support its "extra
element" analysis. After identifying the specific remedies found in 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-505
(2002), the court noted that these remedies "do not include damages for the reasonable
value of the defendants' use of the work." Id. at 456-457.
202. See also Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965, 967-68 (9th Cir. 2004)
(finding that an action for breach of an implied-in-fact contract, seeking compensation for
an idea allegedly embodied in defendant's movie screenplay, was not preempted where the
qualitatively different "extra element" was the implied promise to pay for the idea,
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National Car Rental System, Inc. v. Computer Associates
International, Inc. 20 3  is another case that properly found no
preemption, as the plaintiffs breach of contract claim was not one
alleging breach of a promise not to infringe upon any of the rights
conferred on a copyright owner by § 106. The plaintiff, Computer
Associates (CA), had developed a computer program it had licensed to
National "only for [its] internal operations and . . . for the processing
of its own data.20 4 CA alleged that, in violation of this contractual
promise, National had also used the program to process data of third
parties. 20 5 The district court had concluded that CA's claim for breach
of contract was "equivalent to" a claim for the "exclusive copyright
right of distribution of copies of [its] work," and therefore, was
preempted. 206 In reversing, the court of appeals first concluded that
the plaintiffs complaint, properly read, only alleged claims for
unauthorized use of its copyrighted work, and not a claim for
unauthorized distribution. 20 7 The court stressed that the exclusive
submitted in confidence by plaintiff and voluntarily accepted by defendant, with mutual
expectation that payment would be made therefore), amended by 400 F.3d 658 (9th Cir.
2005); Sharp v. Patterson, No. 03 Civ. 8772 (GEL), 2004 WL 2480426, at *7-*9 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 3, 2004) (finding that claims for breach of express and/or implied contract, based on
an agreement by the author to recognize and compensate plaintiff for her contributions to
his literary work, were not preempted, since the promise constituted an additional element
and right that did not exist under copyright law); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home
Entm't, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 552, 566-67 (D.N.J. 2002) (finding no preemption of a claim
for breach of license agreement that, in addition to prohibiting unauthorized copying and
distribution, also prohibited conduct not covered by the 1976 Act, including the obligation
to return physical objects and linking third-party websites to its own); Firoozye v.
Earthlink Network, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1126-28 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (concluding that an
action for breach of implied-in-fact contract was not preempted because plaintiff would
"have to prove elements beyond unauthorized use, including that the defendant made an
enforceable promise to pay and breached that promise"); cf. Tavormina v. Evening Star
Prods., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 729, 734-35 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (finding that a claim for breach of
contract was preempted to the extent that it was based on the defendants' failure to
compensate plaintiffs for unauthorized copying of their home [(an architectural work)], but
that a quantum meruit claim was not preempted, since plaintiffs also alleged that
defendants failed to compensate them, as promised, "for their time and inconvenience").
See generally Samuel M. Bayard, Note, Chihuahuas, Seventh Circuit Judges, and Movie
Scripts, Oh My!: Copyright Preemption of Contracts to Protect Ideas, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
603 (2001) (examining whether § 301 should preempt contract claims involving the
submission of ideas, and advocating a policy-based framework).
203. 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993).
204. Id. at 427.
205. Id. at 428.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 430. The exclusive right to distribute copies of a work is conferred by
17 U.S.C. § 106(3). The court of appeals understood the complaint merely to challenge
National's unauthorized use of the copyrighted program to process of data of third parties,
but without any copy of the program having been given to those third parties. Nat'l Car
Rental, 991 F.2d at 430.
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right to use copyrighted material is not within the scope of protection
of the Copyright Act. 20 8  It therefore concluded that a claim for
infringement of that different right requires proof of an extra
element-the contractual restriction on that use.
209
Application of the "equivalence requirement" to some other
breach of contract actions has raised more questionable analytical
problems. As was true in Wrench, all claims for breach of contract
obviously require proof of promise and breach. However, is there a
meaningful "extra element" if the defendant's promise was merely
that it would not engage in conduct that would infringe one of the
copyright holders' exclusive rights under the Act?210  Has this
"element" resulted in a "qualitatively different" claim than one under
copyright law?
211
This analytic difficulty is best illustrated by a contrast with a
number of problematic cases that found that the state breach of
contract claim was not preempted. For example, in Acorn Structures,
Inc. v. Swantz, 21 2 the plaintiff, who both designed homes and sold the
208. See Nat'l Car Rental, 991 F.2d at 431-33.
209. The court explained:
CA is alleging that the contract creates a right not existing under the copyright
law, a right based upon National's promise, and that it is suing to protect that
contractual right. The contractual restriction on use of the programs constitutes
an extra element that makes this cause of action qualitatively different from one
for copyright.
Id. at 433; see also Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive Intelligence, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d
756, 765-66 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (finding that an action for the breach of a license agreement
was not preempted when the agreement permitted a licensee to engage in certain conduct
that, in absence of agreement, would have constituted copyright infringement; therefore,
the "scope of a licensee's permissible [conduct] ... is determined by reference to the
contract itself, not the copyright law").
210. The Recursion Software court put forth this very question:
Can, for example, a breach of contract claim arising out of a bare promise not to
reproduce or distribute copies of a copyrighted work be said to be qualitatively
different from a copyright infringement action for the violation of the exclusive
rights of reproduction and distribution granted to the copyright holder by 17
U.S.C. § 106?
425 F. Supp. 2d at 767.
211. Preemption arguments were also properly rejected in Huckshold v. HSSL,
L.L.C., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1207-08 (E.D. Mo. 2004). The plaintiff, the owner of a
copyright in computer software, alleged that the defendant, its licensee, had breached a
contractual promise by allowing a non-party to their agreement to copy and download the
software. Id. at 1205. The court recognized that an action that only asserted that the
defendant had engaged in unauthorized copying would have been preempted, regardless of
any contractual undertaking by the defendant not to engage in that behavior. See id. at
1209. By contrast, here, the necessity of proving that the defendant had permitted a third
party to copy the software, as well as proving the existence of this provision in the contract
itself, constituted a qualitatively different "extra element." Id. at 1208.
212. 846 F.2d 923 (4th Cir. 1988).
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materials to build those homes, entered into a "design agreement"
with the defendant, undertaking to perform architectural services and
to deliver drawings of a residential home to the defendant for the sum
of $750.213 This agreement did not require the defendant to purchase
the necessary materials from the plaintiff and did not expressly
require the return of the drawings. 214 However, the agreement
expressly recited that the "drawings are copyrighted and are [the
plaintiffs] property, and may not be used or copied in any way, in
whole or in part, without the written consent of [plaintiff]. '"215 In the
alleged breach of this undertaking,216 defendant "delivered the
drawings to another architect who filed a copy ... under his own seal"
with the local buildings permits office; a building permit was issued,
and a home based on plaintiffs plans was constructed. 217 Reversing
the district court's conclusion that the claim for breach of contract was
preempted, 218 the Fourth Circuit-with what was at best minimal
analysis, including absolutely no attention to § 301's equivalence
requirement or the extra element test-concluded that the action
could proceed because it "[did] not arise out of the subject matter of
copyright and is therefore a separate and distinct cause of action."219
Even at the time this action was litigated in the 1980's,
architectural plans were considered "pictorial, graphic or sculptural
works,"220 and protection was available against unauthorized copying
213. Id. at 924-25.
214. Id. at 925. Instead, as inducements, the contract provided that the defendant
would receive a credit of $750 towards the purchase of materials in connection with the
construction of the house, and that the defendant would receive a refund of $100 if he
returned the drawings. Id.
215. Id. (emphasis added).
216. Id. at 926 (concluding that the contract contained defendant's implied promise
that, if he did use Acorn's design to build a house, he would either purchase the materials
from Acorn or would purchase the plans himself).
217. Id. at 925.
218. Id. (citing Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 657 F. Supp. 70, 75 (W.D. Va.
1987)). The district court had held that the plaintiffs action for conversion, based on the
unauthorized use of its plans, was also preempted. See id. at 926. This ruling is suspect,
since copyright in fact does not protect against unauthorized exercise of dominion over
property, including copies of a work, as opposed to the misuse of the underlying work. See
supra text accompanying note 153; see infra text accompanying notes 369-370. But, the
court of appeals affirmed this portion of the judgment, "because at best conversion is only
an alternative ground of action to that of breach of contract." Acorn Structures, 846 F.2d at
926.
219. Id.
220. As enacted in 1976, the Act defined "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" to
include "technical drawings." Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541, 2543 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)). In 1988, this portion of the statute was amended to
read "technical drawings, including architectural plans." Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 4(a)(1)(A), 102 Stat. 2853, 2854
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of those plans.221 Thus, at a minimum, the plaintiff, Acorn, would
appear to have had an infringement action against the second
architect, and perhaps against the defendant as well for contributory
infringement. However, it was not until 1990, with the enactment of
the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act (the AWCPA),
222
that "architectural works" were added to the list of the "[s]ubject
matter of copyright," and that protection was explicitly extended to
the unauthorized construction of a structure based upon copyrighted
architectural plans.223 Nonetheless, as discussed below, even prior to
the AWCPA, such works might well have been within the general
"[s]ubject matter of copyright" for purposes of § 301(a). 224 Under this
approach, the plaintiffs action in Acorn Structures, based on the
uncompensated construction of the house,225 was really one for the
unauthorized creation of either a copy or a derivative work of its
architectural plans.226 The defendant's contractual undertaking that
the plans would not be "used or copied in any way" was then a promise
not to infringe on any of the rights that were either within the general
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101). However, even before 1988-at the time of the events in Acorn
Structures-courts had concluded that "technical drawings" included architectural plans.
See, e.g., Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp., No. SA-81-CA-5, 1983 U.S. Dist LEXIS
15936, at *21 (W.D. Tex. June 28, 1983) ("[T]he legislative history of the Copyright Act
leaves no doubt that Congress intended copyright protection to extend to architectural
drawings and plans."); Wickham v. Knoxville Int'l Energy Exposition, Inc., 555 F. Supp.
154, 155 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) ("Architectural plans are subject to copyright protection."), aff'd,
739 F.2d 1094 (6th Cir. 1984); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co.,
542 F. Supp. 252, 260-61 (D. Neb. 1982) (finding infringement from unauthorized copying
of plaintiffs architectural drawings and use thereof to construct a building, without
questioning whether the plans were copyrightable); Robert H. Jacobs, Inc. v. Westoaks
Realtors, Inc., 205 Cal. Rptr. 620, 623 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that an architect's plans
and drawings were protected by federal copyright law); see also Donald Frederick Evans &
Assocs. v. Cont'l Homes, Inc., 785 F.2d 897, 913-14 (11th Cir. 1986) (concluding that an
unfair competition claim, based on an alleged misrepresentation by a homebuilder that its
homes were identical to plaintiffs homes, was not preempted, and noting that, while
plaintiff's "architectural designs [fell] within the subject matter of copyright," the homes
themselves did not).
221. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
222. Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 703, 104 Stat. 5089, 5133 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §
102(a)(8)).
223. Id. § 702(a), 104 Stat. at 5133 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101) (defining
"architectural work" in part as "the design of a building... including a building, plans, or
drawings. The work includes the overall form").
224. See infra Part II.B.1.
225. Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 925 (4th Cir. 1988).
226. Cf. Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 698 F. Supp. 521, 525-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(dismissing as preempted a misappropriation claim "derived from the wrongful
appropriation of plaintiffs [architectural] plans" and the subsequent building of the home).
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scope of copyright, or indeed actually protected by the 1976 Act.
227 It
follows that this breach of contract action, which did not require proof
of anything other than the unauthorized copying of the plans and the
construction of the house based on those plans, was "equivalent to" an
action for a violation of those statutory rights.
228
The Eleventh Circuit engaged in similarly flawed reasoning in
Lipscher v. LRP Publications, Inc. 229 The plaintiff and defendant were
competitors, distributing information to lawyers on individual jury
verdicts. The plaintiff published newsletters summarizing this
information; the defendant maintained this information on
computerized databases and also offered a telephone service, allowing
customers to call in search requests.230 Using a fraudulent name, the
defendant obtained a subscription to plaintiffs newsletters. 231 The
subscription form required subscribers to affirm that the information
was being provided only for their personal use, and that they would
"not computerize, record, reproduce or re-market any portion of the
publication or the selected material which it contains."232 In breach of
that undertaking, the defendant incorporated the information
provided by the plaintiff into its databases. 233 The court of appeals
properly recognized that even though the information collected and
disseminated by plaintiff was not copyrightable, it was nonetheless
within the "subject matter of copyright."234  Nonetheless, the court
held that the plaintiffs breach of contract claim was not preempted; it
concluded that the rights created by contract were not "equivalent to"
the rights created by copyright, since the former only affected the
227. Acorn Structures, 846 F.2d at 925. If the defendant's contractual undertaking
was merely a promise not to violate any of the exclusive rights afforded by the 1976 Act to
the plaintiff, it is arguable that the contract itself was void for lack of consideration.
228. An example of a case which clearly gets this rule wrong is Taquino v. Teledyne
Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1490 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming liability on the basis of the
district court's opinion). The plaintiffs claim was for the unauthorized "use" by the
defendant-its former distributor and now its competitor-of plaintiffs drawings in
defendant's sales materials, in breach of a contract which prohibited that conduct. Id. at
1495, 1501. The district court found no preemption because of the "extra element" of the
defendant's "contractual promise." Id. at 1501. But, since the defendant's conduct violated
the plaintiffs exclusive rights under § 106 to reproduce its drawings and then to distribute
them in copies, in fact, the state law claim was nothing more than one for violation of those
statutorily conferred rights.
229. 266 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2001).
230. See id. at 1308.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1308-09.
233. See id.
234. Id. at 1311. See generally infra notes 404, 416-420, 425-428 and accompanying
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parties to the contract, while the latter exist against the whole
world.23 5 Based on this distinction, the court asserted that, "in order
to succeed on its claim, [plaintiff] needed to show an extra element,
the existence of a valid contract between the parties." 236
Unfortunately, the court -ignored a critical consideration: even absent
the contract, had the material been copyrightable, the plaintiffs claim
would have been for the unauthorized reproduction and/or distribution
of its copyrightable work. 237 There would be little doubt that a state
claim would have been preempted had federal protection existed.
However, allowing the plaintiff to proceed under a breach of contract
theory here had the effect of giving it a state law claim for conduct for
which the federal law withheld protection.
238
235. "[C]laims involving two-party contracts are not preempted because contracts do
not create exclusive rights, but rather affect only their parties." Id. at 1318 (citing ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454-55 (7th Cir. 1996)); see infra text accompanying
notes 246-255 (discussing the ProCD decision).
236. Lipscher, 266 F.3d at 1318-19. Applying the same test, the court had previously
concluded, see id. at 1310-12, that the plaintiffs unfair competition claim was preempted.
See id. at 1311-12; supra note 162.
237. As the Lipscher court recognized, see supra note 234, this portion of the
analysis should not change merely because the material which defendant copied and
distributed was outside the scope of copyright. Relying on Lipscher, the district court in
Ross, Brovins & Oehmke, P.C. v. Lexis/Nexis equally erred on the preemption issue. 348 F.
Supp. 2d 845, 862 (E.D. Mich. 2004), aff'd, 463 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2006). There, the plaintiff
accused the defendant of '[a]ttempting to convert to its own use [plaintiffs] forms without
paying licensing fees' and by '[m]isappropriating [plaintiffs] content by converting some or
all of it to Defendant's own use."' Id. (first and third alterations in original) (quoting
Complaint at 11, 17, Ross, Brovins, 348 F. Supp. 2d 845 (No. 03-74474), 2003 WL
23852213). Although the court acknowledged that "the substance of the breach of contract
claim is very similar to the elements of a copyright claim," the court nonetheless declined to
find preemption on the specious ground that the "[plaintiffs claim requires the existence of
a valid contract, which a copyright claim does not." Id.
238. Equally problematic is the district court's holding in Lowry's Reports, Inc. v.
Legg Mason, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 737 (D. Md. 2003). An employee of the defendant, a
brokerage firm, had a single subscription to a copyrighted stock market newsletter
published by the plaintiff. Id. at 741-43. The employee had signed an agreement promising
"not to disseminate or furnish to others, including associates, branch offices, or affiliates,
the information contained in any reports issued by [plaintiff], without consent." Id. at 756.
In breach of that undertaking, on a daily basis, the defendant distributed the information
in the newsletter to all of its offices telephonically, via fax and by intra-firm intercom,
intranet, and email. Id. at 743. In an earlier decision in this case by another district court
judge, the court had held that the plaintiffs state law unfair competition and breach of
contract claims were not preempted, although a claim for fraud was preempted. Lowry's
Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 592, 594-95 (D. Md. 2002).
At this later stage, without referring to that earlier decision, the district court correctly
held, applying the "extra element" test, that the plaintiffs claim for "unfair competition"
was preempted by § 301. Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 737,
756 (D. Md. 2003). Even though the information disseminated by the defendant was not
itself copyrightable, it still fell within the "subject matter of copyright" because it was part
of a copyrightable (and copyrighted) work. Id. at 755 (finding that plaintiffs reports were
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It is a misreading of the statute to allow parallel copyright
infringement and state law claims to proceed, based on the alleged
violation by the defendant of a contractual promise not to engage in
behavior-some form of unauthorized reproduction or distribution of a
copyrighted work-violative of the copyright owner's bundle of rights
under § 106.239 As already noted, a "promise" not to violate the
copyright laws is not the meaningful "extra element" required by §
301, and so the assertion that "the existence of explicit contractual
rights makes a breach of contract claim qualitatively different from a
claim for copyright infringement" 240  is at best a gross over-
simplification.
24 1
"literary works" under § 101); see infra Part II.B.1. The behavior giving rise to the
plaintiffs claim was the unauthorized copying, distribution, and performance of the
newsletter, or parts thereof. Although the plaintiff sought to characterize the defendant's
behavior as "free-riding," the court properly concluded that this was nothing more than a
"pejorative description of copying." Id. at 756 (quoting Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright,
Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of Databases in the United States and Abroad,
66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 162 (1997)). The court also rejected the plaintiffs attempt to bring
itself within a "hot news" exception to preemption, finding that the proffered elements for
that doctrine "do not describe any behavior at all . . . [but] merely define pre-existing
conditions." Id.
However, with minimal analysis, the court also concluded that the breach of contract
action was not preempted. Id. at 757. Relying on its earlier decision, the court asserted:
The unique terms of the parties' express subscription agreement, if proved,
"establisho a private law governing fair use of the copyrighted works inter
partes, which makes the claim qualitatively different from a simple copyright
case, in which there is no 'private law' defining what is and what is not fair use."
Id. at 756-57 (quoting Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 592, 594-
95 (D. Md. 2002)). But, in reality, the plaintiffs action for breach contract did not provide a
meaningful, or qualitatively different, "extra element." Not only can "private law" not alter
the standards of permissible and unlawful conduct set forth in the Copyright Act, but, more
importantly, it is clear that the defendant's employee's promise was, once again, nothing
more than a repetitive undertaking not to engage in conduct which violated the plaintiffs
exclusive rights under § 106.
The cumulative nature of the federal and state theories is illustrated by the jury verdict
and judgment, awarding the plaintiff nearly $20 million in damages, without apparent
differentiation of the claims for the breach of contract and willful copyright infringement.
Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455, 457-58 (D. Md. 2004).
239. See supra notes 212-238 and accompanying text.
240. eScholar, LLC v. Otis Educ. Sys., Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 329, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(finding no preemption of a claim for failure to pay royalties due under an agreement
licensing the defendant to serve as a reseller of plaintiffs copyrighted computer program,
where the defendant allegedly copied and distributed materials without plaintiffs
permission). Another decision reaching similarly problematic results-again, after minimal
analysis-is Davidson & Associates., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, Inc. 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164
(E.D. Mo. 2004), aff'd sub nom. Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (2005). There, the
court held that § 301 did not preempt a software owner's breach of contract action against
other software designers, based on the defendants' unauthorized reverse engineering in
alleged violation of End-User License Agreements and Terms of Use. Id. at 1168-72, 1175.
Applying the "extra element" test, the court concluded that, "[a]bsent the parties'
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In contrast, a number of other decisions have correctly
concluded that the mere presence, under state law, of certain asserted
"extra elements" in a breach of contract action does not alter the
characteristic of what is essentially a copyright infringement claim.
Thus, for example, the breach of a promise to pay for the use of
copyrighted material is at heart a claim for infringement of the
exclusive right to copy or distribute that work;242 a claim for
agreement, this restriction would not exist." Id. at 1175 (quoting Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc.
v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 433 (8th Cir. 1993)). Then, using circular
reasoning, the court stated that "[tihe contractual restriction on use .. .constitutes an
extra element." Id. However, it is hardly obvious why the plaintiffs claims were not simply
for violations of its rights of reproduction, distribution, and creation of derivative works-
rights which are conferred on the copyright owner by § 106. Thus, an agreement not to
engage in behavior otherwise protectable by, and actionable under, the Copyright Act
would not have required proof of any "extra element." On appeal, the defendants decided
not to pursue this argument, instead relying (ultimately unsuccessfully) on non-statutory
conflict preemption. Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 638 n.9 (8th Cir. 2005); see
infra text accompanying notes 274-280 (further discussing the Davidson & Assocs.
appellate decision); see also Craft & Assocs. v. College Am., Inc., 477 F. Supp. 2d 1053,
1055-56 (D.S.D. 2007) (finding no preemption of a claim for breach of oral contract arising
from disputes regarding a fee for creating and placing, and ownership of, various market
media, because the state law claim required proof of existence of agreement, amounts of fee
owed, and nonpayment thereof); Meridian Project Sys., Inc. v. Hardin Constr. Co., 426 F.
Supp. 2d 1101, 1107-08 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (finding no preemption of breach of software
manufacturer's End-User License Agreement, because "mutual assent and consideration
required by a contract claim" constituted an "extra element").
241. See, e.g., Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425, 439
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Brignoli v. Balch Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1201, 1205
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), (noting that the 'extra element' that saves a contract claim from
preemption is the promise itself," and that therefore, "a breach of contract claim is not
preempted even if the contract involves the rights granted to copyright owners under the
Copyright Act"); Kabehie v. Zoland, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 732 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) ("If the
promise was simply to refrain from copying the material or infringing the rights protected
by copyright, then the promisor has promised nothing more than that which was already
required under federal copyright law."); see also Torah Soft Ltd. v. Drosnin, 224 F. Supp. 2d
704 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (acknowledging that unauthorized marketing of software would have
stated claim for copyright infringement, but concluding that promise not to engage in that
conduct constituted "extra element" precluding preemption of breach of contract action).
See generally Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual
Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 137-44 (1999) (describing varying judicial
treatment given to preemption of contract claims).
242. See Madison River Mgmt. Co. v. Bus. Mgmt. Software Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d
436, 443-44 (M.D.N.C. 2005); see also Entous v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 2d 1150,
1159-60 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (rejecting a "categorical rule exempting all breach of contract
claims from preemption" and concluding that an action for breach of an implied promise to
pay based solely on defendant's unauthorized use without payment was preempted);
Fischer v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 535, 541-42 (D. Md. 2000) (adopting a fact-
specific approach to determining equivalency and finding breach of implied contract was
preempted); Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1060-62 (C.D. Cal.
2000) (preempting breach of implied-in-fact claim on grounds that the "implied promise not
to use or copy materials .. .is equivalent to the protection provided by [the Act]" (second
alteration in original)); Green v. Hendrickson Publ'ns, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 784, 788-90 (Ind.
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unauthorized modification of copyrighted software is at heart a claim
for creation of an unauthorized derivative work;243 and a claim that
the defendant violated the exclusivity provisions in an agreement to
license the rights to broadcast motion pictures was at its heart only a
claim for breach of the plaintiffs exclusive right to perform those
works.244
The invocation of the "extra element" test to determine
"equivalence" has raised particularly difficult questions in the context
of alleged violations of shrinkwrap licenses since these licenses, which
are treated by many state courts as a form of contract, are obviously
being used as alternative means to protect against the unauthorized
reproduction and distribution of the uncopyrightable elements
(information and databases) contained in copyrightable computer
programs. 245  Thus, the plaintiffs are seeking to use these
"contractual" provisions to obtain copyright-like protection, i.e.,
against unauthorized reproduction and distribution, for materials that
2002) (finding preemption of claims for failure to pay royalties pursuant to contract
between copyright owners and publishing company and for continuing to print additional
copies of books after expiration of contract). But see supra text accompanying notes 203-209
(discussing Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426 (8th
Cir. 1993)).
In Santa-Rosa v. Combo Records, a singer sought rescission of his contract with a
recording company based on its alleged material breach. 471 F.3d 224, 226 (1st Cir. 2006),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2265 (2007). In holding that this claim was preempted by § 301, the
court noted that success on the plaintiffs rescission claim would result in there being no
written agreement between the parties, and that then the court would be required to
interpretation of § 201(b) of the Copyright Act to determine ownership of the recordings. Id.
at 227. "In such a case, there is little question that we would be merely determining
whether [the plaintiff] was entitled to compensation because of 'mere copying' or
'performance, distribution or display' of his recordings." Id. (quoting Data Gen. Corp. v.
Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1164 (1st Cir. 1994)).
243. See Evolution, Inc. v. Suntrust Bank, 342 F. Supp. 2d 943, 960 (D. Kan. 2004)
(finding preemption, because the claim did not assert an "extra element," and
distinguishing between claim involving violation of a copyright license, in which case
breach of contract action is permitted, and claims alleging that defendant's conduct
exceeded scope of license, in which case only action for infringement could be brought).
244. See Am. Movie Classics Co. v. Turner Entm't Co., 922 F. Supp. 926, 931-32
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Tannenbaum v. Corbis Sygma, No. 02 Civ. 5066 (LTS), 2002 WL
3178813, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2002) (holding that a prayer for injunctive relief against
"unauthorized licensing" was preempted, since it merely sought to assert copyright owner's
right of distribution).
245. See generally Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright
and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479, 482
(1995) (arguing that while breach of boilerplate contract teams may present strong
arguments for preemption, courts should avoid a bright-line approach); Nathan Smith,
Comment, The Shrinkwrap Snafu: Untangling the "Extra Element" in Breach of Contract
Claims Based on Shrinkwrap Licenses, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1373, 1375 (arguing for
preemption because shrinkwrap licenses contravene the Copyright Act's fair use doctrine
and are undesirable from a public policy standpoint).
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are outside the narrower definition of the "subject matter of
copyright." Nonetheless, two of the courts of appeals to have
considered the application of § 301 to shrinkwrap licenses have
concluded that state contract claims were not preempted.
In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, the plaintiff had compiled
information from hundreds of telephone directories into a computer
database. 246 It sold this database on CD-ROM discs; the box in which
the discs were sold contained a restrictive license, limiting their use by
the purchaser to non-commercial purposes, and the box was enclosed
with a cellophane wrapper, along with language that indicated that
opening the box and using the software constituted assent to the
terms of the license. 247 The defendant disregarded the terms of the
license and sold the plaintiffs database on the Internet; the plaintiff
then sued for breach of contract. 248 Reversing the district court's
conclusion that this state law claim was preempted by § 301, Judge
Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit, held that the plaintiffs
rights under its shrinkwrap agreements with purchasers of its
product, such as the defendant, were not "equivalent to" any of the
rights within the general scope of copyright.
249
The court offered two rationales for this conclusion. First,
rights created by the Copyright Act are rights established by law
rather than by agreement, and they are rights against the world. By
contrast, contracts create rights only between the parties thereto, and
strangers are unaffected by the agreement.250  The terms and
conditions in a contract "reflect private ordering, essential to the
efficient functioning of markets."251 The court asserted that federal
preemption provisions in general do not reach such voluntary,
246. 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
247. Id. at 1459.
248. Id. The plaintiff also asserted claims for copyright infringement,
misappropriation, unfair competition, and violation of Wisconsin's Computer Crimes Act.
See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 644 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th
Cir. 1996). The court of appeals found it unnecessary to consider these other claims. See
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
249. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996). Although the
court assumed that the database itself was insufficiently original to be copyrightable, it
nonetheless held that for purposes of § 301, both the software and the data were within the
"subject matter of copyright." See id. at 1454; see also infra text accompanying notes 427-
428 (further discussing this rationale).
250. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453; see supra text accompanying notes 234-235 (discussing
a similar proposition assert in Lipscher v. LRP Publ'ns, Inc., 226 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir.
2001)).
251. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455.
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contractual arrangements 252 between private parties.253  Second,
Judge Easterbrook concluded that allowing state protection for breach
of these contracts would not be inconsistent with the objectives of §
301-to "prevent[] states from substituting their own regulatory
systems for those of the national government." 254  The federal
copyright regime did not seek to interfere with private transactions
with respect to intellectual property, and thus, the 1976 Act did "not
prevent states from respecting those transactions."
255
However, this analysis is incomplete. Even if the defendant's
"promise" (and his breach of that promise) arguably constituted an
"extra element" in the plaintiffs breach of contract action,256 it would
appear that this particular promise was nothing more than an
undertaking by the defendant not to violate the plaintiffs rights under
the Copyright Act-here, the plaintiffs exclusive rights to reproduce
and/or distribute the copyrighted work.257 Of course, the difficulty for
the plaintiff was that since the database was uncopyrightable, the
Copyright Act conferred no reproduction and distribution rights
thereto, and so such a right could exist, if at all, only under state law.
However, since the Act reflects an advertent decision not to protect
databases, the full body of federal law, in fact, reflects the decision to
preempt any state-based rights "equivalent to" reproduction or
distribution rights for those federally unprotectable works. By
permitting the plaintiff to assert a state law claim for the defendant's
unauthorized reproduction and/or distribution of the plaintiffs
252. The characterization of a contract of adhesion, such as a shrinkwrap license, as
"voluntary" unreasonably expands the meaning of that word. It would make far more sense
to permit state law claims, which are not made subject to federal preemption, only for those
contracts which are the product of arms-length bargaining and where the promise not to
engage in prohibited uses was genuinely "voluntary."
253. The court, however, did not suggest that all contract actions were excluded from
the reach of § 301: "we think it prudent to refrain from adopting a rule that anything with
the label 'contract' is necessarily outside the preemption clause." ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. In an earlier part of the opinion, the court of appeals had held that the
contract-the shrinkwrap license-was enforceable under Wisconsin's Uniform
Commercial Code, even though the licenses were inside the box rather than printed on the
outside. See id. at 1451-53. But, promises contained in such contracts of adhesion offer far
weaker support for finding a "promise" as an extra element than promises made with full
knowledge and often as a result of vigorous bargaining.
257. This was the basis for the district court's conclusion that there was no extra
element-or at least none that is "qualitatively different from the underlying copyright
claim." ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 658 (W.D. Wis. 1996). As that court
correctly observed, "in reality, [the plaintiffs] breach of contract claim is nothing more than
an effort to prevent defendants from copying and distributing its data, exactly what it
sought to bar defendants from doing under copyright law." Id. at 657.
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uncopyrightable database, the court of appeals was affording a cause
of action that the Copyright Act affirmatively withheld. 258
Another shrinkwrap case, Bowers v. Baystate Technologies,
Inc.,259 is even more troubling. There, the plaintiff sold its copyrighted
computer program with a shrinkwrap license that prohibited any
reverse engineering. 260  After the defendant copied the plaintiffs
program as a step in creating its own competitive program, the
plaintiff brought claims for both copyright infringement and breach of
contract.261 Rejecting the defendant's argument that the latter claim
was preempted, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld
judgment for the plaintiff on its state law claim.262  The court
recognized that the copying by the defendant that took place, incident
to the process of reverse engineering, would usually be immunized in a
copyright infringement action by the fair use doctrine. 263 However,
the court nonetheless allowed the breach of contract claim, which was
based on the alleged violation of the shrinkwrap promise, to
proceed. 264
Although the court invoked the "extra element" test in support
of that conclusion, 265 it is not at all clear from the opinion what that
"element" was. If the additional piece necessary for the state law
claim was the defendant's promise not to copy, that would have been
nothing more than a promise not to violate one of the rights within the
general scope of § 106. Pursuant to the shrinkwrap license, the
plaintiff was seeking to extract a promise from the defendant not to
258. See also HotSamba, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 01 C 5540, 2004 WL 609797, at
*5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2004) (following ProCD and finding no preemption of a breach of
contract claim, under which defendant agreed to refrain from disclosing confidential
information and had permission to create derivative works provided those works were not
transferred to third parties, because rights claimed by plaintiff were both more expansive
than and more restrictive than those afforded by copyright law).
259. 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See generally David A. Rice, Copyright and
Contract: Preemption After Bowers v. Baystate, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 595 (2004)
(analyzing the Federal Circuit's reasoning in Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc.).
260. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1322.
261. Id.
262. See id. at 1323-25. The Federal Circuit did, however, disagree with the jury
instruction that "copyright law limited the scope of [plaintiffs] contract provision"; the
court still found substantial evidence so as to affirm the jury's verdict despite this error.
See id. at 1326.
263. Id. at 1325. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843
(Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[R]everse engineering object code to discern the unprotectable ideas in a
computer program is a fair use."); accord Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1539
n.18 (11th Cir. 1996); Sega Enters. Ltd v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520-21 (9th Cir.
1992).
264. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1325.
265. See id. at 1324.
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copy, under circumstances where that conduct was implicitly
authorized by the Act. 266 Although the agreement resulted in a
private undertaking not to copy, the defendant's breach of this
"promise" was still only a breach of the kind of right conferred on
plaintiff as the copyright owner, but then restricted by the fair use
doctrine. 267 Indeed, because that doctrine is an equitably-created
limitation on the rights of the copyright owner, the result here is
especially problematic. The plaintiff was seeking to foreclose the
defendant from undertaking activities which not only would be freely
permitted by the public at large, but which would have benefited the
public by the creation of another work. Thus, the suit for breach of
that contractually created state law "right" should have been viewed
as functionally "equivalent to" a suit under the copyright laws for
infringement of that right, and should have been preempted. 268
A more satisfactory application of the preemption doctrine to
shrinkwrap licenses is found in the Fifth Circuit's Vault Corp. v.
Quaid Software Ltd. decision. 269 The plaintiff produced computer
diskettes, incorporating its copyrighted software program, which were
266. See supra text accompanying note 263 (discussing when reverse engineering is
permissible as fair use). The Bowers court observed that "[t]he shrink-wrap agreements in
this case are far broader than the protection afforded by copyright law." 320 F.3d at 1326.
At one level this is surely true; as just noted, the agreements sought to prohibit conduct
that the statute allows. But this observation merely begs the question of whether the
preemption provision in the Copyright Act forecloses the state from in fact affording that
greater level of "protection" under its contract law. The legislative history of § 301,
indicating that one of its goals was the achievement of national uniformity, dictates that
the answer to this question must be a resounding "yes." See supra text accompanying notes
23-24.
267. This case raises the question of whether the defendant could have, by contract,
waived its fair use defense, so that while reverse engineering would normally be
permissible (and even desirable as a vehicle for creating additional works), the defendant
would have been forbidden to engage in conduct otherwise allowable to the rest of the
world. Another unanswered question is whether these contractual restrictions could have
been made binding against third parties: Could the plaintiff also have used the shrinkwrap
license to bar reverse engineering, and the creation of derivative works, by other entities to
whom the defendant might have sold, loaned, or given away the plaintiffs software? Both
of these questions are beyond the scope of this Article.
268. Ironically, the court seemed to recognize this equivalence, by upholding the
district court's decision to drop copyright damages from the combined damage award.
Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1327-28. That decision was correct, it said, because "the breach of
contract damages arose from the same copying and included the same lost sales that form
the basis for the copyright damages." Id. at 1328. See generally Christopher T. Blackford,
Note, Attention Shoppers: The Federal Circuit's Failure to Preempt Contractual Provisions
Prohibiting Reverse Engineering May Create a Blue Light Special on Jurisdictional
Forums, 57 SMU L. REV. 63, 65 (2004) (arguing that "judicial enforcement of contractual
provisions prohibiting reverse engineering will allow plaintiffs seeking copyright
infringement damages to contract around the Copyright Act as if it were a default rule").
269. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
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designed to prevent the unauthorized duplication of other programs
placed on those diskettes by vendors of computer software, who were
the plaintiffs customers. 270 The plaintiffs diskettes were sold in a
package that specifically prohibited the "copying, modification,
translation, decompilation or disassembly of' its program.271 The
defendant also produced and sold diskettes, which contained a
program that was expressly designed to defeat the plaintiffs
protective program. 272 In order to produce its diskettes, the defendant
had first copied plaintiffs program into the memory of its own
computer and then analyzed the manner in which that program
operated.
273
In addition to asserting copyright claims for unauthorized
copying, creation of an unauthorized derivative work, and contributing
to infringement by others (i.e., by the purchasers of defendant's
diskettes), the plaintiff also asserted a claim, pursuant to a state
statute, for breach of its license agreement. 274 After rejecting all of the
plaintiffs federal copyright claims, the court of appeals correctly held
that the state breach of contract claim was preempted.
275
Remarkably, the court made no reference to § 301. Instead, it relied
on the Sears-Compco line of cases 276 for the proposition that state law
that "touches upon an area" governed by federal law, and that would
"set at naught" or deny the benefits of the federal policy embodied in
that federal law, is preempted. 277 Here, the court noted that state law
conflicted with federal law in at least three significant ways.
278
270. Id. at 256.
271. Id. at 257, 257 n.2.
272. See id. at 257.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 258. This state claim was brought under the Louisiana Software License
Enforcement Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1961-66 (2003) (original version at 1984 La.
Acts. 744, § 1). The plaintiff had also asserted a misappropriation claim based on the
Louisiana Uniform Trade Secrets Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1431-39 (2003) (original
version at ch. 1981 La. Acts. 462, §1). The district court had rejected that claim, and
plaintiff abandoned it on appeal. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 268
(5th Cir. 1988).
275. Vault, 847 F.2d at 270.
276. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); see also infra notes 463-477 (discussing the Sears-
Compco cases).
277. Vault, 847 F.2d at 269 (quoting Sears, 376 U.S. at 229). The district court relied
on both the Sears-Compco cases and § 301 to find that plaintiffs state law claim was
preempted. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 762-63 (E.D. La. 1987),
aff'd 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
278. The court of appeals agreed with the district court's findings that,
(1) while the [Louisiana] License Act authorizes a total prohibition on copying,
the Copyright Act allows archival copies and copies made as an essential step in
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However, application of § 301 by the court of appeals would
have produced the same result-preemption of the state claim. Here,
the plaintiffs software clearly satisfied the second prong of the statute
-it was a work falling within the subject matter of copyright, fixed in
a tangible medium of expression. 279 Furthermore, the plaintiff was
essentially seeking overlapping protection under state law, for claims
that were equivalent to its federal claims for unauthorized
reproduction and creation of a derivative work.
280
A consideration of the policy behind § 301 makes clear why
both statutory and conflict preemption were appropriate here.
Federal law has created a balance-affording certain rights to the
owners of copyrightable works, but also limiting those rights and
conferring parallel rights on others to make certain unauthorized uses
of those works, free of any challenge. The allowance of a state claim
here would have altered this balance and would indeed have "set at
naught" the policies that the federal statutes reflect. Thus, this case
also illustrates the complementary relationship between non-statutory
preemption 281 and the preemption mandated by § 301.
By contrast, a recent Eighth Circuit case declined to follow
Vault in another kind of software infringement action.28 2 Its result, in
my view, was an improper refusal to find non-statutory preemption.
The plaintiff, the designer and owner of copyright in computer
software, brought a breach of contract action against other software
designers for unauthorized reverse engineering, based on the
defendants' alleged violation of End-User License Agreements and
Terms of Use agreements. 28 3 The district court had held that this
the utilization of a computer program, 17 U.S.C. § 117; (2) while the License Act
authorizes a perpetual bar against copying, the Copyright Act grants protection
against unauthorized copying only for the life of the author plus fifty years, 17
U.S.C. § 302(a); and (3) while the License Act places no restrictions on programs
which may be protected, under the Copyright Act, only "original works of
authorship" can be protected, 17 U.S.C. § 102.
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269 (5th Cir. 1988).
279. See supra Part II.B.
280. By contrast, in Frontline Test Equipment Inc. v. Greenleaf Software, Inc., 10 F.
Supp. 2d 583, 585 (W.D. Va. 1998), the parties had entered into a written agreement
authorizing the defendant to distribute the plaintiffs software. In violation of that
agreement, the defendant allegedly decompiled the computer code in that software to
create a new, derivative work. Id. at 586. The court properly found that the plaintiffs
breach of contract action contained an essential additional element-the parties'
agreement contained a provision allegedly expressly prohibiting decompilation-and that,
because specific conduct is not among the rights found in the Copyright Act, the breach of
contract claim was not preempted. See id. at 593.
281. See Part III (discussing non-statutory bases for preemption).
282. Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 638 (8th Cir. 2005).
283. See id. at 633, 636-37.
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state law claim was not preempted by § 301, and the defendants did
not pursue that defense. 28 4 Instead, on appeal, they relied only on
non-statutory (conflict) preemption. Rejecting this argument, the
court of appeals concluded that "the state law at issue here neither
conflicts with the interoperability exception under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)
nor restricts rights given under federal law."28 5  Then, in a single
paragraph, the court-relying on Bowers286 and National Car Rental
28 7
for the proposition that parties may contractually promise not to
engage in conduct that is otherwise permitted by the copyright laws,
including the right to engage in reverse engineering or to rely on the
fair use doctrine-concluded that the contractual claims were not
preempted. 288 However, here too, the court failed to give appropriate
heed to the policies underlying the copyright regime.
As has already been emphasized, the copyright laws give
certain rights to copyright owners but withhold rights from others,
both in recognition of the important interests of the users of
copyrighted works and, of equal importance, because certain uses are
likely to result in the creation of additional, and potentially valuable,
new works. In setting forth the scope and extent of those rights that
have been granted and withheld, Congress made a determination of
the appropriate level of protection for creative expressions.
28 9
Contracts limiting the ability of others to create new works-when the
copyright laws would freely permit, if not encourage, such behavior-
result in a distortion of the federal balance between rewards to
copyright owners and the encouragement of innovation and creativity.
Allowing a contractual restriction under state law on otherwise
protected conduct harms society, and thus, it is inconsistent with this
284. Id. at 638 n.9; see also supra note 240 (discussing the district court's decisions).
285. Davidson, 422 F.3d at 639.
286. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see supra text
accompanying notes 259-268.
287. Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir.
1993); see supra text accompanying notes 203-209.
288. Id.; see also Meridian Project Sys., Inc. v. Hardin Constr. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d
1101, 1109 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1324-25) (finding no preemption of
breach of software manufacturer's End-User License Agreement, which prohibited reverse
engineering, because "[r]everse engineering is not within the scope of the exclusive rights of
copyright.").
289. Cf. Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 585-86 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that
attempt to terminate licensing agreement of non-specified duration, pursuant to state
contract law, was preempted, because contradicted the method and timeframe for
termination of licenses set forth in § 203 of Copyright Act); Valente-Kritzer Video v.
Pinckney, 881 F.2d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming dismissal of claim for breach of
alleged oral agreement on the grounds that "[slection 204(a) not only bars copyright
infringement actions but also breach of contract claims based on oral agreements").
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overall body of law, which was enacted pursuant to constitutional
authority that itself embodies this balance between the interests of
authors and others.
f. Claims for Misuse of Trade Secrets
The continued availability of state law claims for most
instances of misuse of trade information or trade secrets, either by
breach of a promise of confidentiality or by obtaining that information
by improper means, is justified both by the extra element test and by
sound policy analysis. 290 The particular contours of these claims will
of course be determined by state law, including both the information
subject to protection and the defendant's allegedly improper conduct
that will support a claim. But, generally, such claims will require
proof that the information was novel and had some business value;
that the plaintiff took reasonable steps to keep it secret; and either
that the information was conveyed to the defendant with a promise
(and expectation) of confidentiality or that the defendant obtained the
information by theft, fraud, or other misconduct. 291 These are all
important "extra elements" that would not need to be proven if the
plaintiffs claim were merely for the unauthorized "reproduction" or
"distribution" of material within the subject matter of copyright.
292
Judicial treatment of these claims has not been particularly
problematic. Most courts that have considered this issue have
properly found that state claims for misappropriation of trade secrets
require proof of an "extra element" and thus, are not preempted by §
301. For example, in Dun & Bradstreet Software Services, Inc. v.
Grace Consulting, Inc.,293 the plaintiff sought relief for the defendant's
290. Allowing state protection for trade secret protection is also consistent with the
legislative intent. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5748 ("The evolving common law right[] of ... trade secrets . . . would remain
unaffected as long as the causes of action contain elements, such as ... a breach of trust or
confidentiality, that are different in kind from copyright infringement.").
291. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1)-(2), (4), 14 U.L.A. 537-38 (2005).
292. Since the information or secrets taken are usually in the form of data or facts,
an alternate basis for asserting that a state law claim would not be preempted is arguably
that the "work" taken does not fall within the "subject matter of copyright." See, e.g., Dun &
Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2002)
(finding that claim for misappropriation of customer lists was not preempted by § 301(b)(1),
because they were "not subject to copyright"). However, a number of courts have held that
even such unprotectable matter falls within that prong of § 301. See infra text
accompanying notes 404, 416-420, 425-428.
293. 307 F.3d at 216-18.
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misappropriation of software and customer lists. The district court
had dismissed the plaintiffs claim, finding it preempted by § 301.294
Applying the "extra element" test, the Third Circuit reversed.
It concluded that the plaintiff could not recover merely by proving
unauthorized copying of its software, and therefore, that a "state law
misappropriation of trade secrets claim that requires proof of a breach
of duty of trust or confidence to the plaintiff through the improper
disclosure of confidential materials is qualitatively different because it
is not an element of copyright infringement. ' 295 Even the handful of
cases that have dismissed the trade secret claim have used this "extra
294. Id. at 216.
295. Id. at 218 (emphasis added). Other courts of appeals have reached similar
conclusions. See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1165 (1st
Cir. 1994) ("[P]articipation in the breach of a duty of confidentiality-an element that
forms no part of a copyright infringement claim-represents unfair competitive conduct
qualitatively different from mere unauthorized copying."); Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21
F.3d 568, 574 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655,
660 (4th Cir. 1993)) (following Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co. and finding no
preemption because misappropriation claim required "proof of breach of confidence"); Gates
Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 847-48 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding that a
trade secret claim was not preempted since it required proof of extra element of "breach of
a duty of trust or confidence"); Trandes, 996 F.2d at 660 ("[B]reach of a duty of trust or
confidentiality comprises the core of actions for trade secret misappropriation, and
'supplies the "extra element" that qualitatively distinguishes such trade secret causes of
action from claims for copyright infringement that are based solely upon copying."' (quoting
Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 717 (2d Cir. 1992))); S.O.S., Inc. v.
Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1090 n.13 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding no preemption because the
state trade secrets claim "prohibiting certain means of obtaining confidential information"
did not involve a legal right equivalent to any such rights under the 1976 Act); see also
Huckshold v. HSSL, L.L.C., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1209-10 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (finding no
preemption because the misappropriation of trade secret claim required the extra element
of "breach of duty of trust or confidentiality"); Assoc. of Am. Med. Colleges v. Princeton
Review, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 2d 11, 23-24 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding that the extra element of
proof of "improper acquisition of secret material or a breach of confidentiality" precluded
preemption); Higher Gear Group, Inc. v. Rockenbach Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 2d
953, 957-58 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (noting that the requirement that plaintiff prove "breach of
confidential relationship" is an additional element that changes nature of action from
copyright infringement); Firoozye v. EarthLink Network, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1130-31
(N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that there was no preemption, because a trade secret claim
requires proof that information was "not . .. generally known to public" and that
reasonable efforts were taken to maintain its secrecy); Tingley Sys., Inc. v. CSC Consulting,
Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 95, 107 (D. Mass. 2001) (following Data General and finding that the
element of "breach of a confidential relationship" precluded preemption for trade secret
claims); Micro Data Base Sys., Inc. v. Nellcor Puritan-Bennett, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1258,
1262 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (finding that the extra element of "breach of trust" precluded
preemption); cf. Fischer v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 535, 542-44 (D. Md. 2000)
(dismissing a claim for breach of confidential arrangement, based on defendant's use of
plaintiffs idea for a television program, and noting that, while the "Act does not preempt
such claims because they involve the extra element of a confidential promise or duty of
trust between the parties," plaintiff inadequately pleaded existence of confidential
relationship).
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element" approach, but then have held the claim to be preempted
because the specific nature of the plaintiffs action did not require
proof of such an element.
296
Policy analysis also supports the conclusion that such actions
ought not to be preempted. The public welfare is advanced by
encouraging the creator of ideas, customer lists, collections of "data,"
or other business information to share that information with, or to
convey it to, others if he or she wishes to do so. However, in most
cases, that creator understandably will agree to share that
information only under a promise of confidentiality and an expectation
of compensation either for its use or for its improper disclosure. There
is also a public interest in allowing the creator the alternative, if he or
she so chooses, of maintaining the secrecy of that information and
remaining secure from its improper appropriation.
It is a basic principle that facts, processes, ideas, and the like
are unprotected by copyright, 297 and therefore, resort to the copyright
regime for their protection and exploitation is unavailable. In the
absence of the enforceability under state law of a promise of
confidentiality and nondisclosure, it is likely that much information
would simply not be shared with others, thereby diminishing societal
economic welfare. Indeed, absent the ability to control and then reap
certain rewards for that sharing, oftentimes the information would
never be gathered or assembled in the first place, in which case society
would be even worse off. Similarly, if state law could not provide
296. See, e.g., Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 303-05 (6th Cir. 2004)
(recognizing that claims for misappropriation of trade secrets are usually not preempted,
but affirming dismissal of plaintiffs claims because allegedly misappropriated works did
not constitute trade secrets); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1549 (11th Cir.
1996) (stating that, "as a general matter, state law trade secret statutes have been deemed
not to be preempted because the plaintiff must prove the existence and breach of a
confidential relationship in order to prevail," but ultimately finding insufficient evidence to
establish existence of a confidential relationship); Evolution, Inc. v. Suntrust Bank, 342 F.
Supp. 2d 943, 963 (D. Kan. 2004) (preempting a trade secret claim for failure to allege the
extra element of breach of the duty of trust); Keane v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 297 F.
Supp. 2d 921, 944-45 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (rejecting a trade secret claim because plaintiff could
not establish that his idea was conveyed in confidence or that an express or implied
contractual relationship existed between him and the defendants) (alternative holding),
aff'd, 129 F. App'x 874 (5th Cir. 2005); Idema v. Dreamworks, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 1129,
1194-95 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (concluding that a trade secret claim was preempted, not only
because plaintiff did not make requisite "disclosure," but also because alleged "trade
secrets" were plaintiffs idea and expressions"), aff'd in part, dismissed in part, 90 F. App'x
496 (9th Cir. 2004); Avco Corp. v. Precision Air Parts, Inc., No. 79-275-N, 1980 U.S. Dis.
LEXIS 16413, at *8 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 4, 1980) (preempting plaintiffs claim because it did
"not require the elements of an invasion of privacy, a trespass, a breach of trust or a breach
of confidentiality"), aff'd on other grounds, 676 F.2d 494 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
297. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
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remedies against persons who use improper means to obtain trade
secrets, firms would have to incur significant and unnecessary
expenses to insure their continued secrecy, and "bad behavior" would
be undeterred and go unpunished. Affording protection for this
conduct under state law, then, benefits society without undermining
any of the values of the copyright regime.
g. Right of Publicity
Courts have had substantial difficulty wrestling with the
proper scope of the preemption of a state right of publicity claim. One
of the more important decisions dealing with these claims is Baltimore
Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n.298 The Players
Association asserted that the agreements between Major League
Baseball and television broadcasters, providing for the telecast of the
players' "performances" during baseball games, without their
permission, constituted a violation of their right of publicity. 299 The
Seventh Circuit held that these state law claims were preempted.300
In a portion of the opinion that continues to be a matter of controversy
more than two decades later,30 1 the court initially concluded that
because the performances were fixed in tangible form in copyrightable
works-principally on videotapes-they fell within the "subject matter
of copyright."30 2 The court then concluded that the second portion of
the first prong of § 301 was also satisfied, because the rights claimed
by the plaintiffs under state law30 3 were equivalent to the right to
"perform" the audiovisual works, which federal law affords exclusively
to the copyright owner, and that the very same conduct-the alleged
unauthorized broadcasts-gave rise to both claims.30 4  The Seventh
298. 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986). For further discussion of the Baltimore Orioles
decision, see generally David A. Shipley, Three Strikes and They're Out at the Old Ball
Game: Preemption of Performers' Right of Publicity Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 20
ARiz. ST. L. J. 369 (1988), and Shelley Ross Saxer, Note, Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major
League Baseball Players Association: The Right of Publicity in Game Performances and
General Copyright Preemption, 36 UCLA L. REV. 861 (1989).
299. See Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 667, 667 n.2.
300. Id. at 674-75.
301. See infra note 418 and accompanying text.
302. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 675; see also infra notes 410-419 and
accompanying text (further discussing the court's treatment of this issue in detail).
303. "[T]he Players consistently have maintained that their rights of publicity
permit them to control telecasts of their performances, and that televised broadcasts of
their performances made without their consent violate their rights of publicity in their
performances." Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 677.
304. See id. The court offered several examples of claims which would not have been
preempted, because they required significantly different evidence than infringement of a
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Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs' suggestion that the state and federal
rights were not equivalent because they served different interests;
however, the court did not follow the more straight-forward approach,
which would have been a recognition that such "interests," or, more
broadly, the legislative motivation for the enactment of a statute, are
not "elements" of a claim for purposes of determining "equivalence."
Instead, the court held that both bodies of law served a similar
purpose, which was offering incentives for the creation of works that
would "appeal to the public." 30 5 Nonetheless, this case serves as an
important precedent for the proposition that many right of publicity
claims satisfy the "equivalence" requirement and therefore, should be
preempted because they overlap with or duplicate claims under the
copyright regime.
30 6
A comparably straightforward situation for finding that a right
of publicity claim was not preempted is presented by a case like
Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch.30 7  Several decades after a
photographer had taken pictures of the plaintiffs, the photographer
entered into a contract with the defendant-clothing retailer-
unbeknownst to, and without the agreement of, the plaintiffs-
allowing the defendant to use those photographs in its catalog.
308
Although the claim was denominated as an action for
misappropriation of the plaintiffs' names and likenesses, the court
properly evaluated it as one for breach of the right of publicity.
30 9
Rejecting the assertion that this action was preempted by § 301, the
Ninth Circuit properly held that, although the plaintiffs' personas
were embodied in the copyrightable photographs, the subject matter of
right of "performance." See id. at 676 n.24. These included the use by a company, without
the player's consent, of his name or likeness to advertise its product; the placement of the
player's photograph on a playing card; and marketing a game based on the player's career
statistics. Id.
305. Id. at 678 ("Contrary to the [P]layers' contention, the interest underlying the
recognition of the right of publicity also is the promotion of performances that appeal to the
public.").
306. Although not dispositive, it is noteworthy that here the Players had also
asserted-unsuccessfully-a claim for copyright infringement. See id. at 667-73 (concluding
that the Players did not own the copyright in telecasts of their baseball games and that the
parties did not expressly agree to "rebut the statutory presumption that employer owns the
copyright in a works made for hire").
307. 265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001). For a further discussion of Downing, see generally
Erin C. Hansen, Note, The Right of Publicity Expands Into Hallowed Ground: Downing v.
Abercrombie & Fitch and the Preemption Power of the Copyright Act, 71 UMKC L. REV. 171
(2002).
308. Downing, 265 F.3d at 999-1000.
309. See id. at 1000, 1003. Because the plaintiffs had no copyright interest in the
photographs, they would have had no rights against the defendant under the Copyright
Act.
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their claims was the unauthorized use of their names and
likenesses.310 Furthermore, the action for the defendant's use of their
personas, which required evidence that the defendant's actions were
undertaken for commercial purposes and without the plaintiffs'
permission,311 alleged meaningful additional elements.
Far more problematic in its treatment of the preemption of the
right of publicity is another Ninth Circuit decision, Wendt v. Host
International, Inc.,312 which is among the most frequently-discussed
and heavily-criticized decisions dealing with this question.31 3 The
plaintiffs had respectively portrayed Norm and Cliff on the long-
running Cheers television program; it was produced by Paramount,
which also owned the copyright in the show. 31 4 After securing a
license from Paramount, the defendant decided to open several Cheers
airport bars. To help evoke the Cheers theme, Host placed
"animatronic" figures 31 5 resembling the characters of Norm and Cliff
in front of and inside those bars.
310. Id. at 1003-04.
311. See id. at 1001, 1005; see also Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 657-59 (5th Cir.
2000) (upholding the district court's determination that § 301 did not preempt a
misappropriation claim based on defendants' unauthorized use of plaintiffs' names and
likenesses (their personas) to promote sales of unlawfully made cassettes and CDs of
musical works and sound recordings on which plaintiffs retained copyright).
312. 50 F.3d 18, 1995 WL 115571 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision), rev'd,
125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997).
313. For various criticisms of Wendt and the right of publicity, see Rothman, supra
note 6, at 210-12, 259-61; Michael J. Albano, Note, Nothing to "Cheer" About: A Call for
Reform of the Right of Publicity in Audiovisual Characters, 90 GEO. L.J. 253 (2001);
Jennifer Choi, Comment, No Room for Cheers: Schizophrenic Application in the Realm of
Right of Publicity Protection, 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 121 (2002); Dawn H. Dawson,
Note, The Final Frontier: Right of Publicity in Fictional Characters, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
635 (2001); Sean Elliot, Note, Dancing Promotions, Dodging Preemption, and Defending
Personas: Why Preempting the Right of Publicity Deprives Talent the Publicity Protection
They Deserve, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1625, 1649-50 (1998); Ashley D. Hayes, Note, The
Right of Publicity and Protection of Personas: Preemption Not Required, 51 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1049 (2001); Peter K. Yu, Note, Fictional Persona Test: Copyright Preemption in
Human Audiovisual Characters, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 355 (1998); see also Vincent M. de
Grandpr6, Understanding the Market for Celebrity: An Economic Analysis of the Right of
Publicity, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 73 (2001) (arguing that the
current right of publicity is overbroad and suggesting that celebrity identities be protected
by liability, not property, rules); Melissa B. Jacoby & Diane Leenheer Zimmerman,
Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries of the Right of Publicity, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322 (2002) (examining the right of publicity in the context of a debtor-
creditor system and asserting that celebrity personas should be treated as commodities).
314. Wendt v. Host Int'l Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
315. "As best the record discloses, these are life-size stuffed dolls that move
somewhat and play pre-recorded quips." Id. at 1284, 1284 n.4.
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The plaintiffs brought an action under California's right of
publicity statute and its common law doctrine, based on the
defendant's unauthorized use of their identities or likenesses.
Reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment for the
defendants, the Ninth Circuit held, in a decision containing minimal
analysis, that these claims were not preempted because they required
proof of additional elements beyond those needed to make out a
copyright claim-specifically, "proof that the defendant's use of the
plaintiffs 'likeness' or 'identity' was commercial (i.e. connected with
selling or promoting a product), whereas copyright infringement
occurs with any unauthorized copying of the protected material."
3 16
This supposed "additional element" is, in fact, meaningless for
proper preemption analysis. Every episode in the Cheers series
constituted an audiovisual work. The use by the defendant in Wendt
of the materials from that series, which inevitably used a depiction of
the characters in that show,317 involved either the reproduction and
then the distribution of copyrightable elements of those works, or the
creation and then the distribution of derivative works of those works.
These uses of the Cheers program were among the exclusive rights
conferred by the 1976 Act on Paramount, the copyright owner, or on
its licensee. Therefore, had anyone else-and that includes the
plaintiffs-made photographs, posters, paintings, or even animatronic
figures of those copyrighted elements, or made derivative works
thereof, Paramount would have had a claim for copyright
316. Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 50 F.3d 18, 1995 WL 115571, at *1 (9th Cir. 1995)
(unpublished table decision). Initially, in a decision which the court had indicated as not
appropriate for publication, the Ninth Circuit made the bald, and erroneous, assertion that,
"[a]t the outset, we wish to make it clear that this is not a preemption case." Id.
Presumably, the court meant that it had concluded that, under appropriate, albeit absent,
analysis, the right of publicity claim was not preempted. Upon remand, the district court
had granted summary judgment for the defendants on other grounds; on review of that
decision, the Ninth Circuit again reversed, this time in a published decision. Wendt v. Host
Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 1997). In that decision, which involved a different
panel of judges, review of the preemption issue was confined to whether its earlier
conclusion was affected by an intervening state court case, Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr.
2d 645 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). See also infra note 318 (discussing Fleet). The court of appeals
concluded that this decision did not affect its "no preemption" conclusion, since
"[a]ppellants here [were] not seeking to prevent Paramount from exhibiting its copyrighted
work in the Cheers series." Wendt, 125 F.3d at 810.
317. Since the plaintiffs were the only actors who portrayed these characters, it
would have been surprising had the animatronic depiction of the characters not borne some
resemblance to the plaintiffs. In fact, after remand from the first court of appeals decision,
the district court had made an in-court inspection of the robots and found that there was
not "any similarity at all" to the plaintiffs themselves. Id. at 809. The court of appeals
reversed, finding that there were disputed issues of material fact on this question,
requiring evaluation at trial. Id.
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infringement. Even if it is true that Paramount's subsequent use of
its own copyrighted works was commercial-and showing Cheers in
syndicated form or creating a sequel series using the characters from
Cheers would certainly also have been commercial-that added "fact"
or "element" in a right of publicity action does not, by itself, properly
give rise to a claim that is not "equivalent to" the rights conferred on
the copyright owner by § 106. Because the state claim substantially
interfered with rights conferred on Paramount by federal law, it
should have been preempted.
318
Toney v. L'Oreal USA, Inc.319 is less problematic, although it
also concluded that the state right of publicity claim was not
preempted. The defendants, manufacturers of hair-care products,
owned the copyright to the plaintiffs photograph; she had authorized
the defendants to use her likeness, as reflected by that photograph, on
product packaging and in magazine advertisements for a defined time
period. 320 She alleged that, after the expiration of that time, the
defendants continued to use her likeness on packaging and promotion
without her permission. The district court concluded that her right of
318. Several of the defects in the court's reasoning are well analyzed by Judge
Kozinski's opinion, dissenting from the court's decision denying the petition for rehearing
en banc. Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 1999). As he noted, "[t]he parties
are fighting over the same bundle of intellectual property rights-the right to make
dramatic representations of the characters Norm and Cliff." Id. at 1286 (emphasis added).
While the source of their claims-the plaintiffs relied on state law, the defendants' rights
arose under the federal Copyright Act--obviously differed, the nature of those rights, which
involved the distribution and display of likenesses of the Cheers characters portrayed by
the plaintiffs, was the same.
A California state court reached a far sounder result in a case presenting similar issues.
Fleet, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 645. The plaintiffs were actors in a motion picture film, the
copyright for which was owned by the defendant. The plaintiffs had been involved in
unsuccessful litigation with the production company because they had allegedly not been
paid for their performances. Id. at 647. Therefore, after CBS released the film on videotape,
they brought an action against CBS for violation of their right of publicity, asserting that it
did not have their permission to utilize their names, pictures, or likenesses in conjunction
with its commercial exploitation of the film. Id. In affirming the trial court's conclusions
that these claims were preempted, the court of appeals distinguished several decisions that
allowed state claims for such uncopyrightable elements as an individual's face, name, or
voice, to proceed. See id. at 650-53. Here, by contrast, these plaintiffs-as was true of the
plaintiffs in Wendt-were seeking to limit the copyright owner's exercise of rights conferred
on it by the Copyright Act. Id. at 650. Therefore, the California court was correct in its
conclusions that these plaintiffs were "seek[ing] to prevent CBS from using performances
captured on film," id. at 651; that these performances were copyrightable; and "that a party
who does not hold the copyright in a performance captured on film cannot prevent the one
who does from exploiting it by resort to state law." Id. at 652-53.
319. 406 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2005).
320. Id. at 907.
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publicity claim was preempted. 21  In an earlier opinion in the
proceedings, the Seventh Circuit had concluded that the claim was
"based upon her right to publicity in her likeness in photographic
form," and that, therefore, the "likeness" was within the subject
matter of copyright. 322 Upon rehearing, the panel vacated its original
opinion and reversed the district court.
323
The court of appeals concluded that the plaintiffs right of
publicity claim was not preempted because it satisfied neither of the
prongs of § 301. As to the first prong, the court mistakenly asserted,
as had the Ninth Circuit in Wendt, 324 that the "commercial purpose"
requirement in the state statute constituted the necessary extra
element, making the state action not "equivalent to" a copyright
infringement action.325 But, the very essence of the bundle of rights
conferred by § 106-which affords the copyright owner the right "to do
and to authorize" others to do a number of activities-is the conferral
on the copyright owner of the economic benefits from the exploitation
of those rights.326 The Seventh Circuit buttressed its reliance on the
"commercial purpose" element of plaintiffs cause of action by
asserting that the "defendants did not have [plaintiffs] consent to
continue to use the photograph, and therefore, they stripped Toney of
her right to control the commercial value of her identity."327 However,
the financial implications of the allegedly unlawful behavior do not
alter the underlying nature of the plaintiffs claim; it was akin to a
claim for the unauthorized reproduction and distribution of a
copyrighted work-the photograph-which typically will have
commercial implications.
321. Toney v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., No. 02 C 3002, 2002 WL 31455975, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 1, 2002), vacated in part, 406 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2005).
322. Toney v. L'Oreal U.S.A., Inc., 384 F.3d 486, 490 (7th Cir. 2004). However, the
plaintiff could not have brought a copyright infringement action because, as noted, the
defendant owned the copyright in the photograph. The court of appeals wondered why the
plaintiff had not asserted a breach of contract action against the defendant, "which would
have most likely avoided these copyright preemption issues." Id. at 492.
323. Toney v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 911 (7th Cir. 2005).
324. See supra text accompanying notes 314-318.
325. See Toney, 406 F.3d at 910. The failure of the right of publicity claim to satisfy
the first prong of § 301-similarity to the bundle of rights afforded by § 106-may be
supported by the court's statement that the copyright laws do not reach or protect "an
amorphous concept" like identity. Id. However, this assertion actually sounds more like a
failure to meet the "subject matter of copyright" requirement (the second prong of § 301)
than a divergence from any of the "rights" conferred by the Act.
326. Cf. Laws v. Sony Music Enter., Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007) (finding preemption of a voice misappropriation claim where
the plaintiff-singer had contracted away the right to license her master recordings); see also
infra notes 338-344.
327. Toney, 406 F.3d at 910.
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Nonetheless, the court's conclusion of non-preemption is still
justified because the plaintiffs claim did not satisfy the second
"subject matter of copyright" prong.328  Importantly, the premise
underlying the plaintiffs claim was not for the unauthorized use of a
particular photograph, but rather, as in Downing,3 29 for the use of her
identity or persona.330 An action for violation of that interest was not
within the scope of § 102, because, unlike the photograph, her identity
could not be a "work of authorship," and it was not "fixed in a tangible
medium of expression. '" 331
328. See infra Part II.B.1.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 307-311.
330. As the court noted, the offending photograph was "merely one copyrightable
,expression' of the underlying 'work,' which is the plaintiff as a human being." Toney, 406
F.3d at 908-09 (citation omitted). There could be hundreds of other photographs of the
plaintiff, each separately entitled to copyright protection and potentially owned by an equal
number of photographers (or their assignees). By contrast, there can only be one persona of
a person, and it is that identity which is protected by the right of publicity. Id. at 909.
331. Following a similar approach, the court in KNB Enterprises v. Matthews,
incorrectly held that a right of publicity claim was not preempted. 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 723
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000). The plaintiff was the copyright owner of several hundred photographs;
the models in those photos had assigned their right of publicity. Without obtaining the
plaintiffs permission, the defendant displayed those photographs on his website. Id. at 716.
The court held that the plaintiffs state law claim-for misappropriation of the models'
right of publicity-could proceed; it concluded that the subjects of the claims were the
model's uncopyrightable likenesses rather than the copyrighted photographs, and that the
right of publicity generally does not fall within the subject matter of copyright. Id. at 723.
But here, unlike in Toney, the use of the models' personas was not essential to the
defendant's conduct; rather, he simply made an unauthorized web posting of their faces
and bodies without revealing their names or identities. See Id. at 716, 718. And here,
where the essence of the plaintiffs claim arose out of the unauthorized reproduction,
distribution, and display of those photographs, the court did not even suggest that this
right of publicity action asserted any additional element.
Another incorrect decision is Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp.
2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998). The defendants had obtained a videotape of the plaintiffs-Bret
Michaels and Pamela Anderson Lee-engaged in sexual intercourse (the Tape). Id. at 828.
Asserting claims both of copyright infringement and breach of their California right of
publicity, they sought a preliminary injunction barring the defendants from distributing or
displaying the Tape on the Internet. Id. at 829. The court held that, because "the plaintiffs
[had] alleged that the defendants [had] used their names, likenesses, and identities on
radio, television, and the Internet to advertise the imminent distribution of the Tape," the
conduct underlying the claim was "unrelated to the elements of copyright infringement,
which are concerned only with distribution of the Tape itself." Id. at 837. But, of course,
these proffered "extra elements" are, at best, trivial. Virtually every distribution of an
audiovisual work will include an identification of the subject of the work, including the
actors, if any, and the distributor often will include their photographs on the box of the
videotape or in advertisements used in connection with that activity. If the distribution of
this Tape indeed was unauthorized, the plaintiffs could have obtained full relief under the
federal copyright laws; the state claim added nothing meaningful either by way of subject
matter or of rights.
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This narrower approach to the "subject matter of copyright"
prong of § 301 was also given an improper application in a pair of
older Ninth Circuit cases that dealt with "voice imitation"-Midler v.
Ford Motor Co. 332 and Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc. 33 3 In both cases, the
same defendants-an advertiser and its agency-had initially solicited
the participation by the respective plaintiffs, Bette Midler and Tom
Waits, in commercials for their products. After being turned down by
Midler and Waits, the defendants hired less-famous singers to imitate
the plaintiffs' unique vocal styles for their commercials.33 4 In actions
seeking recovery for violation of their rights of publicity, the Ninth
Circuit upheld both trial courts' refusals to dismiss these actions on
preemption grounds for the simple reason that a "voice is not
copyrightable." 335  However, as discussed more fully below,336 the
"subject matter of copyright" also includes the uncopyrightable
elements of copyrighted works. As recording artists, both Midler and
Waits had made numerous copyrighted sound recordings, of which
their distinctive voices were essential elements. Rather than viewing
the absence of protection for a performer's voice as an instance of a
presumed "right" that somehow had fallen between the cracks of the
federal copyright regime, the better view is that any failure to permit
relief to Midler and Waits can be seen as part of the congressional
design regarding those creations that will, and those that will not, get
protection under either federal or state law.337
By contrast, in a recent case, the Ninth Circuit properly upheld
the dismissal of a different state right of publicity claim on preemption
grounds. 338 The plaintiff, a professional vocalist, had performed a
332. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
333. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
334. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1093, 1097-98; Midler, 849 F.2d at 461.
335. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100; Midler, 849 F.2d at 462. The Midler court continued:
"The sounds are not 'fixed.' What is put forward as protectible [sic] here is more personal
than any work of authorship." 849 F.2d at 462. The Ninth Circuit adhered to this analysis
in Waits: "Waits' claim, like Bette Midler's, is for infringement of voice, not for
infringement of a copyrightable subject such as sound recording or musical composition."
978 F.2d at 1100.
336. See infra Part II.B.1.
337. In a case decided between the Midler and Waits cases-White v. Samsung
Electronics America, Inc.-Vanna White successfully asserted a right of publicity claim
against a manufacturer of electronic goods, which had used, in a commercial, a robot
dressed in clothing, and arrayed on a set, which would evoke White's role on the "Wheel of
Fortune" television show. 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit permitted
her right of publicity action to proceed without even addressing the possibility that her
claim might be preempted by the copyright laws. See id. at 1397-99.
338. Laws v. Sony Music Enter., Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006), cert
denied, 127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007).
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song that was embodied in a sound recording; she did not have
copyright interests in either the song or the sound recording. 33 9 She
brought an action for invasion of privacy for the misappropriation of
her name and voice, and for violation of her right of publicity,
340
against a recording company that had incorporated a "sample" of her
song in the sound recording of two other recording artists.
341
Upholding the district court's dismissal of her state claims,342 the
court of appeals correctly concluded that her action-although couched
as one for unauthorized use of her likeness and persona, rather than
for unauthorized reproduction of her contribution to the sound
recording-was within the subject matter of copyright, since the
defendant's taking was of a "work of authorship."343 And, in contrast
to Toney, the court also properly concluded that the state law
requirement of proof of a "commercial purpose" necessary to make out
a claim for the right of publicity was not a meaningful "extra element"
in addition to those needed to assert a copyright claim for
unauthorized reproduction, since it did not "transform the nature of
the action."3
44
Numerous other cases have struggled to identify the
appropriate limits of right of publicity actions. 345  Preemption is
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. The defendant had obtained a license from the copyright owners of the song and
the sound recording, authorizing it to engage in that sampling. Id.
342. Id.; see also Laws v. Sony Music Enter., Inc., 294 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (C.D. Cal.
2003).
343. See Laws v. Sony Music Enter., Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1137-43 (9th Cir. 2006).
344. Id. at 1144. The court adopted the defendant's assertion that the voice
misappropriation claim was "not qualitatively different from the rights protected under
copyright law because the sole basis for her voice misappropriation claim is the
unauthorized reproduction of her copyrighted vocal performance." Id. The court
distinguished Midler and Waits, because here the defendant had engaged in the
unauthorized "sampling," or copying, of the plaintiffs actual sound recording to create a
new sound recording, rather than merely using a "sound alike." Id. at 1040-41.
By contrast, in Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., the court held that a claim under a state
statute protecting against the unauthorized use of one's persona, based on the defendant's
incorporation of the plaintiffs decedent's voice in films, was not preempted. 488 F. Supp. 2d
491 (E.D. Pa. 2007), amended by No. 06-3128, 2007 WL 1575409 (E.D. Penn. May 24, 2007)
(granting request for interlocutory appeal and a stay of the proceedings). The court
distinguished Laws, noting that here the defendant had agreed to limitations on the use of
the sound recordings, and this action was one to enforce those limitations. See id.
345. Courts have, on occasion, cited Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
433 U.S. 562 (1977), as authority for the proposition that rights of publicity actions are not
preempted. See, e.g., Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2000)
("The Supreme Court has recognized that rights of publicity are generally consistent with
the Copyright Act."); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 1992). But
since Zacchini was decided prior to the effective date of the Copyright Act, the Court there
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clearly called for where the claim is based on the unauthorized use of
the copyrighted work itself.346 However, to the extent that plaintiffs
have plausibly asserted a claim for unauthorized use of their identity
or persona, which is separate from the copyrighted works in which
they occasionally are embodied, the majority of these decisions have
held that such claims are not preempted by the copyright laws. The
outcome of some of these cases is consistent with the principles
described in this Article. 347 However, others incorrectly allow the
state law claims to proceed by giving too narrow a scope to the "subject
matter of copyright" or by taking too credulous a view of the proffered
"extra element."348
naturally had no occasion to address the preemptive scope of § 301. As discussed infra note
415, while Mr. Zacchini's publicity claim probably would still survive today, a slight change
in the facts of his cause of action would result in preemption.
346. See, e.g., Stanford v. Caesars Entm't, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 2d 749, 757-59 (W.D.
Tenn. 2006) (preempting claims for breach of rights of privacy and publicity, based on
defendant's use of plaintiffs photograph and voice in previously recorded print and
broadcast advertisements where plaintiffs claims were based on allegedly unauthorized
reproduction or display of copyrighted advertisements); Ahn v. Midway Mfg. Co., 965 F.
Supp. 1134, 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (preempting right of publicity claims, based on allegedly
unauthorized use by a video game producer of a videotaped version of plaintiffs'
performances, because videotapes resulted in fixed versions of choreographic works and
infringement of plaintiffs' rights arose from the distribution and performance of those
works); McMann v. Doe, 460 F. Supp. 2d 259, 268 (D. Mass. 2006) (preempting a claim that
an unknown defendant's posting of plaintiffs information and photograph on a website
violated his common law right of privacy, including a violation of his common law copyright
in the photograph).
347. See Landham, 227 F.3d at 623 (finding no preemption of a claim for the
unauthorized creation and distribution of toy-action figure, allegedly based on plaintiffs
role in a motion picture, where plaintiffs claim was "that the toy evoke[d] his personal
identity-an inchoate 'idea' which [was] not amenable to copyright protection-to his
emotional and financial detriment"); Seifer v. PHE, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 622, 624, 628
(S.D. Ohio 2002) (concluding that an action for invasion of privacy, by the allegedly
unauthorized use of plaintiffs name and likeness in the marketing of videos, was not
preempted in a case where plaintiffs action was not one for control of right of performance
of videos but for misappropriation of her persona in their marketing); Hoffman v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867, 871, 875 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (finding that a celebrity's
right of publicity claim, based on the unauthorized alteration of photograph from a movie
and subsequent publication in a magazine, was not preempted because the action was for
the use of plaintiffs name and likeness, which were not "works of authorship"), rev'd on
other grounds, 255 F.3d 1180, 1189 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001); cf. Leto v. RCA Corp., 341 F. Supp.
2d 1001, 1006-07 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (remanding a right of publicity claim back to state court,
because the 1976 Act did not result in the "complete preemption" of state claims and
because plaintiffs' personas were not "fixed," and noting that their claim for unauthorized
use of their personas did not fall within the "subject matter of copyright").
348. See, e.g., C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc v. Major League Baseball Advanced
Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1100-03 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (concluding that a right of
publicity claim was not preempted because, although baseball players' names and playing




The misappropriation doctrine was endorsed by the Supreme
Court nearly a century ago, in International News Service v.
Associated Press.3 49 In this pre-Erie350 decision, the Court, applying
federal common law, held that the Associated Press (AP), the leading
wire service of its day, had a tort claim under this doctrine against a
rival wire service.3 51 The rival had taken factual stories from east
coast AP newspapers and then wired the rewritten, and
uncopyrightable, facts to its member newspapers on the west coast
who, because of the three-hour time differential, were able to use
those stories in competition with AP members. 352 A number of
subsequent cases, primarily in New York state courts, expanded this
doctrine.353
Although the original House version of the 1976 Act included
certain misappropriation actions in a list of state law theories that
would not be preempted,35 4 the significant majority of post-1978
decisions have properly held that § 301 significantly undermines the
vitality of the misappropriation doctrine. 355  The leading case
analyzing the status of misappropriation claims is National Basketball
349. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
350. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
351. See Int'l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 215, 257-61.
352. Id. at 230-31.
353. See, e.g., Metro. Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d
483, 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950) (enjoining defendants from recording, advertising, and
distributing their recorded copies of the Opera's musical performances, which were
broadcast over the air), aff'd, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (N.Y. App. Div. 1951); see also Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1969) (enjoining defendants from selling tape
recordings of musical performances copied from plaintiffs records and tapes); Dior v.
Milton, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443, 451 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956) (applying the principle that
"commercial unfairness will be restrained when it appears that there has been a
misappropriation, for the commercial advantage of one person, of a benefit of property right
belonging to another" when enjoining defendants from fraudulently obtaining access to a
fashion designers' shows and then distributing sketches of plaintiffs' fashions), affid, 156
N.Y.S.2d 996 (App. Div. 1956).
354. "[R]ights against misappropriation not equivalent to any of such rights [set
forth in § 106]" were specifically listed in the House version of the bill as among the causes
of action which were not preempted by § 301. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 24 (1976). However,
those examples were deleted in the final version. See supra text accompanying notes 143-
146.
355. A number of claims assert theories denominated as "misappropriation" of trade
secrets, of the plaintiffs persona or identity, or even of the plaintiffs property. Preemption
of those claims is discussed above in Parts II.A.2.f, II.A.2.g. Here attention is directed at
what is sometimes referred to as "commercial misappropriation."
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Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc. 35 6 The defendants marketed and sold handheld
pagers that displayed updated information on professional basketball
games being played by the plaintiffs teams; this information was
gathered by individuals who were paid to watch or listen to broadcasts
of these games and then to furnish it to defendants. 357 Concluding
that the National Basketball Association's (NBA) misappropriation
claim was preempted, the Second Circuit held that the subject matter
requirement of § 301 was met as to both the broadcasts and the
games, 358 and that the plaintiffs claim also fell within the general
"scope of copyright," because it lacked any of the requisite "additional
elements." 359  Although the plaintiff relied on earlier state law
doctrine that branded behavior similar to the defendant's as
"commercial immorality," or deemed it to be inconsistent with society's
"ethics," the court of appeals stated that "[s]uch concepts are virtually
synonymous for wrongful copying and are in no meaningful fashion
distinguishable from infringement of a copyright."3 60  While
acknowledging that a 'hot-news' INS-like claim" would survive § 301
preemption because it would fail the general "scope" requirement,
361
the court held that only claims that presented the additional elements
from such a case 3 2-which did not exist here-could be maintained
356. 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). See generally Katherine Horvath, Comment, NBA
v. Motorola, A Case for Federal Preemption of Misappropriation?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
461 (1998).
357. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 105 F.3d at 843-44.
358. The court initially held that "it is the broadcast, not the underlying game, that
is the subject of copyright protection." Id. at 847. But, it further held that, "where the
challenged copying or misappropriation relates in part to the copyrighted broadcasts of the
games, the subject matter requirement is met as to both the broadcasts and the games." Id.
at 848. As to this prong, the court properly concluded that "Section 301 preemption bars
state law misappropriation claims with respect to uncopyrightable as well as copyrightable
elements." Id. at 849; see infra Part II.B (discussing extent to which "subject matter" prong
may extend beyond requirements for copyright contained in §§ 102-103).
359. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 105 F.3d at 853.
360. Id. at 851. The court also recognized that cases like Metropolitan Opera "were
decided at a time when simultaneously-recorded broadcasts were not protected under the
Copyright Act and when the state law claims they fashioned were not subject to federal
preemption." Id. at 852 (citing Metro. Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 101
N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950)).
361. Id. at 845, 848.
362. The court stated:
We therefore find the extra elements-those in addition to the elements of
copyright infringement-that allow a "hot-news" claim to survive preemption
are: (i) the time-sensitive value of factual information, (ii) the free-riding by a
defendant, and (iii) the threat to the very existence of the product or service
provided by the plaintiff.
Id. at 853.
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after enactment of the 1976 Act. 363 Permitting this state law claim
would have permitted the plaintiff to control materials (facts about
sporting events), which Congress had intended would be within the
public domain.
Preemption under § 301 of misappropriation claims is even
easier where the plaintiff merely asserts that the defendant is
obtaining a financial benefit from some form of reproduction, copying,
or exhibition of copyrighted materials. However, a plaintiff may
attempt to bolster its claim by some additional recitation concerning
the value of the property taken, the plaintiffs efforts in its creation, or
the commercial harm it suffered.
364
363. See also Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 205-06,
209 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding that a claim of misappropriation, based on defendant's alleged
use of plaintiffs published, uncopyrightable financial data in defendant's competing
publication, was preempted because plaintiff "proved neither the quantity of copying nor
the immediacy of distribution necessary to sustain a 'hot' news claim"); Lowry's Reports,
Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 737, 755-56 (D. Md. 2003) (questioning whether
"[s]ome 'hot news' claims may yet survive" after passage of the 1976 Act, but concluding
that plaintiff's unfair competition claim did not fall within the exception); Pollstar v.
Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979-80 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (refusing to dismiss the claim
because plaintiff had pled sufficient facts to bring it within the "hot news" exception); Fred
Wehrenberg Circuit of Theatres, Inc. v. Moviefone, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1049-50 (E.D.
Mo. 1999) (concluding that, although Missouri law claim for misappropriation of "hot news"
survives preemption under § 301, the plaintiff had not satisfied the necessary element to
fall within the exception).
364. See ATC Distrib. Group, Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc.,
402 F.3d 700, 709, 713-14 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that a misappropriation claim, based on
unauthorized copying of a catalog, parts numbers, and illustrations, was preempted);
Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 301-02 (6th Cir. 2004) (preempting a claim
of commercial misappropriation regarding the unauthorized use of plaintiffs poem and
screenplay in defendant's motion picture, because plaintiffs assertion that his claim was
based upon "time, effort, and money ... expended in developing the screenplay" did not
constitute a substantial additional element); Daboub v. Gibbons, 42 F.3d 285, 287, 289 (5th
Cir. 1995) (concluding that a claim for misappropriation based on the unauthorized copying
of a musical work was preempted); Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc. 833 F.2d 117, 121
(8th Cir. 1987) (holding that a misappropriation claim based on the unauthorized use of
copyrighted graphics and script was preempted); Pinnacle Pizza Co. v. Little Caesar
Enters., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 2d 891, 902 (D.S.D. 2005) (preempting a claim for
misappropriation of property interest in the plaintiffs slogan and advertising campaign); A
Slice of Pie Prods., LLC v. Wayans Bros. Entm't, 392 F. Supp. 2d 297, 316 (D. Conn. 2005)
(holding that a misappropriation claim based on an allegation that defendant used content
and ideas from the plaintiffs screenplay to create a motion picture was preempted); Am.
Movie Classics Co. v. Turner Entm't Co., 922 F. Supp. 926, 933-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding
that a claim that rival television networks misappropriated plaintiffs exclusive rights to
exhibit copyrighted films was preempted, despite the assertion that defendants allegedly
engaged in "passing off' by falsely representing the origin of the films as coming from
plaintiff and noting that, if anything, defendants engaged in "reverse passing off' by
representing that the defendants owned the right to exhibit films, which was equivalent to
a claim for copyright infringement); Nash v. CBS, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 823, 834-35 (N.D. Ill.
1989) (dismissing a misappropriation claim based on the use of facts and ideas from
plaintiff's books, and stating that allegations of misrepresentation and deception only
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On the other hand, misappropriation claims for which state
law, in fact, also requires proof of such elements as fraud or breach of
fiduciary duty should not be preempted. 3 5 Similarly, preemption is
"accentuated" the claim and were not essential additional elements), aff'd, 899 F.2d 1537
(7th Cir. 1990); Patsy Aiken Designs, Inc. v. Baby Togs, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 108, 111-12
(E.D.N.C. 1988) (dismissing misappropriation and unfair competition claims premised
solely on the unauthorized copying of copyrighted designs for clothing); Selmon v. Hasbro
Bradley, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1267, 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (concluding that an unjust
enrichment claim, which "derive[d] from the misappropriation of material covered by
copyright protection," was preempted); Kisch v. Ammirati & Purs Inc., 657 F. Supp. 380,
385 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (dismissing a misappropriation claim based on alleged similarity
between plaintiffs copyrighted photograph and defendant's photograph); Mayer v. Josiah
Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (concluding that a
misappropriation claim based on the reproduction of plaintiffs design of snowflake was
preempted); P.I.T.S. Films v. Laconis, 588 F. Supp. 1383, 1384-85 (E.D. Mich. 1984)
(dismissing claims for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit grounded on a theory of
defendant's misappropriation of slogans and characters of a copyrightable nature);
Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 943-45 (W.D. Tex. 1982)
(concluding that an unfair competition action based on the copying and distribution of
plaintiffs architectural drawings was preempted, since the claim involved the same
elements as copyright infringement even though misappropriation also included "elements
of Defendants' use of Plaintiffs' product in competition with Plaintiffs to the commercial
damage of Plaintiffs"); see also Summit Mach. Tool Mfg. Corp. v. Victor CNC Sys., Inc., 7
F.3d 1434, 1441-42 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding preemption of an unfair competition claim,
which was premised on defendant's misappropriation of the fruits of plaintiffs labor in the
design of industrial lathes "by employing a particularly unfair method of copying," since
plaintiff "ha[d] not identified any other extra element that would provide it with relief'); cf.
Leto v. RCA Corp., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1005 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (remanding a
misappropriation claim, which had been removed from state court, because the Act did not
result in the "complete preemption" of the state claim); Sargent v. Am. Greetings Corp.,
588 F. Supp. 912, 923-24 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (concluding that claims for breach of
confidential relationship and misappropriation, based on the copying of copyrighted
pictorial works, was not preempted because the claim "involves elements that distinguish it
from [plaintiffs] claim for copyright infringement," without any identification of those
elements).
365. The often difficult balance required in undertaking preemption analysis of
misappropriation claims is illustrated by Aagard v. Palomar Builders, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d
1211 (E.D. Cal. 2004). Palomar, a designer and builder of residential homes, alleged that
the defendant had redrawn the plaintiffs copyrighted architectural plans and, after
relabeling them with her name, had sold them to her own customers. Id. at 1213-14. The
plaintiff, asserting that these plans were created at substantial time and cost, and that the
defendant's use of the plans was done without plaintiffs authorization and at little cost to
her, brought claims, inter alia, for misappropriation and unfair business practices. Id. at
1215-16. The "extra element" relied on by plaintiff was the goodwill and reputation
garnered by its plans. Id. at 1216. The district court held that to the extent that the
plaintiff was asserting a claim for "reverse palming off," i.e., that the defendant took the
plaintiffs product, removed plaintiffs name, and then sold that product under her own
name, the state action would be preempted unless it alleged the additional elements of
bodily appropriation of the product and sought more than merely monetary damages. See
id. at 1217. Otherwise, the plaintiff would be seeking relief merely for the unauthorized
reproduction of, and profit from, the plans. Id. at 1218. However, the court also concluded
that a misappropriation claim resembling "traditional palming off," i.e., the defendant's
marketing of her plans under her name, but in such a way as to suggest sponsorship by the
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not appropriate where the defendant's conduct infringes on rights that
are not within the traditional scope of copyright, such as
misrepresentations about the qualities or nature (as opposed to the
source) of the plaintiffs work. 366 Although the subject matter of these
claims may include copyrightable materials, these claims actually
resonate with concerns more closely implicated by the federal
trademark statute-the Lanham Act-than by the copyright laws.
i. Other Theories
Preemption issues have also arisen in actions alleging a variety
of other theories. Two of the most important are tortious interference
with a contractual relationship and conversion. The majority of cases
have concluded that claims asserting tortious interference with a
contract, which involve rights to copyrightable materials, essentially
duplicate actions under the Copyright Act and therefore, are
preempted. 367  However, a handful of decisions have identified
plaintiff, or labeled so that her customers believed they were getting the plaintiffs product,
would not be preempted. Id. at 1217; see also Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 698 F. Supp. 521,
525-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (dismissing a misappropriation claim based on the unauthorized
copying of plaintiffs architectural plans and subsequent building of a home, but sustaining
a claim under the "commercial immorality" prong of misappropriation doctrine, based on
photographing and then copying the apparently uncopyrightable interior features of home).
366. See, e.g., Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Mgmt. Sys., Inc. 591 F. Supp. 726, 731
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (concluding that a misappropriation claim based on the copying of a
compilation of data was preempted since "commercial immorality" was not an extra
element, but finding that a similar claim based on the use of data was not preempted since
that was not within the scope of rights conferred by copyright, and that the claim based on
copying of procedures and processes for calculating data was also not preempted since they
were outside of subject matter of copyright); cf. Facebook, Inc. v. ConnectU LLC, 489 F.
Supp. 2d 1087, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (concluding that a common law misappropriation
claim, based on the unauthorized copying of data from plaintiffs website, was not
preempted because plaintiff was not "seeking to protect ... uncopyrightable elements of
some larger work of authorship that is protectible [sic] only to the extent provided by the
Copyright Act").
367. See, e.g., Stromback, 384 F.3d at 306-07 (preempting a claim for tortious
interference with prospective economic advantage based on the alleged unauthorized
copying, display, and distribution of plaintiffs poem and screenplay because the allegation
that defendant's conduct harmed the development of plaintiffs professional reputation was
not a substantial extra element); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723
F.2d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that a claim for tortious interference with contractual
relations, based on a magazine publisher's use of an unauthorized excerpt of plaintiffs
book, was preempted on the grounds that the claim was essentially one for violation of
plaintiffs exclusive right to create a derivative work, and additional elements pleaded by
the plaintiff of awareness and intentional interference went "merely to the scope of the
right" and did not "establish qualitatively different conduct"), rev'd on other grounds, 471
U.S. 539 (1985); Pavlica v. Behr, 397 F. Supp. 2d 519, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that a
tortious interference claim by the author of copyrighted materials for their unauthorized
reproduction and use was preempted); Aagard, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 1219 (finding that a
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elements in tortious interference actions that are not a part of a claim
for copyright infringement, and thus, have concluded that those state
law actions may proceed.
368
Since copyright protection does not extend to copies of a work,
actions for conversion of the physical object in which the work is
embodied are not preempted. 36 9 By contrast, almost all courts have
properly recognized that a claim for the "conversion" of the work itself
is nothing more than a claim for its unauthorized duplication,
distribution, alteration, or performance. Since such "wrongs" are the
essence of a copyright infringement, they are properly preempted by §
301.370
claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, premised on
defendant's diversion of business from plaintiff by the sale of plaintiffs copyrighted
architectural plans, was preempted because "federal copyright laws already protect the
exclusive right of distribution"); Huckshold v. HSSL, L.L.C., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1208-09
(E.D. Mo. 2004) (preempting a tortious interference claim where one defendant caused a co-
defendant to breach its contractual promise not to copy plaintiffs copyrighted software on
the grounds that neither defendants' alleged knowledge or awareness of the contract, nor
its intent to interfere with that contract, were substantial extra elements); Tingley Sys.,
Inc. v. CSC Consulting, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 95, 110-11 (D. Mass. 2001) (finding that an
action for intentional interference with a contract was preempted, since the claim merely
added the element of awareness by defendant).
368. See Altera Corp v. Clear Logic, Inc., 424 F.3d 1079, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2005)
(finding that a claim for tortious interference with contract, where the underlying contracts
placed restrictions on plaintiffs customers' software use rather than just restricting their
right to reproduce copyrighted software, was not preempted, because the claim concerning
breach of those contracts against customers would have required proof of a meaningful
"extra element"); Telecom Technical Servs. Inc. v. Rolm Co., 388 F.3d 820, 833 (11th Cir.
2004) (concluding that a tortious interference claim was not preempted because it required
plaintiff to demonstrate that defendants "violated the terms of [plaintiffs] software license
for third parties, which is an element beyond federal copyright law").
369. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
370. See Daboub v. Gibbons, 42 F.3d 285, 288-90 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that claims
for conversion, misappropriation, plagiarism, disparagement, and defamation, all based on
the unauthorized copying of a musical work, were preempted); Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at
200-01 (preempting a claim for conversion based on a magazine publisher's use of an
unauthorized excerpt of plaintiffs book after obtaining purloined copy, because the claim
was essentially one for violation of plaintiffs exclusive right to reproduce and/or create
derivative work); Goldberg v. Cameron, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(holding that claims for conversion and unfair competition, based on the unauthorized use
of a movie script and soundtrack, were preempted); Pinnacle Pizza Co. v. Little Caesar
Enters., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 2d 891, 902-03 (D.S.D. 2005) (preempting a claim for conversion
of plaintiffs property rights in its slogan and advertising campaign); Microstrategy, Inc. v.
Netsolve, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 2d 533, 534, 536-37 (E.D. Va. 2005) (finding that a claim for
excessive use of licensed computer software was preempted, since it only alleged the
unauthorized reproduction and retention of the software); Madison River Mgmt. Co. v. Bus.
Mgmt. Software Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 436, 444-45 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (preempting a
conversion claim based on the alleged excessive connections to copyrighted software and on
allowing employees to use that software); DirecTV, Inc. v. Beecher, 296 F. Supp. 2d 937,
944 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (holding that a conversion claim for the unauthorized interception of
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State claims have also been preempted in a number of less
commonly asserted causes of action. For example, in Rosciszewski v.
Arete Associates, Inc.,371 the Fourth Circuit held that the Virginia
Computer Crimes Act, 372 which created a private, civil claim for
unauthorized copying of computer programs, was preempted, since the
various elements of the Act 373 did not make the action qualitatively
different from one under the 1976 Act for unauthorized copying.
374
Another court found preemption of a claim for recovery of stolen
property under a statute permitting private relief for criminal theft,
again based on the defendant's unauthorized use of copyrighted
software; the required addition of an allegation of specific intent was
not an essentially different element from a copyright infringement
claim.3 7 5  In addition, several courts have dismissed claims for
television signals containing copyrighted audiovisual works was preempted); Zito v.
Steeplechase Films, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that an
action for conversion, based on the unauthorized publication of photograph, merely
restated a claim for copyright infringement, even if the conversion required proof of intent);
Kindergartners Count, Inc. v. DeMoulin, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1192-93 (D. Kan. 2001)
(finding that a conversion claim seeking recovery of profits earned by defendant from the
unauthorized reproduction and distribution of plaintiffs intellectual property was
preempted); Henry v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 147 F. Supp. 2d 16, 21 (D. Mass. 2001)
(holding that a conversion action based on the unauthorized reproduction of plaintiffs
photographs was preempted); Quincy Cablesystems, Inc. v. Sully's Bar, Inc., 650 F. Supp.
838, 849-50 (D. Mass. 1986) (finding preemption of a conversion based on the unauthorized
reception of a cable television operator's signals and the presentation of programming to
patrons of defendant's bar); Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523,
1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that a claim for conversion of a copyrightable snowflake
design was preempted); Melchior v. New Line Prods., Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 347, 355-57
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a claim for conversion, based on defendant's failure to
make royalty payments called for by written agreement to the owner of the copyright in a
motion picture, was preempted); see also Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d
296, 307-09 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that further factual development was needed to
determine whether claim for conversion was preempted). But cf. Lone Ranger Television,
Inc. v. Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718, 726 (9th Cir. 1984) (concluding that "protection
against conversion of an intangible property right in the performances embodied in
[plaintiffs] tapes is unaffected by notions of copyright," without discussing preemption or §
301).
371. 1 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 1993).
372. VA.CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-152.1 to .15 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
373. The Act required, for example, that the defendant use a computer in the course
of the violation, that the use be "without authority," and that the defendant have a
specified unlawful awareness or intent. See id. § 18.2-152.3.
374. Rosciszewski, 1 F.3d at 230; see also SecureInfo Corp. v. Telos Corp., 387 F.
Supp. 2d 593, 618-19 (E.D. Va. 2005) (finding that a claim under the Virginia Act, alleging
that defendant accessed software without permission and downloaded it to compete with
plaintiff, was preempted on the grounds that the action did not contain substantial
additional elements from the claim for unauthorized copying).
375. See Madison River Mgmt. Co., 351 F. Supp. 2d at 445-46; cf. Advance Magazine
Publishers Inc. v. Leach, 466 F. Supp. 2d 628, 635 (D. Md. 2006) (holding that the proffered
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"conspiracy" to infringe the copyright laws. 376 On the other hand, §
301 has properly been held not to preempt actions under state
trademark laws 377 or for indemnification for breach of contractual
representations regarding rights in copyrighted materials.
378
j. Criminal Prosecutions
Although the overwhelming majority of preemption cases
involve potential displacement of civil claims, a handful of courts have
properly recognized that § 301 might also require preemption of a
state criminal prosecution. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
1976 Act preempted a state statute that criminalized a form of theft-
the unauthorized creation and sale of "bootleg" sound recordings of
musical works-because the elements of the crime were "almost
exactly . . . those of the tort of copyright infringement," i.e., the
unauthorized reproduction and distribution of a copyrighted work.
3 79
In another case, the Ohio Supreme Court held that prosecution of
state charges for the crime of "unauthorized use," based upon the
defense, that plaintiff was divested of its interests in its copyright by adverse possession,
would affect the rights afforded by § 106, and thus, was preempted).
376. See, e.g., Irwin v. ZDF Enters. GMBH, No. 04 CIV. 8027 (RWS), 2006 WL
374960, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2006) (concluding that a claim for tortious conspiracy to
violate copyright laws was preempted, since it duplicated concepts of contributory
infringement and vicarious copyright infringement); Brown v. McCormick, 23 F. Supp. 2d
594, 608 (D. Md. 1998) (holding that a claim of conspiracy to commit copyright
infringement that merely added element of "agreement" was preempted).
377. See Polar Bear Prods., Inc. v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700, 721 (9th Cir. 2004);
Tracy v. Skate Key, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 748, 750-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also U-Neek, Inc. v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 158, 174, 174 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (declining to find
preemption of trade dress infringement claim, based on defendant's alleged copying of
design elements of plaintiffs clothing); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231,
247-48 (2d Cir. 1983) (concluding that claims based on "passing off' under the state anti-
dilution statute, causing the impairment of the value of plaintiffs' trademark, were not
preempted). It is clear that § 301 also does not preempt federal trademark law, including
infringement claims under the Lanham Act. See supra note 31.
378. See Pure Country Weavers, Inc. v. Bristar, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 439, 448-50
(W.D.N.C. 2006) (refusing to preempt claims under a state statute governing warranties of
title and against infringement in an action for indemnification by a co-defendant against a
defendant which sold it articles that allegedly infringed on plaintiffs copyright, on the
grounds that the indemnification action required proof of additional elements, including a
"promise by the seller to the buyer that title conveyed is good," and "delivery of goods to
which title was in fact flawed").
379. Crow v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1224, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 1983). The court of
appeals held that the additional element in the state criminal statute-the presence of a
scienter requirement-"[did] not render the elements of the crime different in a meaningful
way," noting that the criminal provision of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2000), also
requires proof of scienter. Id. at 1226; cf. infra notes 446-454 and accompanying text
(discussing state and federal statutes prohibiting creation and sale of unauthorized copies
of unfixed musical works).
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defendant's unauthorized uploading, downloading, and posting of
computer software on a computer bulletin board, was preempted by
the federal copyright laws.38 0
On the other hand, several courts have rejected preemption
challenges to state statutes criminalizing the sale of audiotapes,
videocassettes, or CDs with packaging or labeling that fails to describe
accurately certain information about the producers or performers. 381
Although these provisions were parts of statutes that were enacted to
prevent unauthorized copying and sales of motion pictures or sound
recordings, the courts dismissed preemption challenges on the
somewhat dubious ground that the defendants' failure to disclose,
which resulted in the possible deception of consumers, constituted a
meaningful additional element. 38 2 Another case upheld theft charges
against a defendant who purchased several computer programs, made
copies of both the software and the instruction manuals, and then
immediately returned the programs for a refund, finding an "extra
element" because "the State [was] prosecuting the manner in which
defendant obtained the computer materials rather than the fact he
380. See State v. Perry, 697 N.E.2d 624, 627-29 (Ohio 1998). As in Crow, the
challenged conduct involved the unauthorized copying and distribution of copyrighted
materials; here too, the facts necessary to support the state charge did not require proof of
any significant extra elements. See id. at 628.
381. See Hicks v. State, 674 A.2d 55, 61-62 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996); State v.
Awawdeh, 864 P.2d 965, 968 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994); see also Briggs v. State, 638 S.E.2d
292, 293, 295 (Ga. 2006) (holding that a statute that criminalized the "possession and
distribution of sounds or images without a label bearing the name and address of the
transferor of those sounds or images" was not preempted, because the statute "contain[ed]
an extra element-i.e., labeling-which qualitatively distinguishe[d] it from federal
copyright law"); People v. Borriello, 588 N.Y.S.2d 991, 994-97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (hold
that prosecution under a statute prohibiting the "advertisement or sale of unauthorized
[sound] recordings" was preempted, but that prosecutions under statutes penalizing
"failure to disclose the origin of a recording" and "possession of forged [record labels]" were
not preempted); People v. M & R Records, Inc., 432 N.Y.S.2d 846, 849-50 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980) (holding that prosecutions under a statute prohibiting "manufacture of unauthorized
recording of sound," "advertisement and sale of unauthorized recording of sound," and
"failure to disclose origin of recording of sound" were not preempted).
382. For example, the Borriello court observed that:
This statute does not require the defendant to infringe the rights of the copyright
owner. This statute can be violated even if the transferor has permission and
authority to sell the recording from the copyright owner if the labels or packages
are deceptive. The required element is that the cover, box or jacket does not
clearly and conspicuously disclose manufacturer information. This is an "extra
element" that makes the statute "qualitatively" different from a copyright
infringement claim.
588 N.Y.S.2d at 996. The court also observed that "the right protected in a copyright
infringement claim is the owners [sic] property rights in his intellectual endeavors, while
[the state statute] is aimed at protecting the rights of consumers." Id. This observation is at
best besides the point, since the allegedly different purposes of the state statute and the
Copyright Act are irrelevant in performing the "equivalence" analysis of § 301.
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copied them."38 3  And, in yet another case, a court rejected the
defendant's preemption challenge to his conviction for the production
and sale of a medallion incorporating the seal of the State of Alaska
under a statute criminalizing the unauthorized use of the seal for
advertising or commercial purposes;38 4 instead, the court concluded
that the seal was not within the subject matter of copyright.
38 5
Admittedly, the possible preemption of criminal prosecutions
presents some conceptual difficulties in the application of the
"equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright" prong of § 301. Although the defendant's conduct giving
rise to criminal liability may be the same as conduct that would have
given rise to a private cause of action for copyright infringement, the
nature of the rights and interest of those two systems are
383. State v. Smith, 798 P.2d 1146, 1147, 1149 (Wash. 1990); see also
Commonwealth v. Yourawski, 425 N.E.2d 298, 299 (Mass. 1981) (declining to decide
whether a prosecution for larceny, based on the unauthorized receipt of intellectual
property embodied in stolen video cassette tapes, was preempted by the supremacy clause,
because "intellectual property which appear[ed] on the cassette tapes [was] not 'property'
within the definition of property in [the statute]"); State v. Corcoran, 522 N.W.2d 226, 228,
231 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (declining to decide whether 1976 Act preempted the enforcement
of a statute criminalizing defendant's destruction of computer data by the insertion of
"booby traps" into a former employer's software, because defendant "was properly convicted
of destroying facts that cannot be protected by copyright"); cf. State v. Nelson, 842 A.2d 83,
84 (N.H. 2004) (affirming defendant's conviction for theft and receipt of stolen property,
based on the temporary, surreptitious taking of photographs, scanning them into his
computer, and then returning photographs to lawful owners, without discussing whether
the statute was preempted by Copyright Act).
384. Robart v. State, 82 P.3d 787, 789-90 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
385. See id. at 791. The court's reasoning for this conclusion was at best unfocused.
It asserted that "it is clear that states have the power to protect symbols of their
sovereignty." Id. It also asserted that "federal copyright law is silent on [the] issue [of
congressional intent to supersede state laws]-state seals are not mentioned at all," id. at
792, without even pausing to note that biographies and horror movies are also "not
mentioned at all." Finally, although the court acknowledged that "trademark and copyright
law can overlap," it asserted that "state seals appear to be more akin to trademarks or
service marks than they are to the type of work Congress intended copyrights to cover." Id.
Despite these rationalizations, it seems obvious that a state seal is a "pictorial work"
within the scope of § 102(a)(5), and that the defendant's conduct entailed the authorized
reproduction and distribution of that work. Because the nature of the work being copied
does not constitute an extra element for purposes of § 301, the criminal proceedings should
have been preempted.
In contrast, in Bicentennial Commission v. Olde Bradford Co., a civil action by a state
agency seeking injunctive relief under a statute prohibiting the unauthorized reproduction
and use of the Commission's seal, the court-in a pre-1976 Act decision-held that the
state law was preempted because "the dominant intent of the [state] Act is to prohibit, as
does federal copyright law, the mere unauthorized production of the Commission's marks."
365 A.2d 172, 177 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1976).
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dissimilar. 38 6 Furthermore, since the "plaintiff' here-the state-is
not the copyright owner (or its licensee), it could not have asserted a
civil claim for this conduct. Moreover, the relief sought by the state-
fines and/or imprisonment-is significantly different from the relief
available in an infringement action.
Nonetheless, because the federal regime already provides for
both civil and criminal relief against copyright infringers, 387 and
because allowing state prosecutions against these kinds of behavior
could result in either inconsistent or duplicative actions, in particular,
in punishing conduct that is not reached by the criminal provisions of
the 1976 Act, the goals which animated the inclusion of § 301 in the
1976 Act counsel strongly in favor of a broader interpretation of the
preemption provision. However, if that result is deemed inconsistent
with the statutory language, conflict preemption, which is discussed
below,388 is another sound basis for displacing many state criminal
prosecutions for conduct that is already covered by the federal
Copyright Act.
B. Second Prong of Section 301(a)
Section 301(a) only preempts a state law claim if the
intellectual property for which protection is sought is a work of
authorship that is (1) "within the subject matter of copyright as
specified by sections 102 and 103" and if it is (2) "fixed in a tangible
medium of expression."38 9 As noted above,390 the reciprocal of this
provision-reiterating that works not meeting these two requirements
are not preempted-is found in § 301(b)(1).
Section 102 specifies the general "[slubject matter of
copyright." Copyright is stated to subsist in "original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression."391 In addition
to the three requirements of originality, authorship, and fixation
specified in the Copyright Act, case law makes clear that there is
another requirement for obtaining copyright: there must be some
386. See Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 217 (1985) ("[I]nterference with
copyright does not easily equate with theft, conversion, or fraud .... [Infringement plainly
implicates a more complex set of property interests than does run-of-the-mill theft,
conversion, or fraud.").
387. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-505 (2000) (civil remedies for copyright infringement); 17
U.S.C.A. § 506 (West 2005) (criminal copyright offenses).
388. See infra Part III.
389. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
390. See supra text accompanying note 52.
391. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (emphasis added).
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minimal degree of creativity in the work.392 Section 102 also states a
fundamental rule of copyright: protection is available only for the
"expression of an idea,'393 and copyright does not "extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery."
394
The two conditions for statutory preemption set forth in this
second prong395 have received significantly different treatment both in
the statute and from the courts. As noted above, under the first
prong, preemption will occur if the would-be state right is roughly
"equivalent to" a right falling within the "general scope of copyright,"
even if federal law does not, in fact, afford protection against the
defendant's conduct. 396 As will be seen, for purposes of this second
prong of § 301, the "[s]ubject matter of copyright" is, analogously, also
broader than the actual scope of copyrightable works. However, under
the other requirement found in this second prong-the fixation
requirement-state law is clearly permitted to extend protection to
certain unfixed works that, while arguably potentially copyrightable
under Article I, Section 8, fall outside of the parameters of works
encompassed within the category of statutorily copyrightable works.
The result is that § 301 clearly does not preempt all works for which
the Constitution arguably might allow protection, but rather, under
this second prong, only preempts a somewhat smaller class of works
for which protection has, in fact, been afforded by the federal statute.
1. Plaintiffs Work is Within "Subject Matter of Copyright"
Statutory preemption extends only to works of authorship that
are within the "subject matter of copyright." In determining the
proper "subject matter of copyright," authorship, originality, and
creativity are viewed as constitutional imperatives. 397 For example,
392. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). In fact,
as noted by the Supreme Court in Feist, both originality and creativity are constitutionally
mandated. The Court explained that "originality requires independent creation plus a
modicum of creativity." Id. at 346. After noting that "originality is a constitutionally
mandated prerequisite for copyright protection," id. at 351, the Court then indicated that
"[t]he standard of originality is low, but it does exist." Id. at 362. As the Court has
explained, "the Constitution mandates some minimal degree of creativity." Id. (citation
omitted).
393. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981)
(emphasis added).
394. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); see also Miller, 650 F.2d at 1368 (denying copyright
protection to facts gathered through research).
395. See supra Part II.B.
396. See supra text accompanying notes 391-392.
397. See supra text accompanying notes 391-392.
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Congress could not afford protection under the copyright statutes to
someone who discovered the creative work of another. Only the actual
author of the work-the person who "originated" the work-is entitled
to the copyright. 398 That principle is embodied in § 102(a), which
extends copyright protection to "original works of authorship."3 99
Similarly, some minimum level of creativity is required to obtain a
copyright; as the Supreme Court indicated in a unanimous decision,
the alphabetical listings in the white pages of a telephone directory
are so obvious, and so uncreative, that they simply do not qualify for
copyright protection. 400 Works that do not meet these originality and
creativity requirements are therefore outside the scope of both the
constitutional and statutory "subject matter" of copyright. 40 1 It would
not have been illogical to have allowed the states to afford protection
for such inherently uncopyrightable "works." However, the legislative
history of § 301 makes clear Congress's intent to preempt such
claims, 40 2 and case law generally supports that result.
In reaching this conclusion, most courts interpreting this
second prong of § 301 have taken the same expansive approach to
"subject matter of copyright" as they give to "scope of copyright
protection" under the "equivalency" approach used for the first
prong.40 3 The accepted rule is that to the extent that the material or
"work" for which state law protection is sought is broadly within the
range of copyrightable expression, the claim will be subject to
statutory preemption. This reflects a principle enunciated by a
number of courts: even if federal protection for a work is unavailable,
398. "To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author.
Original ...means only that the work was independently created by the author." Feist
Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (citation omitted). "[F]acts do
not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is one between creation and
discovery." Id. at 347; see also Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737
(1989) ("As a general rule, the author is the party who actually creates the work, that is,
the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright
protection.").
399. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (emphasis added).
400. Feist, 499 U.S. at 363.
401. See C.B.C. Dist. & Mktg., Inc v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.,
443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1101-03 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (concluding that a right of publicity claim
was not preempted because, although baseball players' names and playing records were
arguably within scope of copyright, they lacked originality and were thus not
"copyrightable").
402. "As long as a work fits within one of the general subject matter categories of
sections 102 and 103, the bill prevents the States from protecting it even if it fails to
achieve Federal statutory copyright because it is too minimal or lacking in originality to
qualify . H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 131 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5747.
403. See generally Part II.A.2.
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the work may nonetheless fall within the broader "subject matter of
copyright."
404
A Sixth Circuit case, Murray Hill Publications, Inc. v. ABC
Communications, Inc.,40 5 illustrates the application of this principle to
works that were insufficiently creative to merit copyright protection.
The plaintiff complained that the defendant radio station had, without
his permission, used a six-word tagline (the Line) and a certain
lettering style (the Artwork), both of which had been created or
designed by the plaintiff, in a billboard to promote the defendant's
radio show.406 Holding that the plaintiffs various state law claims 407
were preempted, the court of appeals conceded that the brief Line and
the particular Artwork in question were not amenable to copyright
protection; they lacked the requisite "creativity" to bring them within
§ 102(a).408 Nonetheless, the court properly concluded that these
"works" still constituted "expressions of ideas," albeit unprotectable
ones, which were within the "subject matter of copyright," and thus,
they were subject to preemption. 40 9
Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n 410 is an earlier case that also took this broader approach. As
noted above,411 the Players Association had asserted that the
agreements between Major League Baseball and television
broadcasters, providing for the telecast of the players' "performances"
during baseball games, without their permission, constituted a
violation of their right of publicity. In holding that these claims were
preempted, the Seventh Circuit initially concluded that although
"performances" admittedly were not copyrightable works, they
nonetheless were within the "subject matter of copyright." The
players had argued that this prong of § 301 was not satisfied because
their "performances" were neither "works" which were "fixed" nor
sufficiently "creative" for copyright protection.412 Rejecting the first
argument, the court held that the "performances" for which relief was
sought were fixed by virtue of being embodied in copies, i.e., the
404. See, e.g., Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 455 (6th Cir. 2001)
("[T]he scope of the Copyright Act's subject matter is broader than the scope of the Act's
protections.").
405. 264 F.3d 622 (6th Cir. 2001).
406. See id. at 627-29.
407. The plaintiff asserted claims for conversion, unjust enrichment, and quantum
meruit. Id. at 629.
408. Id. at 633-34.
409. See id. at 635-36.
410. 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986).
411. This decision is discussed supra text accompanying notes 298-306.
412. See Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 674-75.
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videotapes of the telecasts, 413 and they were "works,"414 concluding
that "once a performance is reduced to tangible form, there is no
distinction between the performance and the recording of the
performance for the purpose of preemption under § 301(a)."415
Moreover, even if the "performances" were uncopyrightable because
they lacked the requisite creativity, it was sufficient that the works in
which they were embodied were creative enough to obtain copyright
protection. 416 Indeed, because the scope of preemption under § 301(a)
extends beyond works entitled to copyright protection, creativity of the
"work" was not essential for preemption. 417
Although the court's analysis has been criticized,418  its
conclusion is correct. Not only did the defendant own the copyright to
the broadcasts, but the players, through their association, had agreed
to that arrangement. Thus, the court recognized that the plaintiffs
413. Id. at 675. Although it might have been true that not every major league game
was being telecast, or that some might have been telecast without having been recorded-
in which case they would not have been "fixed"-here the plaintiffs were asserting publicity
rights in their performances only for those games which were telecast and recorded. See id.
at 665.
414. "The work that is the subject of copyright is not merely the Players'
performances, but rather the telecast of the Players' performances." Id. at 669 n.7.
415. Id. at 675. In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the Supreme Court
upheld a state right of publicity claim. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). The plaintiff, a performer
whose act was as a "human cannonball," sued a television station for broadcasting his
entire performance without his permission. Id. at 563-64. Because the case was decided
before the effective date of the 1976 Act, statutory preemption was not at issue. But, as the
Seventh Circuit noted in Baltimore Orioles, this case would have been decided the same
way under § 301; although the "performance" may have been a "work," it was not "fixed"
within the meaning of § 101, since its reduction to a tangible form was not done with the
authority of its author (Zacchini). See 805 F.2d at 675 n.22. By contrast, the Baltimore
Orioles court asserted that if Zacchini had himself authorized the videotaping of his act,
and if the television station had made an unauthorized broadcast of that tape, the right of
publicity claim would have been preempted; in that case, the station's conduct would have
given rise to an action for copyright infringement, and the same evidence would also have
been used as the basis for that hypothetical claim. See id.
416. See id. at 676 ("Regardless of the creativity of the Players' performances, the
works in which they assert rights are copyrightable works which come within the scope of §
301(a) because of the creative contributions of the individuals responsible for recording the
Players' performances.").
417. See id. ("Hence, § 301(a) preempts all equivalent state-law rights claimed in
any work within the subject matter of copyright whether or not the work embodies any
creativity.").
418. In Toney v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2005), the Seventh
Circuit noted that Baltimore Orioles "has been widely criticized by our sister circuits and
by several commentators," id. at 910, but defended its result as "essential in order to
preserve the extent of the public domain established by copyright law." Id. at 911; see also
Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 659 (5th Cir. 2000) (describing Baltimore Orioles as a
"controversial decision" which "has been heavily criticized," and citing to several such
criticizing sources).
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were seeking to obtain through tort law the ownership interests which
they had failed to obtain through their contract negotiations. 419 A
contrary result, allowing such a state law action, would clearly have
undermined the federal interest in having copyright law be the
exclusive basis for resolving those competing claims.
Greater difficulties are presented in applying the limitation
found in § 102(b)-that copyright protection does not "extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery"42 -- to this "subject matter of copyright"
requirement. At one level, this provision would suggest that
protection for ideas, processes, discoveries, and so on, is not within the
subject matter of copyright, and thus, is not preempted by § 301.
Therefore, protection would be available, if at all, under alternate
regimes-whether the federal patent (or trademark) laws, or under
state law.421  Nonetheless, courts have used a similar expansive
approach to define the "subject matter of copyright," when considering
works excluded from protection by the limitations in § 102(b). Here
too, the test focuses not on the narrower actuality of copyright
protection, but the broader potential of the scope of its subject matter.
For example, in one Fourth Circuit case,422 the plaintiff brought
a claim under a state conversion statute, 423 alleging that the
defendant, her Ph.D. supervisor, had taken "ideas and methods" from
her Ph.D. thesis and had then incorporated them into other works
without giving her proper attribution.424 Rejecting the plaintiffs
contention that her state law claim for the plagiarism of her "ideas"
was not preempted because they were specifically excluded from
copyright protection, the court held that "scope and protection are not
synonyms," 425 and therefore, the plaintiffs "ideas" were within the
broader scope of the "subject matter of copyright."
426
419. See Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 679.
420. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). A common version of this principle is that copyright
does not protect "ideas," but only protects the "expression of the idea."
421. Of course, § 301 only deals with preemption of state law. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(d)
("Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under any other Federal
statute."); see also supra note 31 (discussing § 301(d)).
422. United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453 (4th
Cir. 1997).
423. See id. at 1462-63. The statute was a general conversion statute, creating an
action in tort for the owner of any personalty who suffered deprivation of or interference
with the possession of that property. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-260 (LexisNexis 2005).
424. See Berge, 104 F.3d at 1455-56, 1463.
425. Id. at 1463.
426. See id. Without further analysis of this question, the court of appeals merely
asserted that "the shadow actually cast by the Act's preemption is notably broader than the
wing of its protection." Id.
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The rationale for this conclusion was well stated in Judge
Easterbrook's decision in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.427  There, the
court of appeals held that data embodied in a tangible medium of
expression, while not itself eligible for copyright protection, was
nonetheless within the "subject matter of copyright." Preemption of
state claims was necessary to vindicate the congressional
determination that these materials should be in the "public
domain."
4 28
A number of other courts have similarly concluded that ideas,
or other elements of expression that cannot themselves be protected,
nonetheless do fall within the broader "subject matter of copyright,"
thereby preempting state claims for them as well. 429 A handful of
427. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); see also supra text accompanying notes 246-255
(discussing ProCD).
428. Judge Easterbrook explained:
One function of § 301(a) is to prevent states from giving special protection to
works of authorship that Congress has decided should be in the public domain,
which it can accomplish only if "subject matter or copyright" includes all works of
a type covered by sections 102 and 103, even if federal law does not afford
protection to them.
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453.
429. See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)
("[I]t is beyond dispute that compilations of facts are within the subject matter of copyright
... . [C]opyright law seems to contemplate that compilations that consist exclusively of
facts are potentially within its scope."); Lipscher v. LRP Publ'ns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1311
(11th Cir. 2001) (finding that even non-copyrightable factual information was "within the
subject matter of copyright"); Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 454-55 (6th
Cir. 2001) (holding that ideas and concepts are within the "subject matter of copyright,"
because "the scope of the Copyright Act's subject matter is broader than the scope of the
Act's protections"); Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 848 (2d Cir. 1997)
(holding that, "where the challenged copying or misappropriation relates in part to the
copyrighted broadcasts of the [uncopyrightable] games, the subject matter requirement is
met as to both the broadcasts and the games"); Keane v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 297
F. Supp. 2d 921, 944-45 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (preempting state protection for ideas for a
television show, even if they were too amorphous or were lacking in the originality
necessary to qualify them for copyright protection) (alternative holding), aff"d, 129 F. App'x
874 (5th Cir. 2005); Entous v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1159 (C.D. Cal.
2001) ("While 'ideas' do not enjoy copyright protection, courts have consistently held that
they fall within the 'subject matter of copyright' for the purposes of preemption analysis.");
Fischer v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 535, 540-41 (D. Md. 2000) ("[S]ubject matter
of copyright . . . may, in fact, extend to include uncopyrightable material, such as ideas,
particularly when those ideas are embodied in, or intermingled with, copyrightable
material." (citation omitted)); Endemol Entm't B.V. v. Twentieth Television Inc., CV 98-
0608 ABC (BQRx), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19049, at *8-*9 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 29, 1998) (holding
that the ideas for a television program were within the scope of copyright, even if they were
not entitled to copyright protection); see also ATC Distrib. Group, Inc. v. Whatever It Takes
Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 700, 709, 713-14 (6th Cir. 2004) (concluding that
claims for unfair competition, unjust enrichment, and misappropriation, based on
defendant's unauthorized use in its catalog of plaintiffs uncopyrightable system for
numbering car parts, were preempted); Stanford v. Caesars Entm't, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 2d
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decisions, however, have improperly concluded that ideas,
information, and other non-copyrightable materials are not within the
"subject matter of copyright," and thus, protection for alleged taking or
misuse of those materials is not preempted by § 301.430
This more restrictive view is illustrated by a recent Eleventh
Circuit decision. 431 The plaintiff had developed an idea and business
plan for an internet-based bank catering to the gay and lesbian
communities. He shared these in confidence with several investors,
who initially gave him an employment contract. He alleged that, after
they discharged him, these investors stole his idea by continuing to
operate the bank; he brought an action against them for
misappropriation and conversion of that idea. The court of appeals
749, 755-57 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) (finding that claims for breach of rights of privacy and
publicity, based on defendant's use of plaintiffs photograph and voice in previously
recorded print and broadcast advertisements, were preempted because plaintiffs "claims
[did] not involve the use or appropriation of Plaintiffs personal traits, but rather, the use of
copyrightable advertisements featuring a fictional character portrayed by Plaintiff');
Pinnacle Pizza Co. v. Little Caesar Enters., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 2d 891, 899-901 (D.S.D.
2005) (finding that uncopyrightable ideas, concepts, and slogans, which were used in
newspaper and radio advertisements, were within the subject matter of copyright).
430. See, e.g., U.S. Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781, 785 n.6 (7th
Cir. 1981) (holding that a claim for misappropriation of property, based on the use of
information contained on certificates taken from a copyright owner, was "not preempted..
., because it does not fall within the realm of, federal copyright law"); Flaherty v. Filardi,
388 F. Supp. 2d 274, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding no preemption of a claim for
misappropriation of ideas because it was premised on "violations of rights that are outside
the ambit of copyright law"); DirecTV, Inc. v. Hoverson, 319 F. Supp. 2d 735, 736, 740 (N.D.
Tex. 2004) (finding no preemption of a satellite broadcaster's state statutory claim for
interception of communications, since "communications" are not within subject matter of
copyright and "[tihe mere fact that plaintiff may be communicating content that is
copyrightable, and the author of that content may have intellectual property rights under
copyright law, is not sufficient" for preemption); Sw. Airlines Co. v. FareChase, Inc., 318 F.
Supp. 2d 435, 440-41 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (holding that a claim for misappropriation of
uncopyrightable information, including an airline's schedules and fares, was not
preempted); Lattie v. Murdach, No. C-96-2524 MHP, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3558, at *10
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 1997) (asserting that "ideas do not come under the subject matter of
copyright, and claims based upon them are not preempted" but also noting, however, that
the "fact that the [plaintiffs] materials are a compilation that contain no original
arrangement, selection or coordination does not necessarily prevent them from falling
under the subject matter of copyright"); Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F.
Supp. 1523, 1532 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[S]tate laws that protect ideas, as distinct from
their expression, are without the subject matter of copyright.").
The Southwest Airlines, Co. v. FareChase, Inc. decision, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 440, relied
on Feist for its conclusion, where the Court had noted: "[pirotection for the fruits of such
research . . . may in certain circumstances be available under a theory of unfair
competition." 499 U.S. at 345. But, needless to say, this statement-in an opinion which
did not deal at all with the issue of preemption-hardly indicates what those "certain
circumstances" may be, and thus, it cannot support the assertion that information is
outside the "subject matter of copyright" as that term is used in § 301(a).
431. Dunlap v. G&L Holding Group Inc., 381 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2004).
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reversed the district court's determination that this state court claim
was preempted, concluding instead that this idea was outside the
"subject matter of copyright." The court asserted that preemption
could take place only with respect to works that are "substantively
eligible for copyright protection."432 This contrasts with Murray Hill
Publications, Inc. v. ABC Communications, Inc.,433 where, as noted,
the state claim was preempted although the plaintiffs tagline and
artwork failed to meet the constitutional threshold of creativity. Here,
the court concluded that preemption was inappropriate because ideas
are not "works," and thus, the obstacle to their inclusion within the
"subject matter of copyright" was one of "substantive ineligibility."434
At best, the court's distinction has reversed these obstacles to
preemption. Since works that fail a constitutional test can never
obtain federal protection, state law would be the only possible source
of protection. In Murray Hill, the Sixth Circuit had effectively
discerned a congressional determination by nonetheless including
these insufficiently creative works within the subject matter of
copyright for purposes of § 301-to deny all forms of protection to
those works. By contrast, ideas are potentially eligible for federal
protection-patent protection for some, and, in the absence of the
432. Id. at 1295-96 ("[Blecause ideas are substantively excluded from the protection
of the Copyright Act, they do not fall within the subject matter of copyright .... [Iln order
for a state-law claim to be preempted, it is necessary that the claim involve a work that is
substantively eligible for copyright protection.").
The Eleventh Circuit recognized, see id. at 1295 n.18, that at least two other courts of
appeals-the Sixth Circuit in Wrench, see supra note 404, and the Fourth Circuit in Berge,
see supra notes 422-426 and accompanying text-have reached the contrary conclusion, by
holding that ideas are within the "subject matter" of copyright. Although the Eleventh
Circuit distinguished Murray Hill, it offered no explanation of why Wrench and Berge were
wrongly decided, other than to assert that Berge's conclusion was reached "with no analysis
and no legal support." Id. Nor did the court even acknowledge the contrary conclusions by
the Second Circuit in the NBA case, see supra note 358, or by the Seventh Circuit in
ProCD, see supra text accompanying notes 427-428, that material which was denied
protection by § 102(b) might nonetheless fall within the "subject matter" of copyright.
Perhaps most remarkably, the Eleventh Circuit did not even cite, much less distinguish, its
own precedent in Lipscher, see supra text accompanying note 234, where only three years
earlier it had held that "even if [plaintiffs] publications are not copyrightable [because they
consist of factual information], they are nevertheless within the subject matter of
copyright." Lipscher v. LRP Publ'ns., 266 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001).
433. See supra text accompanying notes 405-409.
434. See Dunlap, 381 F.3d at 1297. The court seemed to find it additionally
significant that, because of the "simplicity" of the plaintiffs idea, there were only a limited
number of forms of expression in which that idea could be embodied, and thus, under the
merger doctrine, even the expression could not be protected. See id. at 1295. Not only is it
not obvious that there might not have been numerous ways to describe and explicate the
idea but also this observation seems irrelevant, since the plaintiff was not seeking
protection for his expression, but only for his idea.
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prohibition in § 102(b) of the Copyright Act,435 the possibility of some
degree of copyright protection for others. However, Congress made
the express decision in 1976 to deny copyright protection to "subject
matter" that, as a constitutional matter, might have been eligible for
some form of federal protection. Yet, the Eleventh Circuit's approach
allows for the possibility of state protection as well for these kinds of
ideas-a result which the preemption provision of § 301 seeks to
foreclose. To the extent that a creation is statutorily ineligible for
federal protection, Congress's intent is for it to be freely usable by
everyone, and not, instead, for it to be subject to possible restrictions
under varying state laws. Murray Hill reached the far sounder result,
which advances Congress's objectives by including within the "subject
matter of copyright" not only those works enumerated in § 102(a), but
also other creative material that might have been protected by the
Act.
One appropriate area for preemption under § 301 that has
apparently not been the subject of reported decisions is state
protection for copying of useful articles, such as an attractive design
for a television set, for an automobile, or for clothing. In the
legislative deliberations that culminated in the passage of the 1976
Act, extensive consideration was given to possible protection for useful
articles or designs, and indeed, the Senate version of the bill that
became law contained a chapter affording such protection.
436
However, after the House-Senate conference, that provision was
dropped. 437 Instead, there are several sections in the 1976 Act that
expressly deny protection for useful articles.
438
435. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); see supra text accompanying note 420.
436. The Senate bill contained Title II, "Protection of Ornamental Designs of Useful
Articles." See S. 22, 94th Cong. §§ 201-235 (2d Sess. 1975).
437. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1733, at 82 (1976) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5823; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 49-50 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5662-63 (detailing the history of the deletion of the design protection
provision).
438. The Act defines "[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" to "include works of
artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects
are concerned." 17 U.S.C. § 101. The Act also incorporated preexisting case law, most
prominently Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (holding that artist or sculptor may obtain
copyright protection for statuettes intended to be used as bases for lamps and sold
commercially in bulk), by providing that "[t]his title does not afford, to the owner of
copyright in . . .a useful article as such, any greater or lesser rights with respect to the
making, distribution, or display of the useful article so portrayed than those afforded to
such works under the law ... in effect on December 31, 1977." 17 U.S.C. § 113(b). A "useful
article" is defined, in turn, as "an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not
merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information." Id. § 101; see
Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 413-18 (2d Cir. 1985) (denying
protection to styrofoam forms of human torsos that were used primarily by clothing stores
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This legislative history makes clear that Congress recognized
that useful articles were well within the "subject matter of copyright,"
but that various policy considerations compelled the determination not
to extend protection to them. As discussed below, state protection for
copying of various tangible objects is preempted under the "conflicts
preemption" doctrine unless the defendant has engaged in "passing
off' or the conduct results in consumer deception.439 However, in
addition, the same analysis that requires preemption of certain
"unoriginal" or "uncreative" works, or for various facts or ideas, should
compel preemption under § 301 of state protection against
unauthorized copying of useful articles. By expressly withholding
protection for creations within the broad "subject matter of copyright,"
Congress evidenced an intent that those works should be free of
restrictions that states might otherwise seek to impose on their use.
440
2. Fixation in Tangible Medium of Expression
Unlike the originality and creativity requirements already
discussed, the fixation requirement, which is found in § 102, is
arguably not constitutionally mandated. It is not clear that the
Copyright Clause in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution would
stand in the way of affording federal copyright protection to an
extemporaneous and unrecorded speech, musical work, or
choreographic work,441 and so, arguably, even these examples of
unfixed works could be within the "subject matter of copyright."
442
to display garments, and discussing the legislative history of the 1976 Act's withdrawal of
protection for utilitarian objects).
439. See infra text accompanying notes 463-476.
440. But cf. U-Neek, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 158, 174
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (declining to find preemption of claims for trade dress infringement,
dilution, unfair competition, and tortious interference based on defendant's alleged copying
of the design elements of plaintiffs clothing, and doing so, with respect to copyright
infringement claim, without discussing of possible lack of copyright protection for design of
garments).
441. See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e
decline to decide .. .whether the fixation concept of Copyright Clause can be expanded so
as to encompass live performances that are merely capable of being reduced to tangible
form, but have not been. For purposes of this case, we assume arguendo, without deciding,
that the above described problems with the fixation requirement would preclude the use of
the Copyright Clause as a source of Congressional power for the anti-bootlegging statute."
(internal citation omitted)).
442. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58-59 (1884)
(concluding that photographs were protectable as "writings"); see also SUBCOMM. ON
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS, S. COMM ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., STUDY
NO. 3: THE MEANING OF "WRITINGS" IN THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 84-
86 (Comm. Print 1960) (noting the liberal interpretation given to 'Writings" by Congress
and courts), reprinted in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 62-64 (Copyright Soc'y of U.S.A. 1963).
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The potential constitutional barrier to copyright protection for unfixed
works is that the Copyright Clause only authorizes Congress to give
copyright protection to the "[w]ritings" of an author. Therefore, a
work that is not "fixed" might be outside the scope of protectable
works. 443 In any event, there has been a long-standing legislative
judgment 444 that unfixed works may not obtain federal protection.
445
In part to fill this gap, a number of states have enacted
legislation affording rights with regard to certain unfixed works, by
prohibiting the unauthorized recording of sounds from live
performances or the unauthorized distribution or sale of those
recordings. 446  However, the policies underlying § 301, although
admittedly not its text, would counsel against such state protection.
During the period that the 1909 Act was in effect, although
unfixed works were outside the scope of federal protection, state
443. See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
("While the category of 'writings' has expanded over time, it has never moved into the
realm of unfixed works. The Framers of the Constitution created a system whereby only
fixed works were entitled to Copyright protection .... ), vacated, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir.
2007); see also KISS Catalog v. Passport Int'l Prods., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 831 (C.D. Cal.
2004) ("If 'writings' continues to exist as a constitutional limit, live performances cannot be
within the scope of that term."), vacated in part, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005);
David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1409 (1995) ("One basic
bedrock provision in the interpretation of [the Copyright] clause has been that its reference
to 'Writings' denotes fixation .... [N]o respectable interpretation of the word 'Writings'
embraces an untaped performance of someone singing at Carnegie Hall." (internal citations
omitted)). But see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 82 § 17.6.1, at 17:56 ("There is little doubt that
the performances subject to protection [by the federal anti-bootlegging statute, see infra
note 455,] are 'writings' in the constitutional sense for, beyond literalism, there is nothing
in the mechanical act of fixation to distinguish writings from nonwritings.").
444. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), at 52, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5665 ("As a basic condition of copyright protection, the bill perpetuates the existing
requirement that a work be fixed .... "); see also Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 4, 35
Stat. 1075, 1076 (superseded 1976) ("The works for which copyright may be secured under
this title shall include all the writings of an author.").
445. This doctrine is probably based in large part on these perceived constitutional
obstacles, and is perhaps also based in part on pragmatic considerations of the difficulty of
determining the identity and nature of the work that is the subject of protection, and of
what would constitute infringement of that work.
446. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-81 (LexisNexis 2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
3705 (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.11 (West 2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-7
(West 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3748 (1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:223 (2004 &
Supp. 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-21 (West 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16B-2
(LexisNexis 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-433 (2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.869 (2005); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 4116 (West 1984 & Supp. 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-915 (2003); TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.93 (Vernon 2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.25.030 (West
2005); W. VA. CODE § 61-3-50 (LexisNexis 2005). One California statute specifically confers
rights on the authors of works which have not been fixed. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(1)
(West 2007).
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protection for unfixed works was freely available. 447 The congressional
decision in 1976 to continue to deny federal protection for unfixed
works arguably might have been understood to reflect a determination
to change the existing practice, and to assert that no form of
protection, neither state nor federal, should be allowed for those
works. However, because § 301 preempts only works that "come
within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and
103,' 448 and because § 102 extends copyright protection only to works
of authorship that have been "fixed in any tangible medium of
expression,"449 the opposite is clearly true here: state protection for
unfixed works has been expressly reserved.
450
In light of the comparatively sweeping scope of preemption
under § 301-for example, of any work that falls within the broad
"subject matter" of copyright, even though the Constitution and/or the
1976 Act preclude affording protection to that work 451-the
congressional decision to continue to preserve common law copyright
protection for unfixed works, while explicable historically, is
analytically anomalous and even curious. To use an illustration: If a
customer at a nightclub at which a jazz musician is performing an
extemporaneous musical work makes an unauthorized tape recording
of that work, and if the musician does not also simultaneously make,
or authorize someone else to make, a recording of the work, the work
447. See Estate of Ernest Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 346
(N.Y. 1968) ("[Tlhe underlying rationale for common law copyright (i.e., the recognition
that a property status should attach to the fruits of intellectual labor) is applicable
regardless of whether such labor assumes tangible form."); see also Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 454, 457 (Ohio 1976) ("These statutory requirements [in
the Copyright Act of 1909, giving protection only to a 'writing'] do not restrict the common
law protection for unpublished works .... It has been suggested, for example, that non-
tangible oral expression should be protected by the common law, even though these are
outside the statute."), rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562 (1977); cf. King v. Mister
Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (finding that Martin Luther King's "I Have
A Dream" speech was not "published" and was entitled to common law copyright
protection); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 248 N.Y.S.2d
809, 812-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) (finding that a broadcaster did not lose common law
copyright protection against an unauthorized recording of his news announcement).
448. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
449. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
450. Any doubt that unfixed works are not preempted is made clear by § 301(b)(1):
Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common
law or statutes of any State with respect to ... subject matter that does not come
within the subject matter of copyright as specified by [§§] 102 and 103, including
works of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium of expression.
17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1) (emphasis added).
451. See supra text accompanying notes 416-417, 424-428.
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has not been "fixed."452  Although that customer has made an
unauthorized "reproduction" of the work,453 there will be no federal
right or remedy under the copyright laws. However, the musician
may have recourse for that act of infringement under state law. If, on
the other hand, the musician had also recorded, or authorized the
recording of, the work, the "fixation" requirement would be satisfied,
and the musician could now assert a claim only under federal law.
454
This outcome suffers from two failings. First, permitting a
state claim in the first situation is inconsistent with two of the goals of
the preemption provision of the 1976 Act. Instead of a uniform federal
rule, the existence and nature of the musician's rights and remedies
will continue to be governed by the varying laws of fifty different
jurisdictions. In addition, the duration of protection will be potentially
eternal, rather than the "limited term" provided for under federal
copyright law. 455 Second, allowing the alternative of state protection
452. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when
its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.").
453. See id. § 106(1). The owner of a copyrightable work has the exclusive right to
"reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords." Of course, here the work is not
copyrightable.
454. Professor Goldstein asserts-but without citing any authority, and also while
recognizing that there are arguments to the contrary-that "an actor, singer or musician
whose performance is being simultaneously fixed, but is not being transmitted, will have
no rights under the [1976] Act against someone in the audience who copies his
performance." 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 82, § 2.4, at 2:46. In the absence of contrary
authority, I would take the opposite position, as being consistent with the goals discussed
in the text.
455. In fact, as part of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Congress enacted two
"anti-bootlegging" provisions, creating quasi-copyright protection against the unauthorized
fixation, transmission, or distribution of a live musical performance. Pub. L. No. 103-465,
§§ 512-513, 108 Stat. 4809, 4974-76 (1994) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 1101, 18
U.S.C. §2319A (2000). This legislation provides both for civil remedies, see 17 U.S.C. §
1101, and enforcement through criminal prosecution. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A. However,
unlike the core copyright statute, there are no duration limitations under these federal
statutes.
Since these newly-created prohibitions are not contained in the Copyright Act, they do
not form the basis under § 301 for the preemption of any state protection. Indeed, the civil
portion expressly provides that "[n]othing in this section may be construed to annul or limit
any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State." 17 U.S.C. §
1101(d). Therefore, parallel state protection-which may well be of both a different scope
and a different duration than these federal rights-still remains available. Because of this
continued, and potentially inconsistent, state protection, and also because this federal
statute does not extend protection to similar uses of unfixed works other than musical
performances (for example, these provisions do not extend to the unauthorized recording of
an extemporaneous dance, pantomime act, or comedy sketch,) the absence of incentives to
fix the work, which step would be necessary to obtain federal protection, still exists; thus,
the analysis in the text, criticizing the availability of state protection, remains valid.
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for unfixed works is inconsistent with society's interest in expanding
the number and quality of works of authorship. The continued
existence of common law copyright gives the musician less incentive to
"fix" the work, and thus, there is less likelihood that others will have
access to it.
For all its deficiencies, this outcome clearly seems
contemplated by § 301.456 However, recognition of these failings would
Five reported decisions, by four courts, have considered challenges to the constitutionality
of the federal anti-bootlegging statute. Compare United States v. Martignon, 429 F.3d 140,
149-50 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2319A because it is not
a "copyright law," rather just "copyright-like," and noting that "Congress exceeds its power
under the Commerce Clause by transgressing limitations of the Copyright Clause only
when (1) the law it enacts is an exercise of the power granted Congress by the Copyright
Clause and (2) the resulting law violates one or more specific limits of the Copyright
Clause"), United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1274, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999)
(upholding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2319A while declining to decide whether
fixation is constitutionally required in order to obtain protection under the Copyright
Clause, and holding "that the Copyright Clause does not envision that Congress is
positively forbidden from extending copyright-like protection under other constitutional
clauses, such as the Commerce Clause, to works of authorship that may not meet the
fixation requirement inherent in the term 'Writings"'), and KISS Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport
Int'l Prods., Inc., 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1176-77 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (upholding the
constitutionality of 17 U.S.C. § 1101 upon reconsideration of an earlier decision), with KISS
Catalog v. Passport Int'l Prods., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 829-37 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that
17 U.S.C. § 1101 was unconstitutional because it failed to satisfy the fixed duration
requirement of the Copyright Clause and also is a "copyright-like" statute which could not
be enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause), and United States v. Martignon, 346 F.
Supp. 2d 413, 426-28 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2319A is unconstitutional
because it fails to satisfy both the writings and fixed duration requirements of the
Copyright Clause, and because it is a "copyright-like" statute, it also could not be enacted
pursuant to the Commerce Clause), vacated, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007). See generally
Susan M. Deas, Jazzing Up the Copyright Act? Resolving the Uncertainties of the United
States Anti-Bootlegging Law, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 567 (1998) (discussing 17
U.S.C. § 1101 and suggesting Congressional clarification); Adam Giuliano, Note, Steal This
Concert? The Federal Anti-Bootlegging Statute Gets Struck Down, But Not Out, 7 VAND. J.
ENT. L. & PRAC. 373 (2005) (arguing that the anti-bootlegging statutes are constitutional
and complement copyright regulation); Joseph P. Merschmann, Note, Anchoring Copyright
Laws in the Copyright Clause: Halting the Commerce Clause End Run Around Limits on
Congress' Copyright Power, 34 CONN. L. REV. 661 (2002) (asserting that the statutes
represent Congress's attempts to expand its copyright power); Andrew B. Peterson, Note,
To Bootleg or Not to Bootleg? Confusion Surrounding the Constitutionality of the Anti-
Bootlegging Act Continues, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 723 (2005) (discussing Congress's authority
for the anti-bootlegging statutes); Shue, Casenote, United States v. Martignon: The First
Case to Rule that the Federal Anti-Bootlegging Statute is Unconstitutional Copyright
Legislation, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 131 (2005) (agreeing with the district court's Martignon
decision).
456. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 131 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5747. ("[S]ection 301(b) explicitly preserves common law copyright protection for one
important class of works: works that have not been 'fixed in any tangible medium of
expression.' . . . [Unfixed works] would continue to be subject to protection under State
statute or common law until fixed in tangible form.").
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dictate the desirability of congressional reexamination of the
preservation of common law copyright for claims for unfixed works.
III. NON-STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL BASES FOR PREEMPTION
As previously emphasized, there is a strong federal interest in
uniform national treatment of copyright-uniformity both in the
works that are protectable and what rights the copyright owner will
have therein, and in what is not protectable.4 57 The scope of protection
conferred, as well as the areas left unprotected and the rights not
afforded, are the product of extensive debates and multiple
compromises, and they constitute a deliberately crafted balance of
interests. They reflect legislative judgments about the rights of
authors and owners of copyrights, and instances in which the interests
of users and potential creators of new works should prevail over those
of the copyright owner. These judgments will be severely impaired if
state law can provide a cause of action for, and thus, can prohibit, the
same conduct that federal law leaves unprotected, or alternatively, if
state law limits the rights and protections afforded by federal law.
Preemption of state law does not occur only pursuant to
express provisions in federal statutes such as § 301. Preemption will
also occur when the U.S. Constitution or other federal legislation
evidences the Framers' intent or a congressional intent to occupy fully
the area in question, and to leave no room for supplemental state
regulation, or when there is a fundamental incompatibility between
state and federal law.458 This principle has important implications for
copyright preemption, and it may require the displacement of claims
457. This uniformity is important to advance federal goals, reflected in the
Copyright Clause, of promoting the creation and expanding the range of works available to
the public. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
458. The Supreme Court has explained:
Under the Supremacy Clause, the enforcement of a state regulation may be pre-
empted by federal law in several circumstances: first, when Congress, in
enacting a federal statute, has expressed a clear intent to pre-empt state law;
second, when it is clear, despite the absence of explicit preemptive language, that
Congress has intended, by legislating comprehensively, to occupy an entire field
of regulation and has thereby "left no room for the States to supplement" federal
law; and finally, when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible,
or when the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 698-99 (1984) (internal citations omitted);
see also Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (restating this test
and noting that "[w]e will find preemption where it is impossible for a private party to
comply with both state and federal law").
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under state law even if they would not run afoul of § 301. 459
Regardless of whether a state claim is preempted by that provision,
preemption should also occur if recognition of the state claim would
impede the panoply of goals advanced by the copyright laws.460
Conversely, it also impermissibly interferes with federal interests and
goals when state law attempts to limit the rights conferred on
copyright owners by federal law; here too, the supremacy of federal
interests should preempt such inconsistent state regulation.
One potential response to this call for enhanced preemption on
federal constitutional or other nonstatutory grounds is that the
formulation in § 301 is indicative of a legislative determination of the
appropriate balance between federal and state law. Arguably, any
further curtailment of state claims by judicial application of these
other grounds could be viewed as overreaching.
An easy answer is that, under the Supremacy Clause, the
Constitution, and federal law passed thereunder, including the
Copyright Act, trumps inconsistent state law. 461 Therefore, allowing a
state claim inconsistent with constitutional norms to proceed would be
impermissible, regardless of the presence or absence of a specific
federal preemption statute.462 In response, it might be argued that
the coexistence of state and federal copyright for the majority of the
history of the Republic undercuts the suggestion that permitting some
range of state claims would be unconstitutional. However, because
common law copyright only extended to works not distributed to the
public, even the pre-1976 system contemplated that works that were
exploited commercially could only obtain federal protection.
Furthermore, that protection was subject to all of the formalities and
459. See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Dyk,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("The test for preemption by copyright law ...
should be whether the state law 'substantially impedes the public use of the otherwise
unprotected' material." (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 157 (1989))).
460. See Kathleen K. Olson, Preserving the Copyright Balance: Statutory and
Constitutional Preemption of Contract-Based Claims, 11 COMM. L. & POL'Y 83, 86 (2006)
(concluding that the "current application of [§J 301 preemption is not sufficient to protect
long-standing principles in the copyright law that are at risk from the increased use of
contracts to displace default copyright laws," and calling for a "return to Supremacy Clause
preemption").
461. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land
. . . . .).
462. For example, in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., the Supreme Court held
that, even if a state law cause of action was not barred by a specific statutory preemption
provision, the existence of "gaps" in such a provision "does not foreclose (through negative
implication) 'any possibility of implied [conflict] pre-emption."' 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000)
(quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995)).
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limitations of the federal copyright regime. The constitutional
tradeoff-federal protection, of finite duration, but only for certain
works and affording only certain rights and remedies-is
impermissibly altered by inconsistent state protection for works
within the realm of copyright.
A second, and better, answer is that the goals and values
reflected in the Copyright Clause, and the added goal of not impairing
the federal objectives of the 1976 Act, should inform both the scope of
the statutory prescription of § 301 and of non-statutory "conflict
preemption." Thus, for example, not only is it improper to afford
copyright protection of infinite duration when the Constitution
contemplates that authors will receive protection for "limited times,"
indeed, it is also improper to permit states to afford protection to
intellectual property falling within the broad realm of copyrightable
materials, when Congress has determined not to afford those rights; it
is also improper for the states to abridge rights conferred by the
federal Copyright Act of 1976. In all of these situations, inconsistent
state treatment of copyrightable materials would undercut the
primacy of federal regulation and would thus undermine vital federal
interests.
There are a number of different bases for making a judgment
that the availability and scope of protection for copyrightable
materials should be determined exclusively by federal law, including
the Constitution, a particular statute, or the fabric of federalism. A
principal theme of this Article is that allowing state law claims to
proceed in the face of that judgment interferes with the important goal
of national uniformity, and thus, those claims must be foreclosed. The
most direct support for the preemption, on federalism and
constitutional grounds, of attempts by states to afford rights with
respect to works within the ambit of, but eventually unprotected by,
the federal intellectual property regime is found in the Sears-Compco
line of cases.
In two 1964 decisions, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 463 and
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,464 the Supreme Court held
that, "when an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state
law may not forbid others to copy that article."465 In both cases, the
plaintiff had asserted unfair competition claims, based solely on the
defendant's copying of articles that were not covered by design or
463. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
464. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
465. Id. at 237.
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mechanical patents. 466 The Court strongly rejected the prosecution of
those state law claims,467 concluding that allowing states to afford
protection to works that, under federal law, were in the public domain
was foreclosed because such protection would "clasho with the
objectives of the federal patent laws."468  Even in the absence of a
statutory prohibition like § 301 of the 1976 Act,469 federal interests
and federal policy are the exclusive determinants of permitted and
prohibited conduct, 470 and it is 'familiar doctrine' that the federal
policy 'may not be set at naught, or its benefits denied,' by the state
law." 4 7 1
Since 1964, the Supreme Court has had several occasions to
review the non-statutory preemption of the patent or copyright
laws.472 In its most recent such decision, Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc.,473 the Court acknowledged that "[t]he pre-emptive
sweep of our decisions in Sears and Compco has been the subject of
466. See id. at 234-35; Sears, 376 U.S. at 226.
467. See Sears, 376 U.S. at 231. The Court indicated that a different result might
have been obtained if the defendants had engaged in "palming off' or had failed "to take
precautions to identify their products as their own." Compco, 376 U.S. at 238.
468. Sears, 376 U.S. at 231 ("Just as a State cannot encroach upon the federal
patent laws directly, it cannot, under some other law, such as that forbidding unfair
competition, give protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives of the federal patent
laws."); cf. Coker v. Purdue Pharma Co., No. W2005-02525-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3438082,
at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2006) (holding that, under the Supremacy Clause, state
antitrust and unfair competition claims, based on the defendants' conduct before the
Patent Office, were preempted by federal patent laws).
469. The Sears and Compco decisions predated the passage of § 301 by more than a
decade. And, in these cases the clash was between state law and the federal patent regime,
under which there has never been a statutory preemption provision. See Compco, 376 U.S.
at 234; Sears, 376 U.S. at 225.
470. See Compco, 376 U.S. at 237 ("To forbid copying would interfere with the
federal policy, found in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 of the Constitution, and in the implementing federal
statutes, of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws
leave in the public domain."); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 152 (1989) ("[O]ur past decisions have made clear that state regulation of
intellectual property must yield to the extent that it clashes with the balance struck by
Congress in our patent laws.").
471. Sears, 376 U.S. at 229 (quoting Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S.
172, 173 (1942)).
472. See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 260, 266 (1979)
(holding that federal patent law did not preempt state law permitting enforcement of a
contract requiring payment of royalties to patent applicant, even after patent application
was rejected); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974) (holding that state
trade secret protection is not preempted by operation of the federal patent laws); Goldstein
v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 571 (1973) (reaffirming Sears and Compco and holding that
federal copyright law, which until 1972 did not give protection to sound recordings, did not
preempt criminal conviction under state statutes for 1971 acts of "record piracy" and "tape
piracy"); see also supra notes 70-72(further discussing Goldstein).
473. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
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heated scholarly and judicial debate,"474 and it sought to make clear
that some state regulation of intellectual property was not
foreclosed.475 However, in affirming a decision by the Florida Supreme
Court that had struck down a state statute that purported to confer
protection for unauthorized copying of the designs of boat hulls beyond
that available under the patent laws, the Court endorsed its Sears-
Compco holding reasserting that states could not give protection to
intellectual creations that did not qualify for that protection under
federal law. 4
76
Although Sears and Compco involved preemption by the patent
regime, similar concerns are raised by state laws that interfere with
the copyright laws. Not only is the constitutional authority to enact
both bodies of law found in the same provision in Article I, but also
their goals of advancing America's intellectual and cultural resources
by giving exclusive rights of limited duration as a reward for creativity
are similar. Thus, it is not surprising that the Sears and Compco
decisions made multiple references to the copyright laws. 477 There is
no reason to believe that the Supreme Court's recognition of the
primacy of federal interests over inconsistent state law to delimit the
scope of patent rights does not apply equally to the copyright regime.
474. Id. at 154.
475. The Court referred, for example, to its statement in Sears that states could
make actionable conduct which would mislead consumers about the source of a product.
See id. (quoting Sears, 376 U.S. at 232); accord supra text accompanying note 467. In
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., the Court articulated a different standard for
nonstatutory preemption:
States may hold diverse viewpoints in protecting intellectual property to
invention as they do in protecting the intellectual property relating to the subject
matter of copyright. The only limitation on the States is that in regulating the
area of patents and copyrights they do not conflict with the operation of the laws
in this area passed by Congress ....
416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974).
476. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156 ("[Wle believe that the Sears Court correctly
concluded that the States may not offer patent-like protection to intellectual creations
which would otherwise remain unprotected as a matter of federal law.").
477. For example, the Court asserted that "the patent system is one in which
uniform federal standards are carefully used to promote invention while at the same time
preserving free competition." Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230-31
(1964). To support this proposition, the Court added in a footnote:
The purpose of Congress to have national uniformity in patent and copyright
laws can be inferred from such statutes as that which vests exclusive jurisdiction
to hear patent and copyright cases in federal courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), and
that section of the Copyright Act which expressly saves state protection of
unpublished writings but does not include published writings, 17 U.S.C. § 2.
Id. at 231 n.7 (emphasis added).
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The Ninth Circuit's ill-advised decision in Wendt v. Host
International478 illustrates the serious problems created by permitting
a state law claim in an area also occupied by the federal copyright
regime. The conduct challenged-the alleged unauthorized use of the
plaintiffs' likenesses in animatronic figures-may have occurred both
inside and outside of California. Yet, that state's right of publicity
laws were invoked to determine the plaintiffs' rights not only in
California, but also in Missouri and Ohio, in the face of contrary rights
conferred on the defendants by the federal Copyright Act. 479
Regardless of whether § 301 expressly preempted the plaintiffs'
claim,480 it is destructive of the important goal of national uniformity
to allow a single state, by purporting to recognize rights and to afford
protection for certain activities, to impose duties or foreclose the
exploitation of intellectual property rights throughout the United
States. Under the doctrine of conflict preemption, the nature and
scope of those rights should have been determined solely under one,
uniform federal body of law. 48 1
The Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp case,48 2 by contrast,
demonstrates the proper judicial response to a state statute-here
Oklahoma's-that had the effect of limiting federally afforded rights
and thus, resulted in an improper interference with the balance of
interests carefully crafted by federal law. The 1976 Act made several
changes in the legal treatment previously given, under the 1909 Act,
to the unauthorized retransmission of distant broadcast (i.e., over-the-
air) signals by cable television companies. 48 3 On the one hand, the
1976 Act changed prior law by defining such retransmission as a
"performance,"48 4 and thus, included control over that conduct among
478. 50 F.3d 18, 1995 WL 115571 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision), rev'd,
125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997); see also supra text accompanying notes 312-318 (further
discussing Wendt).
479. See Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from order rejecting suggestion for rehearing en banc) ("Plaintiffs are using
California law to stop Host from displaying a copyrighted work in Kansas City and
Cleveland. Why California should set the national standard for what is a permissible use of
a licensed derivative work is beyond me.").
480. As argued above, it should. See supra text accompanying notes 312-318.
481. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269-70 (5th Cir. 1988)
(concluding that a breach of licensing agreement by the owner of a copyright in computer
software, based on defendant's unauthorized copying and modification of that software,
was preempted by the Sears-Compco line of cases); see also supra text accompanying notes
269-278 (further discussing Vault).
482. 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
483. See id. at 709-10.
484. See id. at 710, 710 n.14. In Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. and Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., which were decided
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the exclusive rights of the copyright owner. 48 5 On the other hand, the
1976 Act also limited the "exclusive" nature of that right, by creating
an elaborate system for the compulsory licensing of that right to cable
companies.
486
One statutory condition of these "licenses" was that the cable
company had to refrain from deleting or altering any commercial
advertising in the broadcast signals being retransmitted. 48 7
Oklahoma law broadly prohibited the advertisement of alcoholic
beverages. 488 The Oklahoma Attorney General issued an opinion that
the retransmission by cable companies of out-of-state alcoholic
beverage advertising would subject them to criminal prosecution-
thus, as a practical matter, barring them from transmitting any
programming containing such advertisements. 48 9 The Supreme Court
unanimously concluded that Oklahoma law was preempted, since it
interfered with two goals of the copyright regime49 0-- promoting broad
availability to the public of copyrighted materials and permitting
copyright owners to obtain rewards for the use of their works. 491
Although the goal of the Oklahoma law may have been laudable, the
Court correctly decided that it had to yield to the superior federal
interests embodied in the federal legislation. Achievement of those
federal goals would have been thwarted if the cable companies had to
comply with state regulation.
492
under the Copyright Act of 1909, the Court had held that such retransmission was not
actionable, since the cable companies' behavior was passive (akin to viewing the program),
and did not constitute a "performance." See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys.,
Inc., 415 U.S. U.S. 394, 405 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392
U.S. 390, 399-400 (1968).
485. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000) (copyright owner of motion pictures and other
audiovisual works has exclusive right to "perform the copyrighted work publicly"); see also
17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "perform").
486. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 111 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007).
487. See id. § 111(c)(3).
488. Capital Cities, 467 U.S. at 694 (noting that the source of this prohibition was
the Oklahoma constitution and implementing statutes).
489. See id. at 695.
490. The Court's opinion made no mention of § 301(a) as a basis for preemption,
relying solely on a "conflicts preemption" analysis. See id. at 698-99.
491. In fact, at least three copyright-related interests were adversely affected by
state law-the interests of the copyright owners in being able to distribute (license) their
works and obtain royalties therefor, of the cable companies in being able to perform
(retransmit) those works, and of the public in being able to view the works. See id. at 710-
11.
492. Of course, it is possible for cable systems to comply with the Oklahoma ban by
simply abandoning their importation of the distant broadcast signals covered by the
Copyright Act. But such a loss of viewing options would plainly thwart the policy identified
by both Congress and the FCC of facilitating and encouraging the importation of distant
broadcast signals. See id. at 711.
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The principle that state law should be preempted based on the
supremacy of the federal copyright regime, when that state law
abridges rights conferred by federal law on copyright owners, is also
illustrated in Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp.493 In an attempt, in
part, to protect operators of smaller movie theaters, Pennsylvania had
enacted legislation requiring distributors of motion pictures to expand
the distribution of movies. After the grant of a maximum of six weeks
of exclusive first-run rights, the statute mandated that distributors of
the movie had to license other theaters in the same geographic area.
494
In an en banc opinion, the Third Circuit correctly held that this state
statute was preempted by the Copyright Act, because it improperly
limited the exclusive right of distribution conferred by the Act on
copyright owners. 495 Here, § 301(a) preemption was probably not at
issue, since state law was not conferring a right "equivalent to" federal
copyright, but rather was withdrawing some of those rights.
496
Nonetheless, the Pennsylvania statute was properly preempted, since
the state's abridgement of the distributors' rights was in fundamental
conflict with the federal conferral of those rights. 497 The statute
irreconcilably interfered with the incentive to create and innovate
493. 189 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc).
494. See 73 PA. CONS. SWAT. ANN. § 203-7 (West 1993).
495. See Orson, 189 F.3d at 398 ("[T]he state may not mandate distribution and
reproduction of a copyrighted work in the face of the exclusive rights to distribution
granted under § 106.").
496. Section 301(a) provides that "all legal and equitable rights that are equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright ... are governed
exclusively by this title." 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000) (emphasis added). Here, the "rights"
involved were those of the copyright owners to control the distribution of their works-
which federal law granted, and which state law limited-and arguably of the second-run
movie distributors, to obtain distribution rights at an earlier stage than they would have
had absent the state statute. The Third Circuit stated that, "[a]lthough both [express
preemption and conflict preemption] may be applicable, because our analysis more closely
parallels that used in cases applying conflict principles, we proceed on that ground." Orson,
189 F.3d at 383.
497. In an earlier challenge to the Pennsylvania statute, Associated Film
Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, the Third Circuit had rejected a claim that the statute
was facially inconsistent with the federal Copyright Act, but remanded the action for a
determination of its actual effect on the copyright owners' rights and incentives. 683 F.2d
808, 816-17 (3d Cir. 1982). After the district court upheld the statute, the Third Circuit
affirmed, applying its rule that required it to adhere to the earlier panel decision upholding
the statute. Assoc. Film Dist. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 800 F.2d 369, 375-76 (3d Cir. 1986),
aff'g, 614 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1985). Because the Orson decision was decided by the
Third Circuit sitting en banc, the court was not similarly bound by its earlier decision.
Orson, 189 F.3d at 380; see also Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656, 658,
662-63 (6th Cir. 1982) (rejecting the assertion that an Ohio statute outlawing "blind
bidding' by movie exhibitors, instead mandating that motion picture suppliers screen their
films for exhibitors prior to negotiations or bidding, was preempted by the Copyright Act of
1976).
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underlying the federal copyright regime, as well as with the balance of
interests, between copyright owners and others, established by the
Copyright Act.
498
Far more questionable, then, was the Fifth Circuit's opposite
resolution of this conflict in Rodrigue v. Rodrigue.499  The case
involved a dispute between the creator of copyrighted paintings and
his former wife-both of whom had resided in Louisiana, a community
property state-to determine her rights in those paintings. 500 At issue
was whether Louisiana law, which provided that "property acquired
during the existence of the legal regime through the effort, skill, or
industry of either spouse" is community property, 50 1 and also that
"[e]ach spouse owns an undivided one-half interest in former
community property and its fruits and products,"50 2 was preempted by
its conflict with § 201 of the 1976 Act, which provides that "[clopyright
498. Similar concerns were raised in Association of American Medical Colleges v.
Cuomo, 928 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1991). The plaintiff AAMC was the copyright owner and
administrator of the Medical College Admission Test (MCAT), the test that is required for
applicants to virtually all American medical schools. Id. at 521. AAMC's longstanding
policy was not to reveal questions or answers from prior MCAT exams; in response, New
York passed a statute-the Standardized Testing Act (STA)-which would effectively have
required, inter alia, their public disclosure. See id. at 521-22. AAMC asserted that the
statute was preempted because it conflicted with the protections given to AAMC by the
1976 Act-the exclusive right to publish, copy, and distribute (and presumably the right
not to distribute) its materials. Id. at 523. The Second Circuit framed the issue as "whether
the disclosure of the MCAT facilitated by the STA infringes on the copyrights held by
AAMC. If the STA facilitates infringement, it conflicts with the federal Copyright Act and
is preempted." Id. The court recognized that, under the Supremacy Clause, preemption was
appropriate if the "state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."' Id. at 522-23 (quoting Darling v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 864 F.2d 981, 986 (2d Cir. 1989)). Although the district court had found that the
requisite infringement took place, and thus concluded that the New York statute was
preempted, the court of appeals reversed and remanded for further consideration of the
"fair use" defense to determine whether, under the facts, it would shield the State from
copyright infringement. See id. at 525-26; cf. Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F.
Supp. 2d 1195, 1198, 1205-06 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (dismissing an action by website operators
alleging tortious interference resulting from their contractual relations with their Internet
service providers (ISPs) based on the defendant's complaints to those ISPs of plaintiffs'
allegedly infringing activities on the grounds that allowing the state law claim would act as
an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's goals in enacting the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act).
499. 218 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2000). See generally Dane S. Ciolino, How Copyrights
Became Community Property (Sort Of): Through the Rodrigue v. Rodrigue Looking Glass,
47 LoY. L. REV. 631, 633 (2001) (characterizing Rodrigue opinion as "egregiously wrong");
Joseph P. Reid, Comment, Rodrigue v. Rodrigue: Another Copyright and Community
Property Case Worth-y of Controversy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183 (2000) (discussing the
district court decision and its implications on community property law).
500. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d at 433-44.
501. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2338 (1985).
502. Id. art. 2369.2 (Supp. 2007)
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in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or
authors of the work. '50 3 After first holding that the application of
these statutory provisions to copyrighted works was not preempted by
§ 301,504 the court of appeals also rejected a conflict preemption
argument by inappropriately narrowing the rights conferred by the
Act on the creator of a copyrighted work, thus permitting the
conclusion that federal law did not "ineluctably conflict" with
Louisiana's matrimonial property law.50 5 This result was achieved in
503. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000).
504. See Rodrigue, 218 F.3d at 439-40. The court correctly noted that § 301 operates
only when the state law governs rights that are "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright" Id. at 439 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 301(a)). But, because
the court concluded that the 1976 Act was silent on the right to receive economic benefits
from ownership of the copyright, it held that a state law which gave half of those benefits
to the author's former spouse was not "equivalent to" any of the statutorily conferred
rights. See id. at 435-36. In order to reach this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit was forced to
give an excruciatingly tortured reading to the language of § 201(a). The court stated that
although § 201(a) "vests" the bundle of five rights which are specified in § 106 in the
author, that former provision did not give him all of the attributes of "ownership." Id. It
reached this conclusion, notwithstanding the fact that § 201 is captioned "Ownership of
Copyright," and that the second sentence of § 201(a) provides that "[t]he authors of a joint
work are coowners of copyright in the work." 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (emphasis added). And, this
conclusion is contrary to the Supreme Court's statement that "[t]he Copyright Act of 1976
provides that copyright ownership 'vests initially in the author or authors of the work."'
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989) (quoting 17 U.S.C. §
201(a)).
Even more bizarrely, the court reached the remarkable conclusion that "none of these
[five] rights [in § 106] either expressly or implicitly include the exclusive right to enjoy
income or any of the other economic benefits produced by or derived from copyrights."
Rodrigue, 218 F.3d at 435. It is downright foolish to suggest that the 1976 Act confers no
right on the copyright owner to exploit his copyright commercially. Thus, for example, does
it make sense to say that the Act gives him the right to distribute copies of the work, but
that the statute is genuinely silent on whether he has the right to obtain economic benefits
therefrom? What will he do, merely display the copyright certificate in a frame on the wall
of his living room? That conclusion is also inconsistent with the language of the Act. For
example, § 106 provides that the owner of copyright "has the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize any of the following." 17 U.S.C. § 106 (emphasis added). The logical assumption
is that the copyright owner will be able to obtain some financial reward for giving that
authorization. Finally, § 201(d) allows the owner of copyright to transfer any of the rights
specified in § 106, in whole or in part-and presumably for consideration.
The Rodrigue court also asserted, "[o]ur conclusion is buttressed by the explicit
clarification in § 301(b)(3) . . . that the preemptive effect does not extend beyond the subject
matter of the Act." Rodrigue, 218 F.3d at 440. As discussed above that provision, which is
merely the mirror side of § 301(a), in fact adds nothing. See supra text accompanying notes
52-53.
505. See Rodrigue, 218 F.3d at 436, 440. The outcome was similar to one previously
reached by a California court, albeit on somewhat different grounds, in Worth v. Worth, 241
Cal. Rptr. 135, 139-140 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). See generally Debora Polacheck, The "Un-
Worth-y Decision: The Characterization of a Copyright as Community Property, 17
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 601 (1995) (arguing for preemption in the context of
community property law); Roberts, Note, Worthy of Rejection: Copyright as Community
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part by recognizing the author-spouse's exclusive management control
over the works, 506 and by giving to the non-author-spouse a one-half
interest only in the economic benefits from exploitation of the
works.
50 7
However, this conflict preemption analysis still fails. There
were several respects in which federal interests might have been
significantly affected by dividing the copyright ownership and
depriving the author of one-half of the benefits therefrom, which
would have argued for the displacement of the state law.50 8 Even
though the court of appeals' Solomonic solution nominally gave the
author-spouse the exclusive right to sell or license the works, would-
be purchasers or licensees might still be hesitant to enter into such
transactions because of the lurking interests of another party, who
might subsequently assert claims against them, including possibly
exercising the right granted by § 203 to terminate transfers and
licenses. 509 And, more importantly, the incentive of many authors to
create new works-an objective expressly found in the Copyright
Clause of the Constitution as the basis for authorizing copyright
protection-might well be diminished by the author's realization that
the financial benefits of that creativity will automatically be cut in
half by state law.510
Property, 100 YALE L. J. 1053 (1991) (discussing the constitutionality of treating copyright
ownership as community property).
506. See Rodrigue, 218 F.3d at 437 ("The author-spouse alone holds the elements of
usus and abusus-a combination that comprises the exclusive rights to possess, use,
transfer, alienate, and encumber the copyright as he sees fit-free of any management,
consent, or participation of the non-author spouse.").
507. See id. at 439; see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369.2 (Supp. 2007).
508. The court of appeals relied on the Supreme Court's statement in Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) that "[sitate family and family-property law must do
'major damage' to 'clear and substantial' federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will
demand that state law be overridden," for the proposition that preemption is less
appropriate where the state has legislated with respect to marital rights and property.
Rodrigue, 218 F.3d at 581. But, in fact, in Hisquierdo, the Court held that benefits payable
to an employee under the federal Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 were not subject to
division under California's community property law. See Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 590.
Indeed, Justice Blackmun's opinion noted that "on at least four prior occasions this Court
has found it necessary to forestall such an injury to federal rights by state law based on
community property concepts." Id. at 582. Rodrigue made no attempt to distinguish
Hisquierdo.
509. The grant of a transfer or license of copyright may be terminated by the author
or, if he has died, by his heirs, during a five-year period, beginning at the end of thirty-five
years from the date of the execution of the grant. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a).
510. The court recognized, but then gave short shrift to, two incentives which
arguably might be diminished by application of Louisiana's law-to create new works, and
to exploit existing works. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d at 441-42. As to the latter possibility, the
court concluded that, even after a divorce, most authors would want to continue to
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In summary, it is true that, in most situations, a non-statutory,
or conflicts, preemption analysis will reach the same result as under §
301.511 However, because this approach to preemption involves the
consideration of some interests that are not fully accounted for under
the statutory standard for preemption, courts should not feel that
their task is necessarily complete simply because they have
undertaken the analysis required by § 301. Instead, non-statutory
analysis may also be required to balance the full range of interests
maximize the economic value of their copyrights, even if those benefits had to be shared
with a former spouse, "rather than cutting off their noses to spite their faces by letting
copyrighted works languish." Id. at 442. As to the former possibility-the disincentive to
creation-the court simply asserted:
[W]e decline to assume globally that the commercial and economic interests of
spouses during marriage are so at odds that one spouse would be disinclined to
create copyrightable works merely because the economic benefits of his
endeavors would inure to the benefit of their community rather than to his
separate estate.
Id. Apart from the fact that this conclusion was the product of intuition rather than
evidence, the court failed to account for the strong disincentive which will flow from the
prospective application of its rule. After this decision, an author, particularly one in a
"fragile" marriage, who is mindful of the rule announced by this court, might well be more
reluctant to create new works, cognizant of the fact that he or she would continue to have
to share half of the economic benefits with a former spouse, even if the marriage were
terminated.
Furthermore, the court completely ignored the post-divorce disincentive problem-one
which becomes particularly acute in a situation like Rodrigue's. Many of his paintings were
based on a common character, mostly notably the so-called "blue dog," which was first
developed during the marriage, and thus, became "community property" under the court's
holding. Id. at 433. An entirely new painting, created after the divorce, but based on that
character, would most likely be a derivative work. Even if the court's solution did not
require Rodrigue first to get permission from his former wife to create that work-and that
is not clear-he would certainly be aware that he probably would have to pay her a portion
of the sales price of that new painting. Thus, Rodrigue's incentive to create new works
based on pre-divorce themes, as opposed to having to develop new characters, would be
substantially altered.
511. See, e.g., Carson v. Dynergy, Inc., 344 F.3d 446, 457 (5th Cir. 2003) (concluding
that "there is no colorable claim that conflict preemption applies [to a conversion claim for
the refusal to return a tangible copy of a copyrighted work] as Texas's protecting rights in
physical property in this way does not 'obstructo the accomplishment of the full purposes
and objectives of the Copyright act" (quoting Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 659 (5th Cir.
2000))); Brown, 201 F.3d at 659-61 (holding that a misappropriation claim, based on
defendants' unauthorized use of plaintiffs' persona to promote the sales of unlawfully made
cassettes and CDs of musical works and sound recordings on which plaintiffs retained
copyright, was not subject to non-statutory preemption since state law would have allowed
a valid holder or licensee of copyright in works to use plaintiffs' names and likenesses to
promote sales of those works, goals of federal copyright system, and state law regime were
not in conflict); Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 2d
1291, 1304-05 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (rejecting a preemption claim and noting that state laws
regulating wagering and telecasts of horseraces "do not stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of Congress' full purpose and objectives" in enacting copyright laws), affld,
479 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2007).
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and values of the federal and state governments in the copyright
area.512 As the Supreme Court recognized in Sears and Compco,
states are forbidden to create or deny rights that would yield outcomes
inconsistent with federal policy. 513 Therefore, when state protection
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress,"5 14 preemption under the
Supremacy Clause is mandated.
IV. CONCLUSION
The aspiration of the drafters of § 301 of the Copyright Act-to
create a provision that would express the scope of preemption "in the
clearest and most unequivocal language possible, so as to foreclose any
conceivable misinterpretation .... and to avoid the development of
any vague borderline areas between State and Federal protection"
515-
has unfortunately not been realized. Instead, inconsistency and
incoherency have flourished.
This is partly because the drafters of any statute always lack
the prescience to anticipate the variety of legal issues that will be
presented by application of the statute to a multitude of factual
situations. Although some uncertainty about the scope of preemption
of state copyright is probably inevitable, this uncertainty could be
reduced by increased judicial attention to the objectives underlying
the statutory provision. In particular, § 301 is intended to advance
uniformity in the scope of copyright protection by bringing the vast
majority of copyright law within a single, federal regime. This goal
requires yielding to the judgments made by Congress about the kinds
of copyright-like works for which protection will (and will not) be
available; the rights available (and not available) to the owners of
these forms of intellectual property; the actions that will (and will not)
512. See Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 638-39 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding
that a breach of contract action was not barred by the conflict preemption doctrine); see
also supra notes 282-288 (discussing Davidson & Assocs.); cf. Roy Exp. Co. v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1150-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that an unfair
competition claim arising from the pre-1978 copying of motion pictures was not preempted,
because the claim required evidence of commercial immorality and defendant's bad faith),
aff'd, 672 F.2d 1095, 1105-06 (2d Cir. 1980). But see Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve
Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 946-48 (W.D. Tex. 1982) (reinforcing a dubious refusal to apply
preemption under § 301 with non-statutory analysis, and concluding that "[p]laintiffs'
action [did] not unreasonably interfere or conflict with federal copyright policy").
513. See supra text accompanying notes 463-472.
514. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
515. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 130 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5746 (emphasis added).
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constitute an infringement of those rights; and finally, the remedies
that will (and will not) be available in the event of infringement.
Express invocation of a strong presumption that federal law will
control, and that state law must yield in arguably close situations,
should simultaneously advance the policies underlying preemption
and advance the goal of certainty spoken of so fondly thirty years ago.

